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ABSTRACT 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY, RIGHTS TO BUY, AND LAND LAW REFORM 
 
This dissertation examines the application and effect of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
ECHR in relation to Scots land law reform. Chapter one will reflect on why existing rights to 
property have come to be challenged. Chapter two sets out the human rights paradigm and 
scrutinises what rights and whose rights are engaged. Chapter three traces the development of 
A1P1. Chapter four applies the human rights paradigm to contemporary reforms. Chapter five 
considers the broader effect A1P1 has had on domestic property law.  
 
This dissertation submits that the problem to be overcome is that, in many instances, Scots land 
law reform has been reduced into a simplistic struggle. A1P1 has been held up as either a citadel 
protecting landowners or as an ineffective and unjustified right to be ignored. At the core of this 
debate are competing claims between liberal individualist rights to property and socially 
democratic, egalitarian goals.  
 
This dissertation argues that it is important to move beyond this binary debate. This is not about 
finding some mysterious “red card” or eureka moment that conclusively shows compatibility or 
incompatibility. Instead, compatibility will be determined by following a rule-based approach that 
values rational decision-making and the best available evidence, as well as the importance of 
democratic institutions. As such, it will be illustrated how future challenges are likely to focus not 
on the underlying purpose of land law reform but on the macro or micro granularity of Ministerial 
discretion. In coming to this conclusion, it will be argued that A1P1 has a pervasive influence on 
the entire workings of all public bodies and, like a dye, permeates the legislative process.  
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Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law 
and by the general principles of international law.  
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as 
it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.1 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights   
Land reform in Scotland is hard to do at this time because of the European convention on human rights. I 
am not in any sense against the ECHR, but as we heard at the start of the debate, land reform post-ECHR 
tends to be focused on individuals’ property rights… article 1, protocol 1 on rights in relation to property. 
That does not mean that we should not try to undertake radical land reform in Scotland— of course we 
should. Our constituents want it—my constituents want it and people across the country want it—but it is 
hard to do.2 
The Scottish Parliament, Official Reports, Meeting of the Parliament, 16 March 2016, col. 51. (Michael Russell MSP) 
1.1 OVERVIEW  
 
The establishment of the Scottish Executive in 1999 has resulted in twenty years of momentous 
land law reform. Arguably the most controversial part of this reform has been the introduction of 
legislation that gives communities, crofters, and agricultural tenants the pre-emptive and 
conditional right to purchase land and ancillary rights. The ability of states to expropriate property, 
whether directly or indirectly through third parties, is not a new phenomenon. This process is 
known by many names: compulsory purchase, eminent domain, and rights to buy. The ownership 
and distribution of land in Scotland has inspired passion and intrigue. It is this present-day discord 
that makes contemporary Scots rights to buy a particularly apt prism through which to examine 
the application and effect of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession in Article 1 of the 
First Protocol (“A1P1”) to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). 
 
                                               
1 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952, 213 
U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter “A1P1”]; Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 [hereinafter 
“ECHR”].  
2 SP, OR, 16 March 2016, col. 51.  
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Land law and human rights were, for a long time, considered to be unconnected jurisprudential 
concerns. In particular, the native origins of land law and the conception of a land lawyer as a 
private lawyer made the supranational public law dimension of human rights appear quite 
unrelated. Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) the ECHR only had a limited impact on 
Scots law. This has, however, changed with the Scotland Act 1998 (“SA 1998”), HRA and several 
high-profile Supreme Court decisions acting as catalysts for a small, but significant, shift in 
conceptions of what it is that a land lawyer does. The most visible manifestation of this shift in 
Scotland is observable in relation to contemporary land law reform.  
When this thesis refers to land reform, it denotes the legislative mechanisms introduced by the 
Scottish Parliament to facilitate the transfer of existing title from one individual(s) or another or 
group(s). These reforms are inspired by notions of equality and the realisation of human rights, in 
securing greater diversity in land ownership and tenure, empowering communities.3 While land 
reform is not confined to these rights to buy, they remain the best prism through which to consider 
the application and effect of human rights.  
Legislative mechanisms that result in the expropriation of land and related rights have come into 
conflict with traditional conceptions of land ownership and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions protected by A1P1. The result has been the emergence of a binary debate in which 
rights to property conflict with the Scottish Government’s programme of distributive land reform. 
The ECHR has come in for sustained criticism by those who seek to advance the case of 
distributive reforms. To the Scottish Ministers, land reform activists, and associated groups, there 
remains a fear that A1P1 will serve as a “red card” to halt existing reforms. To others (primarily 
landowners and associated interest groups), A1P1 has been held up as a potential shield against 
“radical”, politically motivated, state intervention. This thesis will show how this narrow debate 
misunderstands how A1P1 works in practice.  
The human rights discourse has progressed in recent years to one that recognises “relevant non-
convention rights”, of which the most significant are the socio-economic rights contained in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). This has been part 
of a concerted effort to broaden the human rights discourse in Scotland.4 This thesis will analyse 
                                               
3 P. Peacock, Land: For the many, not the few? Limitations on the Scale of Land Ownership (Inverness: Scottish Land 
Commission 2018) p. 2.  
4 K. Shields, Human Rights and the Work of the Scottish Land Commission (Inverness: Scottish Land Commission 2018) p. 
15.  
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A1P1 within this developing human rights paradigm.  
1.2 STRUCTURE AND AIMS  
1.2.1 CHAPTER ONE 
 
This thesis is divided into 5 chapters. The first chapter sets out the “Scottish land question” and 
the legislative response. The purposes of chapter one is: first, to consider the reasons for the 
Scottish Government’s introduction of the community and agricultural tenants’ rights to buy; and 
second, to explain the legislative rights to buy thus enacted and the resulting mechanisms and 
processes by which community and agricultural tenants can purchase land. Chapter one considers 
the complexity of existing landownership and notions of the right to private property in land.  
Chapter one then sets out the legislative measures enacted by the Scottish Government.  
 
1.2.2 CHAPTER TWO 
The objective of chapter two is to determine what “rights” and whose “rights” are really at the 
core of land reform. Chapter two will illustrate the obligations to respect Convention rights placed 
on the Scottish government, judiciary and public and quasi-public bodies. It will set out the 
potential role for “relevant non-convention rights” and claims of native title to land in Scotland.  
It will be submitted that the indivisibility of human rights means that the modern land lawyers 
must consider not only Convention rights, but also relevant non-convention rights such as the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). Therefore, while 
human rights and public law were historically considered practically unrelated to land law, this is 
no longer the case as human rights and public law have come to pervasively influence the workings 
of modern land law.  
1.2.3 CHAPTER THREE 
Chapter three of this thesis will consider the drafting and subsequent development of A1P1. 
Chapter three will illustrate that, despite relatively inauspicious beginnings and often conflicting 
jurisprudence from the ECtHR, A1P1 has developed into a recognisable right to property that can 
be broken down into six component tests. Chapter three makes several important observations 
about the limits of A1P1: (i) possession has been given an autonomous meaning and, therefore, 
must be disassociated from its traditional domestic meaning; (ii) the lawfulness test requires Acts 
of the Scottish Parliament to be sufficiently accessible and foreseeable; (iii) the public interest test 
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has been rendered a paper tiger in the face of governmental intervention and is in practice left 
almost wholly to the discretion of democratic institutions; and (iv) proportionality has developed 
to embody four distinct principles that an interference must pursue a legitimate aim; be rationally 
connected to that aim; be the least intrusive measure undertaken to achieve that aim; and satisfy 
the fair balance between the competing interests of the parties.   
1.2.4 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Chapter four applies the analysis in chapters one, two and three to contemporary rights to buy.  
Chapter four will argue that the existing debate, which tends to ask whether A1P1 will act as a “red 
card” to halt or limit existing rights to buy, misunderstands how A1P1 is given effect in practice.   
 
Chapter four considers the test of who will constitute a victim, what constitutes a possession and 
when will an interference establish a control of use or a deprivation. The significance of this 
distinction is that deprivations, in all but exceptional circumstances, must be accompanied by 
compensation. Chapter four will consider the utility of the lawfulness and public interest tests and 
will evaluate the community and agricultural tenant’s right to buy from the four-part 
proportionality requirement. It will be argued that contemporary rights to buy satisfy the legitimate 
aim test. Chapter four will discuss the rationality requirement resting on the Scottish Ministers 
when determining applications for community rights to buy and further legislative reform. It will 
be submitted that the principles of equivalence and just compensation will limit “radical” reforms 
but will accept that the ECtHR has, in exceptional circumstances, derogated from the full 
compensation standard.  
 
The role of relevant non-convention rights, particularly the ICESCR, will be considered, and it 
will be asked what weight should be given to these international human rights standards when 
considering the question of the fair balance of an interference under A1P1.  
 
1.2.5 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Chapter five of this thesis will consider what effect A1P1 has had on domestic property law. It will 
ask whether A1P1 mirrors existing entitlement, displaces or subordinates domestic law, or 
complements domestic law in a more nuanced manner. This is important because if A1P1 simply 
mirrors existing entitlement, the forceful rhetoric against A1P1 as limiting the Scottish Ministers’ 
ability to legislate on radical land reform is misplaced. Further, it brings into view the complexities 
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of applying supranational human rights instruments to private law, and potentially raises questions 
of sovereignty and democratic legitimacy.  
 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS THESIS  
Although the application and interpretation of human rights and Scots land law reforms have been 
touched upon in political circles and reference has been made in the available literature, an 
extensive inquiry remains conspicuously absent. This thesis will therefore fill a critical lacuna and 
in doing so clarify existing confusions, inject a balanced analysis which has been most notably 
lacking, and introduce a level of theoretical abstraction and detail that has not yet been applied to 
A1P1 and Scottish land law.  
There exists a great deal of misunderstanding concerning the application of A1P1 to contemporary 
reforms. There are numerous examples. In June 2018, Lord Drummond Young noted obiter in 
McMaster v Scottish Ministers that the grounds of appeal, in relation to A1P1, were “complex and 
somewhat difficult to follow”.5 Giving evidence to the Scottish Parliament, a representative from 
the NFU bemoaned that “if you ask three ECHR lawyers the same question, you will get three 
different opinions”.6 He noted that “on ECHR, I have sat down with lawyers, but whenever I 
meet them, I become more confused than ever. I would like the issues to be set out in layman’s 
terms so that the industry can discuss them. That would be helpful”.7 It would be naïve to believe 
that this thesis can clarify such concerns in their totality, but it is hoped that, in undertaking this 
extensive research, a certain level of understanding can be articulated that is currently unavailable. 
This is not just relevant to the contemporary rights to buy but has wider implications for the 
application and effect of Convention rights. Simon Stockwell, giving evidence on the Long Leases 
(Scotland) Bill in 2012 stated that “we [Scottish Government Non-Government Bills Unit] have 
gone through the ECHR implications in some detail. To be honest, it has been the bane of my life 
at times”.8 
Within academic literature, political discourse, and during the legislative process, there is a 
conspicuous absence of balance when considering recent land law reforms in Scotland. Lord Hope 
cited this partiality at the legislative stage of the Land Reform (Scotland) Bill which became the 
                                               
5 McMaster v Scottish Ministers [2018] CSIH 40, GWD 22-271 [14]. 
6 SP, OR, RACCE, 16 September 2015, col. 55.  
7 Ibid col. 54.  
8 SP, OR, RACCE, 8 February 2012, col. 602.  
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Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (“LR(S)A 2003”). To Lord Hope “radical policies were being 
promoted by MSPs which were resisted by a significant body of public opinion on the grounds 
that it affected their rights and liberties”.9 The journalist Linklater, on reading through the various 
reports and committee meetings, noted that:  
 
As I began to read, I was struck by two things—first of all the blatant, and often self-
confessed bias of its members against landowners, farmers and their representatives. 
Second, the almost wilful refusal to accept evidence which challenged the thrust of the Bill. 
Those who lobbied for open access to land, or who campaigned for wider distribution of 
property were listened to with respect and deference and often called back to give further 
evidence. Those who sought to defend the rights of property-owners were exposed to 
truculent and often offensive questioning.10 
 
The Supreme Court exposed this one-sidedness in the seminal decision of Salvesen v Riddell, where 
a late and retroactive amendment to the AH(S)A 2003 was held to be an unjustifiable interference 
with the owner’s rights to property under A1P1.11  Lord Hope in Salvesen criticised the legislative 
process at Holyrood and observed that “[a] reader of what the Deputy Minister said during that 
debate might be forgiven for thinking that it displayed a marked bias against landlords”.12  
 
This partiality during the legislative process was apparent during a session on human rights 
regarding what would become the LR(S)A 2016. While giving evidence, one solicitor noted the 
possibility of the proposals contained in the Bill clashing with individual rights under the ECHR. 
The response was rather swift, to one MSP:  
I am struck by the word “progressive” because, with the greatest respect, looking at the 
Brodies opinion, I suspect that if Brodies had been asked to give an opinion on the 
Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886—fortunately, we did not have the ECHR at that 
stage—it would have been quite negative about it.13 
                                               
9 D. Hope, “What a Second Chamber Can Do for Legislative Scrutiny” (2004) 25 Statute Law Review 3, 10. 
10 “Land reform falls foul of Scotland’s own kangaroo committee” The Scotsman (Edinburgh: 1 December 2002). 
11 Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22, 2013 SC (UKSC) 236.  
12 Ibid [38].  
13 SP, OR, RACCE, 7 October 2015, col. 10.  
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While Livingston was quick to respond that the rights contained in the ECHR apply to everyone, 
including landlords and tenants, this was ignored by the committee.14 Distrust for experts and 
radicalism is never far from the debate.15 To Wightman: “For too long the law has been the 
preserve of the lawyers… It is worth remembering that, particularly over local land issues, it is 
quite possible to become just as well informed if not more so than many so-called legal experts”.16 
A 2016 study, commissioned by the Scottish Government, noted when considering the available 
literature on landownership patterns in Scotland that much of it had “radical land reform 
overtones”.17 When studying land reform literature in Scotland it remains essential to consider the 
source and context within which it was written.   
1.3.1 PREVIOUS APPROACHES  
 
In 1985, Walker lamented that in Scotland “the law of property was rather neglected”.18 Prior to 
the more recent revival of property law literature, most people relied on the Institutional Writers 
and Rankine’s The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland.  Rankin even starts his 1879 text by noting 
that he was attempting to “fill up an admitted gap in the Scotch legal literature”.19 In an article in 
the LQR in 1959, Mann discussed the history of expropriation aiming to “stimulate others to do 
so”.20 However, this call to arms largely fell on deaf ears. While rights to property were considered 
by the Institutional Writers and leading figures of the Scottish Enlightenment by the middle of the 
19th century, academic inquiry into rights to property and property law, in general, had become 
largely ignored.21 
 
The last thirty years have borne witness to a revival in Scots property law literature. The works of 
Rennie at Glasgow, Carey-Miller and Paisley at Aberdeen, and Gretton, Reid, and Steven at 
                                               
14 Ibid col. 10-11.  
15 J. Hunter, Towards a land reform agenda for a Scots Parliament, (Second John McEwen Memorial Lecture, Dingwall 1995). 
16 A. Wightman, The Poor Had No Lawyers (Edinburgh: Berlinn 2011) pp. 4-5.  
17 S. Thomson et al, The impact of diversity of ownership scale on social, economic and environmental outcomes: 
Exploration and case studies CR/2014/19 (Edinburgh: The Scottish Government, 2016) p. 19.  
18 D. Walker, The Scottish Jurists (Edinburgh: W. Green 1985) p. 430.  
19 J. Rankin, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons 1879). 
20 F.  Mann, “Outlines of a History of Expropriation” (1959) 75 Law Quarterly Review 188. 
21 K. Reid, “Property Law: Sources and Doctrine” in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law in 
Scotland: Vol 1 (Oxford: OUP 2000) p. 208.  
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Edinburgh have all contributed significantly.22 When considering the law of agricultural holdings, 
it is difficult to overestimate the importance of Lord Gill and his seminal Law of Agricultural Holdings 
and Agricultural Tenancies.23 Practitioners and courts are often found asking, “what does Gill say?”. 
Similarly, concerning crofting law, Agnew QC’s Crofting Law remains the most important text in 
the field.24 
 
Despite the revival in property law, in general there remains relatively limited available literature 
on land law and A1P1 since the passing of the HRA in direct relation to Scots law. The most 
important work has been undertaken by Allen at Durham. Allen’s Property and the Human Rights Act 
and additional work remain the most comprehensive consideration of A1P1 in the UK.25 
Important literature on the relationship between Convention rights and real property law in 
England is available in the works of Lees and Goymour both of Cambridge.26 Significant 
contributions have also been made by McCarthy at Glasgow and Waring at Cambridge and more 
recently York, who published PhDs on rights to property in 2009 and 2010 respectively.27 A more 
recent PhD thesis was published at Durham in 2016 by Kristoffer on A1P1.28 As of writing, the 
literature on A1P1 and land law in Scotland reform remains primarily confined to analysis of the 
Supreme Court decision in Salvesen.29  
 
The total number of articles published on Scottish land law reform are limited, but there are several 
papers and authors to highlight. Combe at Aberdeen has been the most prolific writer on land 
reform over the last ten years.30 The American scholar Lovett while on leave at Edinburgh 
                                               
22 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (Edinburgh: Butterworths Law, 1996); G. Gretton and A. Steven, Property 
Trusts and Succession (London: Bloomsbury 2013). 
23 B. Gill, Agricultural Tenancies (Edinburgh: W. Green 2017).  
24 C. Agnew, Crofting Law (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 2000). 
25 T. Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart 2005); T. Allen, “Compensation for Property under the 
European Convention on Human Rights” (2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 287; T. Allen, “Human Rights 
and Regulatory Takings” (2005) 17 Journal of Environmental Law 245.  
26 E. Lees, “Article 8, Proportionality and Horizontal Effect” (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 31; A. Goymour, 
“Proprietary Clams and Human Rights – A “Reservoir of Entitlement”?” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 699. 
27 E. Waring, Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings (Cambridge University, PhD Thesis, 2009); F. McCarthy, 
Article One of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights: the evolution of a right in Europe and the United 
Kingdom (Glasgow University, PhD Thesis, 2010). 
28 D. Kristoffer, On the Legitimacy of Economic Development Takings (Durham University, PhD Thesis, 2016).  
29 D. Carr, “Not Law (But Not Yet Effectively Not Law)” (2013) 17 Edinburgh Law Review 370-376; A Fox, “Holyrood 
out of Bounds” (2013) 58(6) Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 28.  
30 See inter alia, M Combe, “The Environmental Implications of Redistributive Land Reform” (2016) 18 Environmental 
Law Review, 104-125; M Combe, “The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016: another answer to the Scottish land question” 
(2016) Juridical Review 291-313.  
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University published “Progressive Property in Action” which remains the sole detailed application 
of property theory to Scots land law reform.31  
 
The narrative of land reform has been significantly shaped by the socialist theorist and forester, 
John McEwan. A treasure trove of passion can be found in the A. K. Bell Library in Perth which 
holds the personal archives of McEwan. The archive is full of newspaper cuttings, letters, and 
personal writings, often written on old envelopes or the back side of ripped out pages from copies 
of Hansard.32 Very little was known about patterns of land ownership until John McEwan 
published Who Owns Scotland in 1977.33 His work was to inspire the influential biennial John 
McEwen Memorial Lectures between 1993 and 1999 which were significant in shaping the modern 
land reform debate.34  
 
Wightman’s The Poor Had No Lawyers, first published in 2010, has been the most widely read text 
in recent years on the Scottish land question.35  Wightman was elected as an MSP on 5 May 2016 
for the Green Party in the Lothians. His political work combined with his writing and significant 
online presence have made Wightman the most prominent pro-land reform figure in Scotland.36  
 
1.4 DEFINITIONS  
 
There is a certain level of linguistic confusion that this thesis must attempt to overcome. In truth, 
however, the opaque and disputed nature of essential concepts such as “rights” and “property” 
will leave a residue of discontent. This is, in part, down to the multitude of diverse factors that go 
into our understanding of the basis of the peaceful enjoyment of possession in A1P1. It is not the 
purpose of this thesis to consider in detail the philosophical basis of “rights”, “legal rights”, and 
“human rights”; nor is it to turn into a debate between the underlying assumptions that can 
potentially determine whether one speaks of “property rights” or “the right to property”. It is 
                                               
31 J.  Lovett, “Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003” (2011) 89 Nebraska Law Review 
740. 
32 McEwan Archive, A. K. Bell Library, Perth MS164/5/477 (Typed Notes in file Marx & Marxism Today).  
33 J. McEwan, Who Owns Scotland? Study in Landownership (Edinburgh: EUSPB, 1977). 
34 See B. MacGregor, “Land Tenure in Scotland” (First John McEwen Memorial Lecture 1993); J. Hunter, “Towards 
a Land Reform Agenda for a Scots Parliament” (Second John McEwan Memorial Lecture, 1995); J. Bryden, “Land 
Tenure and Rural Development in Scotland” (Third John McEwen Memorial Lecture 1996).  
35 Wightman, The Poor Had No Lawyers (n 16). 
36 A. Wightman, Land and Power (Edinburgh: Berlinn 1999). 
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important to accept these limitations from the outset, and also to set out (in brief) the linguistic 
framework that will be followed in the proceeding analysis.  
 
1.4.1 LAND REFORM  
 
It is an old joke that there is “no law” relating to land reform: this is based on the essential truth 
that most radical change in the world occurs through revolution and that the lawyers simply come 
in to tidy up afterwards. The process in Scotland has in practice been somewhat less radical than 
the debate often appears.  
As a legal issue, land reform is amongst the most challenging possibilities of the law; to even define 
“land reform” in a succinct and coherent manner is not easy.37 Land reform is about altering 
existing institutions and practices relating to land law and ownership to remove improprieties and 
promote efficiency. The problem is that such a straightforward definition is difficult to find in 
practice.  
The Scottish Government has taken a broad approach. The Land Reform Policy Group (“LRPG”) 
in 1998 stated that “the objective of land reform is to remove the land-based barriers to the 
sustainable development of rural communities”.38  For the purposes of this thesis, land reform 
refers to attempts to correct perceived market failures and land oligopolies by institutional reforms 
enacted or induced by public powers to facilitate systematic change in property distribution, size, 
and tenure. This is undertaken as part of a shift or rather a broadening of emphasis from a focus 
on wealth creation to a recognition of the importance of effective local democratic governance.39 
The significance of land reform in Scotland should not be underestimated. To Lovett, “Scotland’s 
political leadership and civil society have collectively made land reform one of the pillars of 
Scotland’s current national identity”.40 
 
The Scottish Government has facilitated this through the introduction of legislative mechanisms. 
When this thesis refers to land law reform or “rights to buy” it refers collectively to the pre-
                                               
37 C. Warren, “Scottish Land Reform Time to Get Lairds A-Leaping” (1999) 20 ECOS 1-4. 
38 LPRG, Identifying the Problems (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office 1998). 
39 M. Hoffman, “Why Community Ownership? Understanding land reform in Scotland” (2013) 31 Land Use Policy 
289. 
40 J. Lovett, “Towards Sustainable Community Ownership: A Comparative Assessment of the Community Right to 
Buy” (Cambridge Centre for Property Law Conference, Cambridge, 26 May 2018). 
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emptive, conditional, and absolute legislative rights to buy. Part 2 of the Land Reform (Scotland) 
Act 2003 (“LR(S)A 2003”) introduced the “community right to buy”.41 This right is pre-emptive 
in that it is a right to register an interest that only becomes active when the land is offered for sale. 
Part 3 of the LR(S)A 2003 introduced an absolute right to buy for crofting communities.42 This 
right is absolute as, provided the correct procedures are followed, the landowner cannot object to 
the purchase.43 The Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 (“AH(S)A 2003”) introduced the 
tenant farmer’s right to buy.44 The Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 introduced the 
“right to buy abandoned and neglected land” into Part 3A of the LR(S)A 2003.45 This introduced 
a conditional right to buy abandoned and neglected land upon ministerial approval. Part 5 of the 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 (“LR(S)A 2016”) introduced the community right to buy for 
“sustainable development”.46 This right is conditional upon ministerial approval and is expected 
to come into force in 2019. The LR(S)A 2016 introduced the right of agricultural tenants to apply 
to the Scottish Land Court for an order of sale where the landlord is in breach.47 These rights to 
buy will be discussed in detail in part 2 of chapter one.  
1.4.2 PROPERTY  
 
Property to the layman is “thing ownership”.48 In relation to the purposes of this thesis, it can be 
rudimentarily reduced to the dominium or ownership of land. Under A1P1, the term “possession” 
is used and has been given an autonomous meaning by the ECtHR and domestic courts as denoted 
by a corporeal or incorporeal thing, or the legitimate expectation of acquiring a thing.  
 
What constitutes property has occupied many of the greatest thinkers throughout history without 
a unitary agreeable definition being found. The first point to note is that while one is often found 
referring to a “thing” such as a house, car, or toothbrush, when accompanied by possession as 
one’s property, in the proper legal sense the property one is referring to is simply the visible 
manifestation of invisible rights. Property is therefore not one single unitary thing but a multitude 
                                               
41 LR(S)A 2003 Pt 2.  
42 Ibid Pt 3.  
43 Pairc Crofters v Scottish Ministers [2012] CSIH 96, 2013 SLT 308.  
44 AH(S)A 2003.  
45 CE(S)A 2015 Pt. 4; LR(S)A 2003 Pt 3A.  
46 LR(S)A 2016 Pt 5.  
47 Ibid s. 100; AH(S)A 2003 Pt 2A. 
48 L. Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (Oxford: OUP 2003) p. 11. 
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of accompanying and sometimes conflicting rights. To MacCormick, the ownership of private 
property “involves a devolution of power over the use and enjoyment of things to the discretion 
of each member of a multitude of persons in ways that constantly vary in the context of markets 
wherever these exist”.49  
 
However, property is not defined merely by individual entitlements but instead encompasses 
certain societal norms and legal obligations that must be respected for all rights to be fully 
enforceable and to retain existing possession.50 These rights are not absolute in the sense of being 
inalienable. In Jus Feudale, one of the foundational texts of Scots law, in 1603, Craig wrote that one 
way in which a feudal estate may be lost is when “the importance of preserving inviolate private 
rights and contract is outweighed by considerations of public policy”.51  
 
Going forward, it is essential to reiterate that property in land is not an absolute right but is 
qualified by the public interest. Property rights in land do not refer to the physical soil but the legal 
rights that exist between the soil, the individual, and society.  Such rights and obligations are the 
legal, and sometimes even moral, manifestation of recognisable rights that the layman will 
recognise as thing-ownership but, upon further inspection, is a complex and highly disputed set 
of power relations and concurrent societal obligations.52 
 
1.4.3 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY  
 
With incommensurable debates shadowing our understanding of “rights” and “property”, finding 
a workable definition of the “right to property” is no straightforward task.53 It is not the purpose 
of this thesis to dwell on these complex theoretical questions, but a general linguistic framework 
is required to proceed. The defence of private property has been a feature of philosophical, 
theological, and legal discourse from antiquity to the present day.54  
 
                                               
49 N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford: OUP 2007) p. 152. 
50 G. Alexander, E. Penalver, J. Singer and L Underkuffler, “A Statement of Progressive Property” (2009) 94 Cornell 
Law Review 743, 743. 
51 T. Craig, The Jus Feudale (Trans) J. Clyde (Edinburgh: William Hodge & Co 1934) p. 921.  
52 K. Gray, “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252.  
53 J. Harris, “Is Property a Human Right?”’ in J. McLean (ed) Property and the Constitution (Oxford: Hart 1999) p. 64. 
54 P. Garnsey, Thinking about Property from Antiquity to the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: CUP 2007). 
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For example, an agricultural tenancy held by X is a “property right”. The right of X to enjoy the 
peaceful enjoyment of this lease is a “right to property”. The “property rights” in this example 
determine the tenancy, notably the terms for which the holding or different parts thereof are 
agreed between X and the landowner Y. The “right to property” represents the “pre-shaped” rights 
that will be protected for the duration of the tenancy and after, i.e. X’s right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of the tenancy and Y’s right as the owner of the land. The “right to property” is not 
confined to X and Y but extends to the further societal rights of Z. Z’s rights are numerous but 
include inter alia the right of responsible access under Part 1 of the LR(S)A 2003 and in some 
instances “negative” rights such as the law of nuisance and environmental law which limits the 
free use of the subjects held by X and Y, deemed necessary to protect Z but also, by way of the 
doctrine of “reciprocity of advantage”, also X and Y.  These rights are also applicable to X and 
Y’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of property and the tenancy. Whether the rights (the right to 
protect property rights against nuisance, trespass, or another interference) are protected by private 
law (for X, essentially the contract contained in the tenancy) or human rights law, is difficult to 
discern.  
 
The “property right” is essentially a private law right. Whether the “right to property” is also a 
private law right or derives its authority from human rights law, namely A1P1, is also not a 
straightforward task. Within the context of private law, rights to property can be contracted out 
of, and surrendered by, other means. In the context of human rights law, the “rights” are in the 
words of Dworkin, “clubs to defend oneself against the abuses of the state”.55 
Since the coming into effect of the HRA, the “parchment” guarantee is the most visible 
manifestation of a right to property in relation to contemporary Scots land law reform. However, 
when and where human rights law will “bite” instead of private law rights to protect X and Y’s 
“right to property” is blurred.  Further observations will be made on these issues in chapter five.   
 
Readers of this thesis are to proceed under the linguistic framework that reference to “property 
rights” primarily denotes the “ownership” rights associated with land. This is not a reference to 
the land itself as a physical entity but the legal rights that relate to that physical entity. These are 
not just held by “owners” but tenants and the populace. The “right to property” is the ability to 
defend the legal relationships that exist between the individual, communities, and the object. It is 
these rights to property that are protected by A1P1. As Stewart J of the US Supreme Court 
                                               
55 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Bloomsbury 2013). 
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observed “property does not have rights. People have rights”.56 
 
1.4.4 HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPERTY  
A1P1 protects against interferences with the “peaceful enjoyment of possessions”, or in other 
words, the right to property.57 For example, the text of A1P1 includes the use of “possessions” 
(“biens/propriété”) and “use of property” (“usage des biens”), and the travaux préparatoires shows that 
the drafters continually spoke of the “right of property” or “right to property” to describe the 
subject-matter.58  
The ECtHR has developed a discernable set of tests when considering A1P1 applications that have 
since been incorporated into domestic law. The ECtHR has taken an “autonomous” approach to 
“possession” to denote an object of economic value.59 Domestic courts have therefore followed 
this broad approach, disassociating possession from its ordinary Scots law meaning.60 The human 
right to property is a qualified right and can be deprived by States under certain circumstances. 
The ECtHR has determined that interference must meet the test of legal certainty, be justified in 
the general or public interest, and have a reasonable degree of proportionality between the means 
selected and the ends sought to be achieved. This is thought to be necessary to ensure that a fair 
balance between individual and collective interests has been maintained.61  
Scottish land reform is reigniting the enduring question of what constitutes a human right. The 
UK is a dualist state and, as such, even international treaties do not form part of Scots law although 
they can be taken into account as an aid to the interpretation of statutes and in the development 
of the common law.62 What the HRA has done is to create domestic rights expressed in the same 
terms as those contained in the ECHR and its Protocols. However, they are domestic rights, not 
international rights.63 The domestic rights created by the HRA are interpreted by reference to the 
                                               
56 Lynch v Household Finance Corp (1972) 405 US 538, 542 (United States). 
57 Goymour, “Proprietary Clams and Human Rights – A “Reservoir of Entitlement”?” (n 26) 709.  
58 Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 350 [63]. 
59 Broniowski v Poland (2005) 40 EHRR 21. 
60 AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 868 [114].  
61 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
62 J. Murdoch and R. Reed, Human Rights Law in Scotland (London: Bloomsbury 2017) p. 1.  
63 Re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12, [2004] 1 WLR 807 [65].  
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corresponding rights under the ECHR.64 
1.4.5 MICRO AND MACRO GRANULARITY  
 
When this thesis refers to “granularity”, this denotes the scale or level of detail that the court 
considers in its decision-making capacity. This can be split between macro-granularity – when the 
court takes a broad approach to determining compatibility by considering the underlying purpose 
and wording of the Act, – and micro-granularity – when the court considers the facts of the case 
before it in greater detail and considers the question of individual balance and individual rights. 
References to “micro” or “macro” legal analysis are relatively common in comparative legal 
research.65 The importance of the distinction between macro and micro for this thesis is that it 
emphasises how proportionality operates at two levels of intensity. This is apparent in the 
approach of Lord Neuberger in Manchester City Council v Pinnock.66  
The level of granularity undertaken in A1P1 cases is comparable to the Supreme Court decisions 
concerning Article 8 of the ECHR. For example, the Supreme Court in Manchester City Council v 
Pinnock and London Borough of Hounslow v Powell observed that, in general, the measures in question 
are proportionate (macro-granularity), but that, in certain exceptional cases, they may not be 
proportionate (micro-granularity).67 As a result, the Supreme Court appears to consider two 
separate, but related questions. First, it is asked whether the legislation is compatible with 
Convention rights. However, the weight given to democratic institutions means that the reasoning 
undertaken at this stage is imbued with judicial deference. The second level of analysis requires the 
court to individualise the facts before it. This requires the court to take a harder look, although 
judicial deference remains an important consideration and is limited by the interpretative 
methodologies undertaken by the Supreme Court being not entirely uniformed.68 
 
1.5 RELEVANT NON-CONVENTION RIGHTS  
 
While this thesis is primarily concerned with A1P1, it cannot give a comprehensive account of 
A1P1 if it is considered in isolation. Over the three years in which this thesis has been researched 
                                               
64 R (S and Marper) v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2014] UKHL 39, [2004] 1 WLR 2196 [66]. 
65 See M. Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2014) p. 14.  
66 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
67 Ibid; London Borough of Hounslow v Powell [2011] UKSC 8, [2011] 2 AC 186.  
68 Sims v Dacorum Borough Council [2014] UKSC 63, [2015] AC 1136.  
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and written, it has become increasingly apparent that to fully appreciate the role A1P1 serves, it 
must be placed within the broadening of the human rights discourse in Scotland.  In a discussion 
paper published by the Scottish Land Commission in May 2018, Shields argued that:  
Recognition that the ECHR right to property does not exist in isolation but exists in inter-
relationship with all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, created a 
sea change in engagement with the human rights potential of the [LR(S)A 2016]. Rather 
than thwart the community ownership agenda through right to property claims, it became 
clear that human rights could legitimise and give structure to long-awaited changes in land 
ownership.69 
It is therefore clear that the inclusion of the ICESCR was a considered response to a perceived 
overemphasis on individual rights, which are the focus of this thesis. Chapter two of this thesis 
will therefore ask what rights and whose rights are engaged by contemporary Scots rights to buy, 
and in particular what effect reference to the several “relevant non-convention rights” Acts of the 
Scottish Parliament will have on the ability of individuals to realise their A1P1 rights in Scots law.  
 
1.6 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES  
 
This thesis will refer to several other jurisdictions around the world to add examples and context 
to Scots law. Caution is necessary when taking a comparative lens. As Montesquieu once noted, it 
is “very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another”.70 Further, the Scottish legal system 
is distinct from that of England and Wales. Land reform is inherently political and often has its 
foundations in questions over entitlement and the just distribution of rights to property in land. It 
is important to recognise the politics of reform, especially where political rhetoric does not reflect 
the practical realities and consequences of reform.71  
 
1.7 CASE LAW  
 
The case law on A1P1 and rights to buy is sparse; therefore, it is important to set out the facts in 
the three main decisions on A1P1 and land reform in Scotland.  
                                               
69 Shields (n 4) p. 2. 
70 C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws Bk 3. (Cambridge: CUP 1989) p. 8.  
71 J. Howell, The Dangers of Reform in The Reform of Property Law (Aldershot: Ashgate 1997) p. 59. 
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1.7.1 Pairc Crofters Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2012] CSIH 96, 2013 SLT 308 
 
The Pairc Estate (A’ Phàirc) is located on the island of Lewis and extends over 26,800 acres. In 
March 2011, the Scottish Ministers granted consent to the application of the Pairc Trust which 
represented the crofting community body to exercise a right to buy croft land on the Pairc Estate.72 
The purchase was challenged on the grounds that the crofting community right to buy was 
incompatible with A1P1 and Article 6.73 In essence, the appellants contend that sustainability and 
the public interest must be deemed non-justiciable, and thus, if Parliament had decided otherwise, 
it would have set this out in clear and specific language.74 The appellants questioned the criteria 
for consent to a purchase by Ministers – in particular, “sustainable development”,75 and the 
deprivation of property being in the public interest.76 The Inner House unanimously dismissed the 
appeal, with Lord Gil observing that “the relevant legislative provisions and the principles of 
administrative law, considered as a whole, offer a level of protection equal to or surpassing that 
which, on any view, is required by the Convention”.77 
 
1.7.2 Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22, 2013 SC (UKSC) 236 
 
Background  
In Scotland, agricultural tenants enjoyed near indefinite security of tenure under the Agricultural 
Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991 (“1991 Act”).78 A notice to quit could only be served in limited 
circumstances and only when the Land Court granted consent.79 Further, tenants had a right to 
bequeath the tenancy to a broad category of related persons for an indefinite number of 
generations.80  
                                               
72 LR(S)A 2003 s. 73.  
73 Pairc Crofters (n 43). 
74 Ibid [100]. 
75 LR(S)A 2003 s. 74(1)(j); LR(S)A 2003 s. 74 and 74(1A).  
76 LR(S)A 2003 s. 74(1)(n). 
77 Pairc Crofters (n 43) [68]. 
78 Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1948; Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991; MacFarlane v Falfield 
Investments Ltd 1998 SC 14 (IH).  
79 Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991 Pt III.  
80 Ibid s. 11.  
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To avoid this far-reaching and perpetual security of tenure, a practice emerged of granting 
agricultural tenancies to partnerships governed by the Limited Partnerships Act 1907. The 
landowner, or his nominee, became the limited partner and the tenants became general partners.  
Landlords who sought vacant possession could dissolve the partnership, bringing the agricultural 
tenancy to an end.81 This practice, while criticised, became widespread.82  
It became recognised that a new statutory structure for leasing of agricultural land was required to 
stop this practice and give general partners security of tenure.83 In April 2002, the Scottish 
Executive published a Consultation Paper incorporating the Draft Bill. Section 42, which would 
later become section 70 of the 2003 Act, stated that it was to apply only to partnerships entered 
into after the commencement of the act.84 As such, the Bill did not affect existing limited 
partnership tenancies. 
 
Fearing the loss of control caused by the creation of near indefinite security of tenure, many 
landowners responded by serving notices to quit on tenants. This spate of notices to quit resulted 
in strong criticism from Holyrood.85  The Scottish Ministers responded by adding Amendment 
169 an “anti-forestalling” provision to the effect that general partners who had received notice of 
dissolution of their limited partnership on or after 4 February 2003 could apply to the Land Court 
for an order allowing them to continue as 1991 Act tenants.86 It followed from this proposal that 
if the Land Court were to make such an order, the general partner, qua tenant, would be able to 
take advantage of the right to buy provisions that the Bill proposed.87 
 
The Scottish Ministers proposed another amendment at Stage 3 of the Bill. Amendment 111 
provided inter alia that where notice of dissolution was served on or after 16 September 2002 but 
before the relevant date, the tenancy would continue in effect with the general partner as tenant if 
the general partner gave notice to that effect. As Lord Gill noted in Salvesen:  
 
                                               
81 ibid s. 6(3). 
82 HC Deb, 21 April 1983, Vol. 41, Cols. 454-459.  
83 Scottish Executive, Agricultural Holdings: Proposals for Legislation (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive 2000) para 2.9. 
84 Scottish Executive, Draft Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Bill (April 2002)  
85 SP, OP, RDC, 4 February 2003.  
86 AH(S)A 1991 s. 21-24. 
87 Salveson v Riddell [2012] CSIH 26, 2013 SC 69 [23].  
Rights to Property, Rights to Buy, and Land Law Reform  28 
Amendment 111 was potentially calamitous for some landlords. It made the landlord’s 
position even weaker than it had been after amendment 169. Under amendment 169 the 
general partner could become tenant only if he applied to the Land Court and established 
the specified grounds: but under amendment 111 the general partner, on giving notice, 
became tenant unless the landlord applied to the Land Court and established the specified 
conditions. But worst of all, from the landlord’s point of view, amendment 111 was 
retrospective. It caught notices of dissolution that had been served in the period since the 
Bill was introduced. It therefore caught notices served when the assurance in the White 
Paper that existing limited partnership leases would not be affected by the legislation had 
not been withdrawn or qualified. The new proposal had particular significance for 
landlords because of the right to buy provisions.88 
 
The result of these amendments was that the 2003 Act that received Royal Assent on 22 April 
2003, was a “very different animal to the Bill which Ross Finnie introduced on 16 September 
2002”.89 As the Scottish Executive had undertaken what Fox described this as a “knee-jerk 
reaction”, to nullify the effect of dissolution notices served between the “relevant period” of 16 
September to 1 July 2003.90 
 
As enacted, section 72 allowed general partners of existing limited partnerships to obtain secure 
1991 Act tenancies on the dissolution of the partnership. This significantly reduced the autonomy 
of the landowners. Section 72(6) of the 2003 Act provided that if a landlord sought to bring an 
agricultural tenancy to an end by dissolving a limited partnership on or after 16 September 2002, 
then the tenancy continued inexistence with the non-landlord partner, known as the general 
partner, as tenant in his or her own right (if the general partner gave notice that this is intended to 
happen).91  
 
Section 73 of the 2003 Act was a counterpart to section 72(6).92 It entitled the landlord to bring 
the tenancy to an end by service of a notice to quit at a time of the landlord’s own choosing.93 
                                               
88 Ibid at [23].  
89 A. Fox, ‘How the Leopard Changed Its Spots’ (2003) 48(5) Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 58, 58.  
90 Ibid.  
91 AH(S)A 2003 (as originally passed) s. 72. 
92 ibid s. 72(6) and 73. 
93 ibid. 
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However, section 72(10) qualified this position by stipulating that section 73 did not apply to 
landlords who served the dissolution notice between 16th September 2002 and 30th June 2003.94 
The paradox created by section 72 was summarised by Lord Gill in Salvesen: 
 
In this way the Parliament conferred on the general partner a form of tenancy the creation 
of which section 1 of the 2003 Act was designed to restrict and a form of tenancy that had 
caused the problems that the 2003 Act sought to cure.95 
Thus section 72 had an adverse, and somewhat incongruous effect on the rights of landlords who 
gave notice to dissolve a limited partnership tenancy within a relatively limited period, running 
from the introduction of the Bill to 30 June 2003. Other landowners who had let farms to limited 
partnerships but did not give notice during that period were not affected.96 
1.7.2.2 The Case of Salvesen v Riddell  
Salvesen owned a farm in East Lothian. Salvesen, like many landowners served a notice of 
dissolution on 3 February 2003 on a limited partnership entered in 1992 that ran to 28 November 
2008.97 Riddell gave notice to Salvesen under the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 that 
they intended to become joint tenants of the subjects in their right.98 The late amendments to the 
2003 Act required Salvesen to obtain and order from the Land Court. However, this was dismissed, 
and Salvesen was unable to obtain vacant possession.99 
Salvesen appealed to the Inner House on the grounds that section 72 of the 2003 Act, as read by 
the Land Court, was incompatible with A1P1. To Lord Gill the difference in treatment caused by 
the late amendments to the bill were “arbitrary”, “retaliatory”, and “lacked intellectual 
justification”.100 Lord Gill was unable to find any convincing justification for the difference in 
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96 McMaster (IH) (n 5) (n 1) at [7].  
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treatment of landlords.101 As such, it was held that section 72 of the 2003 Act was incompatible 
with A1P1.102 
The Lord Advocate appealed to the Supreme Court on the compatibility issue. The Supreme Court 
held that the effect of section 72(10) was to deny the benefit of section 73 to all cases where the 
tenancy was purportedly terminated between 16 September 2002 and 30 June 2003, but which 
continue to have effect by virtue of section 72(6). The landlords who served dissolution notices 
during that period were in a worse position than those who served notices from 1 July 2003. The 
provision was disproportionate and discriminatory in a respect that affects the landlords’ 
Convention rights.103  
The Supreme Court’s order in Salvesen, dated 24 April 2013, suspended the effect of that 
declaration for 12 months, or such shorter period as might be required for the defect to be 
corrected by remedial legislation. The Scottish Ministers responded by passing the Remedial 
Order.104 This came into force on 3 April 2014 and removed the incompatibility arising from the 
operation of section 72(10) by repealing provisions of section 72 and inserting a new section 
72A.105 The result was that the future petitioners in McMaster had their secure 1991 Act tenancies 
extinguished. As a result, all of the petitioners’ respective landlords in McMaster issued notices 
terminating the tenancies. 
1.7.3 McMaster v Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 46, 2017 SLT 586 
 
In McMaster, six sets of petitioners totalling 27 persons including the former general partner or 
joint general partners of a limited partnership which had been the tenant of particular farming 
land, family members of the general partners and one or more partnerships or limited partnerships, 
averred that they had suffered loss, injury and damage because of the passing of section 72(10) of 
the AH(S)A 1991 and the making of the Remedial Order.106  The applicants believed that they 
could acquire secure AH(S)A 1991 tenancies on the passing of the AH(S)A 2003. A notice of 
dissolution had been served on each partnership between 16 September 2002 and 30 June 2003.107 
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The result of the Inner House and the Supreme Court in Salvesen finding sections of the AH(S)A 
2003 as ultra vires and the resulting remedial order has extinguished these perceived rights of 
obtaining a secure tenancy. 
At first instance, Lord Clark held that compensation was only available where the petitioners had 
incurred costs in consequences of “reasonable reliance” on the defective legislation.108 But any 
claim was subject to the counterbalancing effect of setting off the value of benefits obtained by 
the qualifying general partners arising from the extended period of tenancy that they had enjoyed 
(from 1 July 2003 until the Remedial Order came into force on 3 April 2014).109 Crucially, The 
petitioners were unable to claim for the loss of the secure 1991 Act tenancies and the loss of the 
good-will tied up in the family farming business. As Shields noted in response: “Having established 
that compensation might be due to the petitioners, the scope for compensation was then 
minimised so as to be rendered almost worthless”.110 
The petitioners appealed to the Inner House. On 12 June 2018, The Inner House of the Court of 
Session handed down a unanimous opinion in McMaster v Scottish Ministers.111 Lord Drummond 
Young (with whom The Lord President, Lord Carloway and Lord Menzies agreed) dismissed the 
appeal.112  
 
1.8 SUMMARY  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the role and influence A1P1 has had, and will continue 
to have, on contemporary Scots rights to buy. In doing so, it will not consider A1P1 in isolation, 
but place it within the broader human rights discourse. It will then be shown how the conclusions 
drawn offer significant guidance on the effect of A1P1 in domestic law and the limits of 
progressive rights to property in practice. 
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2 CHAPTER ONE 
THE SCOTTISH LAND QUESTION AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL 
REFORMS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis challenges existing conceptions of A1P1. It does this through the lens of contemporary 
distributive land reform in Scotland. Since devolution, the Scottish Parliament has undertaken 
arguably the most far-reaching legislative reform of land law in the Western world. Part 1 of this 
chapter considers the driving forces behind contemporary reforms. It argues that several, often 
intertwined factors have inspired reform. Land reform is inspired by the complex history of 
Scotland and the contemporary conceptions of landed power and the highland clearances. This is 
emboldened by a feeling of distance between those who own the land and those who live there, 
facilitated by absentee ownership, the use of tax avoidance schemes, and questions over the 
transparency of ownership. The contemporary political rhetoric tends to focus on the high 
concentration of ownership that has existed for centuries and theories of distributive justice. Part 
1 should not be considered a comprehensive critique of the Scottish land question or the history 
of Scottish land law; instead, it should be read as a background to the legislative reforms that will 
later be outlined in part 2 and considered through the lens of property rights throughout this thesis.   
Part 2 of this chapter will set out contemporary Scots land law reforms. While it is important not 
to conflate land reform in its totality with community, crofting and agricultural rights to buy, the 
focus of this thesis will be on the six contemporary rights to buy and their ability to conditionally 
and pre-emptively expropriate land and ancillary rights.  
2.2 CHAPTER ONE: PART 1 THE SCOTTISH LAND QUESTION 
 
Commentators today often speak of the “Scottish land question”, and as such it has become a 
term synonymous with contemporary reforms. Land reform was brought onto the political agenda 
in the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries.113 It would be a gross understatement to 
describe the Scottish land question as simply controversial. Historically complex and politically 
contentious, not to mention legally complicated, the confusion that greets this topic is exacerbated 
                                               
113 M. Combe, “The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016: another answer to the Scottish land question” (2016) Juridical 
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by the available literature often being cumbersome and inaccessible. To comprehend 
contemporary debates, the historical context of modern reforms must be understood.  
 
For most of the twentieth century, despite sporadic minor resurgences, the debate shifted from 
the political mainstream to be the preserve of the legal profession, Scotland Office civil servants, 
and a small group of activists. This all changed with the establishment of the Scottish Executive 
in 1999, which transformed the context in which Scottish property law could be debated and 
addressed.114 The result is that the last twenty years have seen land reform thrust to the legislative 
and policy forefront. Despite the assertions of Lord Sewel, the chairman of the Land Reform 
Policy Group (“LRPG”), in 1999 that “the Government’s approach to land reform is to focus on 
the future, not the past”,115 it would be naïve to think that recent reforms were not inspired, in 
part, by factors that have been described as Scotland’s “historical hangover”.116  
It is not possible to do justice to the complicated past and enduring debates that surround the 
history of land ownership in Scotland. Readers are advised to turn to Tom Devine’s The Scottish 
Clearances: A History of the Dispossessed, published in 2018, for as near a comprehensive account as is 
possible within the confines of a text that is digestible.117 
2.2.1 A DIVIDED NATION  
The eminent Scottish writer Robert Louis Stevenson wrote: 
Scotland is indefinable; it has no unity except on the map. Two languages, many dialects, 
innumerable forms of piety, and countless local patriotisms and prejudices, part us among 
ourselves more widely than the extreme east and west of that great continent of America.118  
What Stevenson helps illustrate is that, traditionally, Scotland has been divided between the 
Highlands and Islands and the lowlands and East coast.119 This division is important for this thesis.  
In the lowlands, Norman feudal law came to influence the system of land tenure as ancient military 
                                               
114 SA 1998 named the body the “Scottish Executive”. In 2007 this was rebranded as the “Scottish Government”. The 
name was officially changed to the Scottish Government by s. 12(1) of the Scotland Act 2012.  
115 LRRG, Recommendations for Action (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office 1999).  
116 M. Lloyd and M. Dawson, “The Land Policy Group in Scotland” (2000) 15 Local Economy 214, 221. 
117 T. M. Devine, The Scottish Clearances: A History of the Dispossessed (London: Penguin Random House, 2018). 
118 R. Stevenson, The Silverado Squatters (Carlisle MA: Applewood Books 2007) p. 337.  
119 See J. Dawson, “The Gaidhealtachd and the emergence of the Scottish Highlands” in B. Bradshaw and P. Roberts 
(eds) British Identity and British Consciousness (Cambridge: CUP 1998) pp. 259-300.  
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tenures were converted to the paying of rents. In the Highlands, the system of land tenure retained 
its ancient origins significantly longer than in the rest of the UK.120 As such, it is often contended 
that the Scottish land question is predominantly concerned with the Highlands and Islands.121 This 
is most apparent in relation to crofting law which was historically confined to the “crofting 
counties”, shown as the shaded counties in figure 1. As the Land Reform Review Group 
(“LRRG”) noted, “the fact that the Crofters Act in 1886 only introduced crofting tenure in the 
seven most northerly and westerly counties in Scotland, has tended to encourage a view that 
crofters and crofting have always been something distinct to those areas”.122 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Land Reform Review Group, “The Land of Scotland and the Common Good” 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2014) Fig. 30 
The land reform debate is often Highland centric, and this is important to highlight, but it does 
cover the entirety of Scotland.123  The legislative reforms do not just affect the ownership of land 
in “rural” communities. While the original LR(S)A 2003 was only applicable to communities with 
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a population under 10,000, this has since been removed.124 For example, a high-profile application 
has been made in regard to a disused church in Edinburgh.125 The point to take into the rest of 
this thesis is that while the land reform debate is arguably at its most heated for historical and 
socio-economic reasons in the Highlands and Islands, the debate encompasses the whole of 
Scotland. Despite this, rights to buy and community ownership remain primarily confined to the 
Highlands and Islands. The Office of National Statistics reported in December 2017 that 548,128 
out of a total of 562,299 acres of land in community ownership is in the Highlands and Islands, 
with only 9 acres in the Lothians and 11 in Glasgow.126 
2.2.2 HISTORICAL GRIEVANCES  
When it comes to the Scottish land question, in the words of the influential play The Cheviot the Stag 
and the Black, Black Oil, “it begins, I suppose, with 1746 – Culloden and all that. The Highlands 
were in a bit of a mess”.127 The defeat at Culloden resulted in legal reform as the British government 
attempted to bring the Highlands under control.128  The age of enlightenment was accompanied 
by the increase of capitalism and a paternalistic theory of improvement.129 This shift in land-use 
resulted in considerable population reductions; forced emigration to North America or Australasia; 
and re-settlement on Scotland’s coastal fringes. This reverberated around the world as many of the 
dispossessed went on to expropriate land from native peoples around the British empire. Those 
pushed to the coast make up a considerable proportion of the people we, today, call crofters.130  
It is important to remember the dispossession and the enclosures were not confined to the 
Highlands. As Devine asserts, this “was indeed the Scottish clearances”.131 However, he notes that 
“[t]he dispossession of people in the Highlands has always had a high historical profile. In the 
Lowlands it is low to the point of virtual non-existence”.132 The Clearances were not a homogenous 
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serious of events nor were the reasons for change uniform.133 A widespread perception of the 
clearances is illustrated in the play The Cheviot the Stag and the Black, Black Oil, by characters playing 
the infamous factor of the Sutherland Estate, Patrick Sellar, and his assistant James Loch:  
So if you'd abandon your old misery – 
I will teach you the secrets of high industry: 
 
Your barbarous customs, though they may be old 
To civilised people hold horrors untold – 
What value a culture that cannot be sold? 
The price of a culture is counted in gold. 
 
I've money to double the rent that you pay 
The factor is willing to give me my way 
So off you go quietly – like sheep as they say – 
I'll arrange for the boats to collect you today.134 
 
The importance of the legacy and popular perception of the Clearances should not be 
underestimated. As the Scottish Landowners Federation concluded: “the passionate memory of 
the Highland clearances is likely to be a stumbling block to any effective advocacy of the 
landowner’s case”.135  It is difficult to overstate how sensitive the clearances remain. Speaking in 
Parliament in 1965, Willie Ross MP stated to the House that “[f]or 200 years, the Highlander has 
been the man on Scotland's conscience... No part of Scotland has been given a shabbier deal by 
history”. Ross felt it necessary to highlight that “[i]f there is bitterness in my voice, I can assure 
the House that there is bitterness in Scotland, too, when we recollect the history of these areas... 
We have [in the Scottish Highlands] nine million acres, where 275,000 people live, and we are 
short of land!”136  
 
The accuracy of popular narrative is subject to challenge. In The Scottish Clearances: A History of the 
Dispossessed, Devine concludes that past quasi-historians have successfully embedded a Greek 
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tragedy in the Highlands. This portrayal of a struggle between a noble warrior people suffering 
brutal repression at the hands of the British state, abandoned by their tribal leaders due to their 
lust for money and power, remains a compelling (yet not entirely historically inaccurate) part of 
the Scottish narrative.137 While compelling as a story, Devine sets out the limitations of natural 
endowment in the Highlands in meticulous detail: the unsustainable increase in population; the 
destruction of infant manufacturing; bankruptcy; the overwhelming power of market capitalism; 
and the absence of any viable alternative to pastoral husbandry.138  
 
2.2.3 AN ERA OF INSTABILITY  
Agricultural decline and an influx of new industrial wealth from the rest of the UK and its 
burgeoning empire in the middle of the 19th century resulted in the “Balmoralisation” of the 
Highlands. This is named after the romanticised castle bought by Queen Victoria in 1852. Large 
tracts of the Highlands were bought for the sole purpose of recreation as a sentimentalised image, 
exaggerated by the likes of Sir Walter Scott, the royal family, and the British press’s fascination 
with the noble actions of Scottish regiments overseas. By the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century over two thirds of Highland estates had changed hands.139 With this tweed-, shortbread-, 
and tartan-covered image of Scotland that survives to this day came an influx of new landowners. 
Large parts of particularly the Highlands were increasingly being used exclusively for the leisure 
pursuits of the wealthy. As a result, anti-landlord sentiment grew as did the feeling that the 
landowners were outsiders, often absentees, and worst of all “English!”140  
The system of land ownership in Scotland began to be questioned and challenged.  In 1885 George 
observed in The Reduction to Inequality:  
Test the institution of private property in land by its fruits in any country where it exists. 
Take Scotland. What, there, are its results? That wild beasts have supplanted human beings; 
that glens which once sent forth their thousand fighting men are now tenanted by a couple 
of gamekeepers; that there is destitution and degradation that would shame savages; that 
little children are stunted and starved for want of proper nourishment; that women are 
                                               
137 Devine (n 117) p. 360.  
138 Ibid pp. 360-361. 
139 Ibid p. 132.  
140 McIntosh and Wightman (n 123) 64-70.  
Rights to Property, Rights to Buy, and Land Law Reform  38 
compelled to do the work of animals; that young girls who ought to be fitting themselves 
for wifehood and motherhood are held to monotonous toil in factories.141 
With unrest growing, the popular consciousness was grabbed by stories of famine and unrest in 
the popular British press.142 The government responded by setting up a Royal Commission into 
the conditions of crofters and cottars in the Highlands and Islands in 1883. This would become 
known as the Napier Commission. The Napier Commission resulted in the passing of the Crofters’ 
Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886 which set up a body called “the Crofters Commission”, whose prime 
duty was indeed to fix fair rents for crofts. This was replaced by the Scottish Land Court with 
effect from 1 April 1912, when the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act 1911 came into force.143   
 
2.2.4 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY   
 
The twentieth century saw an increase in absentee and foreign ownership. Absentee landlords and 
land owned by anonymous trusts or – as the recent Panama papers revealed – companies registered 
in tax havens have helped perpetuate a feeling that much of rural Scotland is owned by a distinct, 
often portrayed as alien, class of landowners.144  This desire to publicise ownership is observable 
in the recent debates over land registration and transparency in the Land Registration etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2012.145 The grievance of absentee owners and their perceived disinterest in local 
communities is expressed in a song in The Cheviot the Stag and the Black, Black Oil, where two absentee 
landlords sing:   
 
We are the men 
Who own your glen 
Though you won't see us there – 
In Edinburgh clubs 
And Guildford pubs 
We insist how much we care: 
Your interests 
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Are ours, my friends, 
From Golspie to the Minch – 
But if you want your land 
We'll take a stand 
We will not budge one inch…146 
 
Absentee owners are more diverse than simply those who frequent private members clubs or enjoy 
£8 pints in Surrey. As Cramb noted in 2000, “there has been an Arab period, there has been a 
Dutch period, there is an on-going Danish period... there was a very strong Hong Kong period... 
and a rock group period”.147 The important point is that land in Scotland has in many instances 
become subject to broader forces of capitalism and has become yet another commodity to be 
traded.148 This has fuelled the rhetoric of radical reform and a feeling that the Scottish people have 
been disinherited from their own country.149  
 
What this section has sought to highlight is the long and complex history of land law and land 
ownership in Scotland, particularly the Highlands. Scottish history continues to have an impact on 
modern land law. The historical accuracy of many of the grievances is subject to dispute.  This is, 
however, beyond the ambit of this thesis.  
 
2.2.5 THE CONCENTRATION OF LAND IN SCOTLAND 
Proponents of land reform argue that the inequalities of the current system are at the heart of 
wider social and economic injustices.150 LRPG argued in 1998 that the current distribution of land 
in Scotland inhibited local enterprise, caused depopulation and in some instances resulted in 
environmental degradation.151  To the LRPG, “[a]ll too often…the interests of the majority have 
been damaged by the interests of the few”.152 It is often said that Scotland has the most 
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concentrated land ownership patterns in the Western world.153 Warren concluded that “a 
minuscule 0.025% of the population owns 67% of the privately owned rural land. Thirty owners 
have more than 25,000 hectares each”.154 This association with the high concentration of 
landownership and a lack of rural development “has been a source of persistent calls for land 
reform”.155 
Figure 2 








Source: Land Reform Review Group, “The Land of Scotland and the Common Good” 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2014) Fig. 25. 
It must be remembered that these statistics are slightly misleading, particularly when considering 
Scotland and not simply the Highlands and Islands. Some of the largest estates cover marginal 
moorland and areas with some of the poorest quality soil in Europe. This is illustrated by a report 
published by the Hutton Institute which shows that 51% of Scotland’s land is classified as Class 6 
to 7 meaning that the land has severe limitations and is either steep, very poorly drained, and has 
acidic or shallow soils.156 Despite this, the high concentration of ownership is significant and 
remains a driving force behind calls for greater land reform and distributive justice.157 The political 
rhetoric is the deeply embedded conviction that those who work the land should own the land. 
The 1954 Royal Commission on Crofting Conditions observed that: 
They have the feeling that the croft, its land, its house are their own. They have gathered 
its stones and reared its buildings and occupied it as their own all their days.  
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They have received it from their ancestors who won if from the wilderness and they cherish 
the hope they will transmit it to the generations to come.  
 
Whatever the legal theory they feel it to be their own.158  
This sentiment is strikingly similar to Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath:   
Sure, cried the tenant men, but it’s our land. We measured it and broke it up. We were 
born on it, and we got killed on it, died on it. Even if it’s no good, it’s still ours. That’s 
what makes it ours-being born on it, working it, dying on it.159 
 
2.2.6 TAXATION, SUBSIDIES AND TRUSTS  
The prevalence of tax avoidance schemes, the use of offshore and onshore trusts, and the large 
number of available subsidies have been subject to considerable criticism. Leaked documents from 
the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca showed that companies registered in Panama owned 
over 60,000 acres of Scotland.160 The combination of large pay-outs, secretive ownership, and the 
use of tax avoidance mechanisms is fuelling calls for reform and anti-landlord sentiment. 
Many landowners benefit from large transfers of public money in the form of subsidies. While the 
common agricultural policy (“CAP”), forestry and environmental subsidies make large pay-outs, it 
is the wind farm “boom” in Scotland that has drawn the greatest criticism from commentators. 
The Conservative MEP Struan Stevenson concluded that Scotland’s wealthiest landowners were 
on course to earn over £1 billion in rental fees from wind companies.161 While landowners are 
adept at maximising public money, a briefing submitted to the Scottish Affairs Committee (“SAC”) 
noted that they are “equally skilled at minimising the flow of cash in the other direction – helped 
greatly in this regard by successive Governments’ toleration of a series of arrangements intended 
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to reduce greatly, or even eliminate, effective taxation of landed wealth”.162 A 2013 article in The 
Guardian described them as “the world’s most successful benefit tourists”.163 
2.2.7 THE POLITICS OF REFORM 
The political climate that has facilitated contemporary reforms can be observed in the many policy 
documents, committee meetings, and debates emanating from Holyrood.164 Scottish Land & 
Estates which represents the interest of landowners and farmers in Scotland described the LR(S)A 
2016 as being marked by “raw anti-landowner sentiment” pointed towards an “incessant clamour 
for radicalism”.165 To others, the reforms do not go far enough. On the main stage at the SNP 
conference in 2015 one member exclaimed that current landowners “stole the land” and “anyone 
who bought the land from the people who stole it first of all are guilty of reset”. This resulted in 
enthusiastic applause from the delegates.166 There are also many notable, and often unfortunate 
quotes that have been seized upon by the media, or those seeking to help divide others further. 
The historian Hunter was quoted promising that “when the sporting estate is dead and buried, I’ll 
lead the dancing on its grave”.167 The MSP Bill Aitken was quoted in 2002 describing contemporary 
land reform as “social engineering” such as that found in “Zimbabwe, North Korea and Cuba” 
and described the then Land Reform Bill as “a land grab of which Robert Mugabe would be 
proud”.168 This resulted in a memorable and unfortunate headline in The Daily Mail on the passing 
of the LR(S)A 2003.169 
While the headlines are grabbed by the controversial views outlined above, what this does is to 
denigrate the politics of reform into stereotypes. Churlish tweed-clad landowners and radical leftist 
campaigners wrapped in hemp stand in an intractable standoff, unable to appreciate the other 
side’s perspective. It is important to emphasise that the political debate is significantly more 
complicated than it is often portrayed in the media. That being so, it is not controversial to state 
that Holyrood and those who support land reform represent political parties and groups whose 
                                               
162 Scottish Affairs Committee Briefing Paper (n 99) para 2.5. 
163 G. Monibot, “Farming subsidies: this is the most blatant transfer of cash to the rich” The Guardian (London: 2 July 
2013). 
164 See inter alia LRRG, The Land of Scotland and the Common Good (n 122); LRPG, Recommendations for Action (n 115). 
165 S. Johnson, “Scotland’s lairds: We are SNP land reform ‘whipping boys’” The Telegraph (London: 16 March 2016).  
166 S. Johnson, “SNP members rebel in demand for radical land reform” The Telegraph (London: 16 October 2015).  
167 J. Glass et al (n 85).  
168 A. Cramb, “Crofters’ Bill ‘like Zimbabwe land grab’” The Telegraph (London: 20 March 2002).  
169 E. Barnes, “Let the Land Grab Begin” The Scottish Daily Mail (Glasgow: 24 January 2003). 
Douglas S K Maxwell  43 
underpinning ideology sits on the left of the political compass and those who represent the interest 
of landowners tend to be more conservative.  
2.2.8 PUBLIC POLICY AND LAND REFORM  
Land reform encompasses a diverse range of public policy concerns. A comprehensive account 
within the confined of this thesis is not possible, but several points should be emphasised.170 The 
land question was of limited legislative and political importance until the last few years of the 
twentieth century. It was with the election of Labour in 1997 and the establishment of the Scottish 
Executive in 1999 that land reform was pushed up the legislative agenda. The result was the 
appointment of Lord Sewel to the LRPG, which was given the remit to: “identify and assess 
proposals for land reform in rural Scotland, taking account of their cost, legislative and 
administrative implications and their likely impact on the social and economic development of 
rural communities and the natural heritage”.171 The LRPG published three documents, Identifying 
the Problems, Identifying the Solutions and Recommendations for Action. The LRPG aimed to 
transform Scottish land law.172 Speaking in 2013, the First Minister of Scotland called for the 
doubling of community-owned land in Scotland to 1 million acres by 2020. Statistics published in 
December 2017 showed that an additional 437,770 acres would have to come into community 
ownership to achieve this target by 2020.173 
In May 2014, the LRRG published its final report, “The Land of Scotland and the Common 
Good”.174 The report reflects the importance of land as a finite resource, and explores how the 
arrangements governing the possession and use of land facilitate or inhibit progress towards 
achieving a Scotland which is economically successful, socially just and environmentally 
sustainable.175 It runs over two hundred and sixty pages and makes over sixty recommendations 
on a wide range of topics, noting that there was “no single measure, or ‘silver bullet’, which would 
modernise land ownership patterns in Scotland and deliver land reform measures which would 
better serve the public interest”.176 The diversification of ownership through community 
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ownership is described in one Scottish Parliament Research Briefing paper as the “key land reform 
policy”.177 
In September 2017, the Scottish Ministers published the Scottish Land Rights and Responsibilities 
Statement (“SLRRS”). Together with the Scottish Land Commission’s Strategic Plan, the 
statement underlines the Government’s commitment to on-going and long-term land reform.178 
The SLRRS breaks land reform into six “principles”, that focus on the need for the realisation of 
human rights, a balance of public and private interest, a shift towards an egalitarian pattern of land 
ownership, community engagement, environmental stewardship, greater transparency and 
community collaboration.179 These principles are important as they emphasise the public policy 
behind the rights to buy. It is the impact A1P1 has had and will continue to have on these rights 
to buy that are at the core of the analysis of this thesis. 
 
2.2.9 CONCLUSIONS ON THE SCOTTISH LAND QUESTION  
 
As the above section has shown, the Scottish land question can be broken down into four primary 
concerns; (i) historical, most notably the legacy of dispossession and the Highland Clearances; (ii) 
absentee landowners, transparency of ownership, and tax avoidance; (iii) the high concentration 
of ownership; and (iv) the public policy of reform, as exemplified in the LRRG 2014 report. 
Caution is always necessary when considering the Scottish land question as, while these four 
concerns are often cited, they remain open to criticism and are understudied, especially by impartial 
observers. It is not possible within this thesis to discuss these issues in any more detail. 
Considerable information is available in the various reports produced by the LRPG, LRRG, and 
the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee.180  
 
                                               
177 A. Reid, SPICe Briefing: Land Reform in Scotland SPICe Briefing 15/28 (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office 2015) 
p. 16. 
178 Scottish Government, Scottish Land Rights and Responsibilities Statement (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office 2017).  
179 Ibid p. 9.  
180 Scottish Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2014-15, Land Reform in Scotland: Final Report, HC 274; 
Scottish Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2013-14, Land Reform in Scotland: Interim Report, HC 877. 
Douglas S K Maxwell  45 
2.3 CHAPTER ONE: PART 2 
2.3.1 CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
The previous section has highlighted the political desire for land reform in Scotland. It has 
emphasised the historical background and the contemporary problems that have made the 
diversification of ownership a justifiable legislative endeavour. This section shall set out concepts 
of land reform and show how Scotland, by focusing on community ownership, is implementing a 
distinct form of property re-ordering.  
The reconstitution of the Scottish Parliament has resulted in a near revolution in Scots property 
law. As Lord Gill observed, “modern legislation in this area, has achieved more radical and valuable 
reforms within a few years than it had achieved in the previous century”.181 The government 
introduced the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2004, which on the “appointed day” 
removed the feudal system of land holding in Scotland.182 Further reforms were brought in by the 
Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 which effectively introduced a code governing most 
perpetual obligations affecting land. The Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 codified the law of 
condominium.183 The volume of legislation in this area is vast,184 and more legislation is 
forthcoming.185  
 
It is therefore important to outline in detail the primary pre-emptive and absolute rights to buy 
that the Scottish Ministers primarily hope will facilitate the realisation of the six principles outlined 
in the SLRRS. These are:  
 
- The community right to buy (“CRtB”) 
- The crofting community right to buy (“CCRtB”) 
- The right to buy abandoned and neglected land (“RtBAN”) 
- The right to buy for sustainable development (“RtBSD”) 
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- The agricultural tenants right to buy (“ARtB”) 
- The agricultural tenants right to buy where a landlord is in breach (ARtBB”) 
 
These reforms are often the focus when commentators and politicians speak of “land reform”, 
whereas much of the legislation modernises and consolidates property law.186 It is important to 
note that what this thesis has termed rights to buy, are not the only means by which the public 
powers may be used in Scotland to purchase land. However, others will not be discussed in this 
thesis.187 
The proceeding section will set out what this thesis has termed the six “rights to buy”. It will 
illustrate, in brief, the background to each and will give an outline of the procedure. In doing so, 
it will highlight several important judicial decisions and comment upon the effectiveness of the 
existing sales orders.  
 
- The community right to buy (“CRtB”) 
- The crofting community right to buy (“CCRtB”) 
- The right to buy abandoned and neglected land (“RtBAN”) 
- The right to buy for sustainable development (“RtBSD”) 
- The agricultural tenants right to buy (“ARtB”) 
- The agricultural tenants right to buy where a landlord is in breach (ARtBB”) 
 
2.3.2 THE COMMUNITY RIGHT TO BUY  
 
The “original” community right to buy was introduced by part 2 of the LR(S)A 2003 as amended 
by the CE(S)A 2015 and was brought into force on 14 June 2004.188 Under part 2, a community 
body (“CB”) can apply to Ministers to register an interest in land that is not excluded,189 this 
includes additional rights such as salmon fishing and mineral rights.190 It is important to emphasise 
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that the original community right to buy requires the owner(s) to consensually sell of the land 
subject to registration. As such, it should be considered more akin to a “right to register”, or a 
right for the CB to stand first in line if the landowner chooses to sell in the future.  
 
Chapter two of part 2 of the LR(S)A 2003 outlines the procedure for the community right to buy. 
Registration can be undertaken under the “timeous application” procedure in section 37 and 38 
where no sale of the land to which the registration related is anticipated.191 Section 39 adds the 
second mechanism for a “late application” where action had been taken which, if a community 
interest had been registered, would be prohibited.192 The late application procedure is only 
accepted in “exceptional circumstances”.193 As of April 2005, unawareness of the legislation is no 
longer regarded as a valid reason for not submitting a timeous registration.194 
 
The Act requires the CB to define “community” during the application.195 The community is 
defined by an area of land covered by a full postcode.196  Members of the community must also be 
registered to vote at a local government election at an address within the postcode unit or units 
defining the community.197 The LR(S)A 2003 originally required that the community had to appear 
to the Ministers to be rural and not exceed a population of 10,000, but this was removed by the 
LR(S)A 2016.198  
 
Ministers need to be satisfied that the registration is in the public interest,199 and is consistent with 
furthering sustainable development.200 Once the CRtB is confirmed, the owner is entitled to 
compensation at market value.201 The new guidance has affirmed this stating that “the community 
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right to buy process is not intended to be used as a means to stop the landowner from developing 
their land in any way”.202 It is also apparent that it is not considered in the public interest for the 
right to buy to subvert the planning process. This is because the grant of planning permission, 
itself, is viewed as being in the public interest.203  
 
2.3.2.1 CONCLUSIONS ON THE COMMUNITY RIGHT TO BUY  
 
The community right to buy does have the potential to be a positive mechanism for communities. 
To Bryden and Geisler, “the community’s right to buy is fundamentally a right ‘to be’ and to secure 
a place-based arena of common identity and interests, protected by legal title”.204 However, a 2012 
Scottish Government report noted that the high drop-out rate and lower than expected use of the 
CRtB was due to: land not coming on to the market or being withdrawn; complex, resource-
intense legislation; applications being rejected due to them being late or flawed; and a lack of 
resources and finances to purchase land.205 Uptake has, however, been significant. As of 1 June 
2018, there were 234 entries in the register, although the majority have already been deleted.206 
One of the few available studies was published in 2015 by Ipsos MORI and Scotland’s Rural 
College. This report gives some guidance on existing and future problems.207 It concludes that 
most of the key promises remain unfulfilled and there remains a lack of detailed economic analysis 
of the full effect of these measures.   
 
2.3.3 CROFTING LAW 
 
Giving evidence to the RACCE Committee in 2015, Peter Peacock from Community Land 
Scotland gave a warning.  
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It is said that only three people understand crofting law—one is mad, one is dead and 
nobody can remember who the third one is. Actually, to be fair, that was said of local 
government finance.208  
 
This is a rather suitable adaption of the famous quote accredited to Lord Palmerston about 
the Schleswig-Holstein question.209 Much like the Schleswig-Holstein question, most today will 
never have heard of crofting law. Further, most will not be able to point on a map to where its 
complexity can be found. There can be little doubt that both will be met with a justifiable look of 
tedium if brought up in conversation. Crofting is a very technical and specialised area of Scots law 
that is saturated with history and politics.210 
 
The best definition of a croft remains that it is “an area of land surrounded by a sea of 
legislation”.211 Crofting is a creation of the Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886 (CH(S)A 1986), 
which came from the findings of the 1883 Napier Commission.212 CH(S)A 1886 established the 
“Crofters Commission” which was a quasi-judicial body regulating crofting tenure.213 This was 
abolished in 1911 and replaced by the Land Court. The Crofters (Scotland) Act 1955 created a 
new Crofters Commission, whose functions were regulatory and administrative, rather than quasi-
judicial.214  In 2010 the name of the Crofters Commission was changed to “The Crofting 
Commission”.215  
 
In practice, a croft is a small area of land that can roughly range between one and fifty acres that 
are generally worked by a family group alongside common grazing. The system is designed to 
control and safeguard security of tenure and maintain communities on some of Scotland’s most 
marginal land. Crofts were originally distinct to the “crofting counties”. However, the Crofting 
Reform etc. Act 2007 gave the Scottish Ministers the power to extend crofting tenure.216 The 
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modern law of crofting is largely governed by the Crofters (Scotland) Act 1993 (“C(S)A 1993”), 
which has been amended. While crofting is a unique form of leasehold tenure, it remains a legal 
relationship between landlord and tenant.217 
 
There is a long history of crofters being able to purchase their croft land and ancillary rights, being 
first introduced in the Crofting Reform (Scotland) Act 1976.218  This was amended by the Crofters 
(Scotland) Act 1993 (“C(S)A 1993”). Under C(S)A 1993 section 12, crofters could apply to the 
Scottish Land Court for authority to acquire the “croft land”.219 The right to apply to the Land 
Court only arises after there has been an attempt to negotiate a sale, which has failed.220 Under 
section 13 the Land Court can make an order forcing sale of all, or part, of the croft land,221 
provided that the Land Court does not deem that the sale will cause a “substantial degree of 
hardship” to the owner or be “substantially detrimental to the interests of sound management of 
the estate of the landlord”.222 The compensation payable to the deposed owner is calculated at the 
current rent (or the rent fixed by the Land Court as a fair rent on an application by the landlord) 
multiplied by the factor of 15.223  The Transfer of Crofting Estates (Scotland) Act 1997 was 
intended to facilitate the sale of a large number of government-owned crofting estates to crofting 
communities.224 However, there was, in fact, no take up on the part of the crofting communities, 
most of which were perfectly happy with the Secretary of State for Scotland and, post-devolution, 
the Scottish Ministers, as their landlord, until the West Harris buy-out in 2010.225  
 
2.3.3.1 CROFTING COMMUNITY RIGHT TO BUY 
 
The crofting community right to buy (“CCRtB”) is contained in part 3 of the LR(S)A 2003. The 
2003 Act provides a right to buy croft land. Croft land, in general, consists of crofts as defined by 
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section 3 of the C(S)A 1993 and land over which croft tenants have grazing.226 The CCRtB may 
also cover “eligible additional land” held by the croft landowner which is contiguous with the croft 
land.227 The right to buy also extends to a tenant’s interest in a lease over croft land other than a 
croft tenancy or a tenancy of a dwelling-house. The purchase of such an interest brings the lease 
to an end and is, in effect, a resumption of the land.228  
 
Only a crofting community body can exercise the CCRtB.229 Such a body must be a company 
limited by guarantee. Its articles of association must provide that the company can exercise the 
right to buy under part 3, that the majority of the members of the company must be members of 
the crofting community, and that such members shall have control of the company.230 The Scottish 
Ministers must confirm that the body’s main purpose is consistent with furthering sustainable 
development.231 The LR(S)A 2003 makes elaborate provision for the membership of the crofting 
community body. In general, the membership consists of those who are resident on croft land or 
land contiguous with it or are tenants of croft land who live in the locality.232  
 
A crofting community body may buy additional eligible land without the landowner’s consent, but 
only if the Land Court so determines.233 The Land Court may authorise the purchase of such 
additional land only if it is satisfied that the purchase is essential to the development of the crofting 
community and that such development is compatible with furthering sustainable development.234 
The consideration payable to the landowner is ascertained by valuation determined by a person 
appointed by the Scottish Ministers. It consists of a sum representing the open market value of 
the land acquired, together with compensation for disturbance.235  
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2.3.3.2 THE CROFTING COMMUNITY RIGHT TO BUY IN PRACTICE  
The CCRtB has been used sparingly, the 26,000 acre Pairc Trust and the 56,000 acre Galston 
Trust, both on the Isle of Lewis, being the only two. Other buyouts, such as 93,000 acres South 
Uist Estate were purchased through negotiations without the need for a CCRtB application. The 
Scottish Government published a report in 2012 that noted that the process remains “onerous, 
complex and resource-intensive” with uptake being “much lower than had originally been 
anticipated”.236 The report noted that part 3 has come to be viewed as a “fall-back position of last 
resort” and the lack of funding, support and advice combined with demanding mapping 
requirements had become barriers to the successful implementation of the CCRtB.237 
2.3.4 THE RIGHT TO BUY ABANDONED AND NEGLECTED LAND  
 
The Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 (“CE(S)A”) part 4 introduces part 3A into 
the LR(S)A 2003. This allows all communities, not just rural, to apply for ministerial approval to 
acquire “neglected” or “abandoned” land.238 The CE(S)A 2015 has broadened the non-profit 
organisation that can constitute a community body. These are companies limited by guarantee, a 
Scottish charitable organisation and a community benefit society.239 While the CRtB is pre-
emptive, the right to buy abandoned or neglected land is absolute, being limited only by the 
conditions placed on Ministers when granting consent. Part 3A came partly into force on 30 June 
2017  and creates a “New Register” for applications for the right to buy abandoned and neglected 
land.240  
 
Eligible land is land that is “wholly or mainly abandoned or neglected, or the use or management 
of the land is such that it results in or causes harm, directly or indirectly, to the environmental well-
being of a relevant community”.241 Harm includes “the environmental effects of which have an 
adverse effect on the lives of persons comprising the relevant community”, and “does not include 
harm which, in the opinion of Ministers, is negligible”.242 This does not include “land on which 
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there is a building or other structure which is an individual’s home”, “eligible croft land”, and “land 
which is owned or occupied by the Crown by virtue of its having vested as bona vacantia in the 
Crown”.243 In a similar manner to existing sales orders, Pt 3A requires the transfer of land to be 
likely to further sustainable development.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, this is an interesting development as it appears that the Scottish 
Government has taken an almost utilitarian view of ownership. In that, if an owner is not utilising 
their property, their title becomes subject to challenge under part 3A and can be forcefully 
transferred. All of this is left to the discretion of the Scottish Ministers which may become 
problematic. Interestingly, perhaps the most detailed study on compulsory purchase powers for 
abandoned and neglected land was written in 2011 by the American Brooking-Rockefeller 
Foundation in a report entitled “Recapturing Land for Economic and Fiscal Growth”.244 
The right to buy abandoned and neglected land was subject to considerable criticism during 
consultation.245 The real difficulty will most likely come in defining what constitutes abandoned 
and neglected land. This will be discussed in chapter four.  
2.3.5 THE RIGHT TO BUY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
 
The LR(S)A 2016 part 5 introduces the “right to buy land to further sustainable development” 
(“CRBSD”), introducing a “new” community right to buy, which is likely to come into force in 
2019.246 Replicating the original CRtB, community is defined in a geographic sense by postcode 
unit.247 The community body can be constituted as a  company limited by guarantee, a Scottish 
charitable incorporated organisation and a community benefit society.248 Land is defined as all land 
which is not “excluded”. The LR(S)A 2016 makes an individual’s home excluded land and in doing 
so helps protect individuals’ Article 8 rights to a home and family life.249 Communities must register 
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their interest in the New Register and apply to the Scottish ministers for consent to buy land for 
the proposed purpose of “furthering sustainable development”.250  
 
The tests for approval of a right to buy in part 5 gives a more detailed legislative definition of what 
constitutes the public interest and sustainable development than is found in the original CRtB and 
the CCRtB.  LR(S)A 2016 section 56 states that when considering an application, the Scottish 
Ministers must not consent unless they are satisfied that the sustainable development conditions 
are met. This means that it must be shown that the transfer of land is likely to further the 
achievement of sustainable development, is in the public interest, is likely to result in significant 
benefit to the relevant community, and is the only practicable, or the most practicable, way of 
achieving that significant benefit, and not granting consent to the transfer of land is likely to result 
in harm to that community. In determining what constitutes significant benefit the Scottish 
Ministers must consider, economic development, regeneration, public health, social well-being, 
and environmental wellbeing.251 Part 5 of the LR(S)A 2016 has not yet entered into force. The 
right to buy for sustainable development is only conditional on ministerial consent.252  
 
2.3.6 THE LAW OF AGRICULTURAL LEASES 
 
The law of leases relating to agricultural land in Scotland, applies to land that does not constitute 
croft land or a small holding. The AH(S)A 2003 and the AH(S)A 2016 regulates agricultural leases 
and “agricultural holdings” are regulated by the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991 
(“AH(S)A 1991”). For over 130 years there have been statutory regulations for agricultural 
leases.253 The current primary legislation is the AH(S)A 1991 as amended.254 Much like crofting 
law, and indeed, the Schleswig-Holstein question, agricultural holdings law, is unbeknown to most 
who want to remain sane. As the practitioner Blair admits, “agricultural holdings law has one 
distinctive feature - most lawyers, when students, were told to be very cautious of getting 
involved”.255 This is complicated by the reality that recent changes have brought about “greater 
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change in the tenanted sector of Scottish agriculture than any legislation since 1883”.256 In the 
latter part of the nineteenth Century over 90% of farms in Scotland were tenanted.257  However, 
tenant farming in Scotland is undoubtedly in decline. Since 1982 the amount of tenanted 
agricultural land has declined by more than 40%. At present, only about 23% of agricultural land 
is subject to tenancy.258 
 
The AH(S)A 1991 defines “agricultural holding” as “the aggregate of the agricultural land 
comprised in a lease, not being a lease under which the land is let to the tenant during his 
continuance in any office, appointment or employment held under the landlord”.259 “Agricultural 
land” is defined as “land used for agriculture for purposes of a trade or business” or land designed 
so by the Secretary of State.260 The definition of what constitutes a 1991 Act tenancy is often 
disputed and frequently leads to litigation. This is, in part because a 1991 Act tenancy does not 
require a written lease. Even if a written lease does exist the practical reality of occupation may be 
found contrary to the lease and to lead to unintended consequences. 
 
The effect of the AH(S)A 2003 was to create a threefold classification of agricultural tenancies, 
namely; (i) 1991 Act tenancies; (ii) two forms of new limited duration tenancies; and (iii) leases for 
grazing or mowing.261 The LR(S)A 2016 replaced the “limited duration tenancy” with the “modern 
limited duration tenancy”.262 Inter alia this allows for the conversion of 1991 Act tenancies into 
modern limited duration tenancies.263 
 
The principle of freedom of contract generally applies in the law of leases; but since one important 
aspect of the legislation is the protection of the tenant in various ways, the principle is overridden 
by many of its provisions. A Scottish Government report in 2015 found that around 80% of 
tenanted land (excluding seasonal lets) is leased through a 1991 Act tenancy.264  
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2.3.6.1 AGRICULTURAL TENANT’S PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHT TO BUY  
 
Before proceeding it is important to highlight that while part 2 of the AH(S)A 2003 is titled the 
“tenant’s right to buy land”, the Act does not confer a right to buy such as that given to crofters 
or tenants of public sector housing.265 As Lord Gill noted, “[t]he expression ‘right to buy’ is, 
therefore, inaccurate. Nevertheless, it is in common use throughout the agricultural world by 
farmers and lawyers alike”.266 
 
Part 2, which came into effect on 15 December 2004, introduced the tenant’s right to buy for land 
leased under the AH(S)A 1991.267 The policy was to allow tenants to buy their farms.268 As 
originally passed, the tenant’s right to buy required registration in the register of community 
interests in land, that had to be renewed every five years to remain valid.269 Section 99 of the 
LR(S)A 2016 removed the requirement to register.270  This was contrary to the view of the 
Agricultural Holdings Legislation Review Group who concluded that the removal of the 
registration requirement would not be in the interests of agricultural tenants.271 
 
The right to buy applies throughout the subsistence of the tenancy. It does not restrict the right 
of the landlord to terminate the tenancy on any available ground and thereafter to sell the land 
with vacant possession.272 The tenant’s right to buy is pre-emptive like the CRtB, in that it requires 
a willing seller. The AH(S)A 2003 states that two possible trigger events activate the right to buy 
provisions.  
 
1. Where the owner or the creditor with the right to sell land in respect of which the tenant 
has registered an interest gives notice to the tenant of a proposal to transfer the land, or 
any part of it.273  
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2. Where the owner or the creditor “takes any action” with a view to such a transfer and the 
transfer is one of which notice to the tenant is required.274 
 
The introduction of the agricultural tenant’s pre-emptive right to buy has been perhaps the most 
controversial part of land reform in Scotland.275 The most important case concerning the 
agricultural tenant’s right to buy, and the wider debate about property rights and law reform, is the 
unanimous Supreme Court decision of Salvesen v Riddell.276 Further, the large number of notices to 
quit served on tenants and the McMaster v Scottish Ministers litigation highlights the unintended 
negative consequences of reform.277 
 
2.3.6.2 THE AGRICULTURAL TENANT’S RIGHT TO BUY WHERE THE 
LANDLORD IS IN BREACH  
 
The LR(S)A 2016 section 100 amends the AH(S)A 2003 with a new Pt 2A introducing the right 
for a tenant to apply to the Land Court for an order of sale “where the landlord is in breach”.278 
This came partially into force on 23 December 2016.279 This enables a tenant to apply to the Land 
Court for an order for sale of the holding where the landlord is in breach of obligations under the 
tenancy, and this is affecting the tenant’s ability to farm in accordance with the rules of good 
husbandry.280 This provision appears to be a tool attempting to reduce the perceived problem of 
poor land management either through subtle coercion to promote “good land management” or, if 
this fails, to force a sale.  
 
The new AH(S)A 2003 section 38A sets out the circumstances in which a tenant can make an 
application to the Land Court for an order of sale.  This includes where the landlord has failed, in 
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a material regard, to comply with a previous order or award by the Land Court under the section.281 
The Land Court must be satisfied that “the failure substantially and adversely affects the tenant’s 
ability to fulfil the tenant’s responsibilities to farm the holding in accordance with the rules of good 
husbandry, greater hardship would be caused by not making the order than by making it, and in 
all the circumstances it is appropriate”.282 Section 38B(7) states that AH(S)A 2003 Schedule 6 of 
the Agriculture (Scotland) Act 1948 is to define the “rules of good husbandry”.283 The 1948 Act 
gives a relatively long definition of good husbandry as including inter alia: “the occupier is 
maintaining a reasonable standard of efficient production, as respects both the kind of produce 
and the quality and quantity thereof, while keeping the unit in a condition to enable such a standard 
to be maintained in the future”.284  
 
Compensation provisions are contained in Section 38E AH(S)A 2003 which outlines that it is for 
the tenant to make the offer to buy. The offer is to be at a price agreed between parties where 
there is no such agreement, compensation is to be determined following section 34(8) AH(S)A 
2003 by the appointment of an independent valuer, or by appeal to the Land Court.285 Section 38G 
makes provision for the process for the appointment of the valuer and valuation of the land where 
the tenant and the landlord cannot agree on a price.286 This is governed and calculated under the 
same mechanisms outlined in section 33 to 36 of the AH(S)A 2003 relating to the original tenant’s 
right to buy in the 2003 Act.287 
 
2.3.7 THE SCOTTISH LAND COMMISSION 
The LR(S)A 2016 established the Scottish Land Commission (“the Commission”) as an executive 
non-departmental public body.288 The came into being on 1 April 2017.289 There are six 
Commissioners, including one tenant farming commissioner, supported by a small team of 
administrative staff, based in Inverness. The functions of the Commissioners are on any matter 
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relating to land in Scotland: to review the impact and effectiveness of any law or policy; to 
recommend changes to any law or policy; to gather evidence, to carry out research, to prepare 
reports; and to provide information and guidance.290  Matters relating to land include; ownership 
and other rights in land, management of land, use of land; and the land use strategy prepared under 
section 57 of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009.291 The tenant farming commissioner is to, 
inter alia, prepare a separate code of practice on agricultural holdings, to investigate alleged 
breaches, to make recommendations to improve the relationship between agents, tenants and 
landlords.292 The first strategic plan, published by the Commission in September 2017, states that:  
It [the Commission] has been given an initial remit by Scottish Ministers that is as 
ambitious as it is wide-ranging. The Scottish people now have a mechanism for driving 
forward land reform that previous generations could only have dreamt of.293 
The strategic plan states that the Commission will review the impacts of the scale and 
concentration of land ownership; review the effects of ownership structures, tax and fiscal 
arrangements on the public interest; and improve the effectiveness of community right to buy 
mechanisms and identify measures to secure more community benefit, use and ownership from 
Common Good.294 The Commission stated in its 2017 strategic plan that  
Land reform is a continuous process, it is not an event. It is the means whereby the 
legislative, policy and cultural framework within which land is owned, managed and used 
continuously evolves so that it maintains its relevance in a changing economic, social and 
cultural context. It is the task of the Scottish Land Commission to ensure that this 
framework evolves fast enough to keep up with change, and in ways that fully reflect that 
shifting context. It is, in short, both a pressing and a long-term job.295  
The future of land reform and the narrative surrounding Convention rights and land law in 
Scotland are likely to be considerably shaped by the Land Commission. While it remains a relatively 
new institution, its importance should not be underestimated.  
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2.3.8 UNFINISHED BUSINESS  
 
As Lord Sewel wrote in the LRPG’s 1999 paper Recommendations for Action, “[i]t is crucial that 
we regard land reform not as a once-for-all issue but as an on-going process”.296 Land law reform 
remains on the legislative agenda. This may result in new primary legislation or regulations being 
brought forward in the coming years. It is therefore imperative when considering the application 
of human rights to remember what has been omitted from recent reforms and what other 
measures may be attempted in the future. The legislation discussed above may be a stepping-stone 
towards more radical changes.  
Proposals to increase transparency in the ownership of land by companies registered in British 
Overseas Territories and Crown dependencies were defeated.297 This may prove to be one of the 
most controversial rejected amendments as it is estimated that such companies own 750,000 acres 
in the Highlands.298 The initial proposal to limit the total amount of land that one individual can 
own were omitted from the LR(S)A 2016. A discussion paper, published in March 2018, has once 
again proposed the introduction of a restriction or fixed limit to landholdings.299 Calls for a limit 
on the class of people who may own land in Scotland will also remain. While the free movement 
of capital halted this beyond rhetoric, it is unlikely that those who wish to see land in the hands of 
“Scots” or even “resident” landlords will remain silent.  
It remains likely that land reform activists will continue to campaign for a more radical absolute 
agricultural right to buy and while part 10 of the LR(S)A 2016 does significantly shift the balance 
of power towards tenant farmers, calls for transformative measures will undoubtedly remain.300 
However, it is not possible to speculate further within the confines of this thesis as to what these 
future reforms will entail.  
2.3.9 CHAPTER ONE CONCLUSIONS 
 
The legislative reform of land law has its base in historical, economic, and political factors. The 
Scottish land question helps to underline the complexity of existing title and the problems that an 
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inability to convince the populace of the validity of existing title has to the stability of rights to 
property.  The Scottish Executive (and later Government), responded by making the reform of 
land and property law one of its most important endeavours. The focus of this thesis is on how 
these reforms have interacted with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession in A1P1.  
 
There are several mechanisms under which community and agricultural tenants can acquire land 
in Scotland. The Scottish Government has instituted four “community” sales procedures. The 
original community right to buy is pre-emptive and requires a willing seller, the right to buy for 
sustainable development and the right to buy abandoned and neglected land are conditional on 
Ministerial approval and do not require a willing seller. The crofting community right to buy applies 
only to croft land and ancillary rights. The agricultural tenant’s right to buy is not an absolute right 
but requires a willing seller. Since the LR(S)A 2016 removed the requirement of registration, this 
right applies to all land held under an AH(S)A 1991 tenancies. The right to buy where a landlord 
is in breach remains a somewhat unknown quantity. The proceeding analysis in this thesis will 
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3 CHAPTER TWO 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPERTY LAW 
 
Human rights, after all, are about the protection of individuals against the state – something of interest 
perhaps to immigration lawyers, family lawyers, and criminal lawyers. Surely there is not much in this area 




3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
It is often said that “human rights” are at the heart of the legislative reform of land law in 
Scotland.302 The human rights paradigm, however, encompasses multiple, negative and positive 
rights-claims or “trumps”.303 For centuries, lawyers and philosophers have debated which rights 
should be considered “human rights”. Reconciling these entitlements is a task fraught with 
difficulty. It is time to reconsider the vexed question of what “rights” and whose “rights” are really 
at the core of land reform. Land law reform is acting as a catalyst to the broadening of the human 
rights discourse in Scotland. While the focus of this thesis is A1P1, the ECHR cannot be 
considered in isolation, as multiple rights have been declared relevant to ministerial and judicial 
discretion. It must be asked what role these “new” rights and instruments have and if they have 
the potential to alter how A1P1 is interpreted. The question to be answered in the second part of 
this chapter is therefore not the broad question of the role of all relevant non-convention rights, 
but instead what potential effects will these rights have on the application and effect of A1P1. In 
2002, the then Convenor of the Scottish Justice Committee stated that “we are changing the nature 
of property rights in Scotland”.304 It has to be considered whether the Scottish Ministers have the 
devolved competencies to do this and whether such a move would be desirable, or even possible.  
Part 1 will set out the application and effect of A1P1 in Scots law since the enactment of the HRA. 
It will be noted that the Scottish Parliament is required to legislate in a manner that is compatible 
with the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Courts and Tribunals are public authorities 
within the meaning of the HRA. As such, the Scottish judiciary is required to operate in a manner 
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that is compatible with Convention rights. 
Part 2 considers the questions of what the Scottish Government has termed “relevant non-
convention rights”.305  The next stage, in this shift in the human rights paradigm, has seen the 
Scottish Parliament come to consider whether socio-economic rights—such as the right to 
participate in cultural life,306 to an adequate standard of living,307 education308 and social security—
should also be considered deserving of the special epithet and resulting legal protection given to 
“human rights”309. Part 2 of this chapter will posit that the Scottish Government’s inclusion of the 
ICESCR while being within their devolved competencies, will not incorporate enforceable legal 
rights. The ICESCR reiterates existing obligations on the Scottish Ministers to progressively realise 
socio-economic rights. The domestic application of socio-economic rights is subject to several 
significant challenges; these, however, are not insurmountable, but whether socio-economic rights 
are more than rhetorical tools and (or) policy goals remains disputed.  
 
This raises critical questions as to the role of the judiciary, who have traditionally been deferential 
to questions of socio-economic policy.310 In addition, the widening of the human rights discourse 
in Scotland will influence litigators who have conventionally been wary of using arguments based 
on socio-economic rights. However, the ICESCR may affect the role of the Scottish Ministers 
when considering their human rights and socio-economic duties under contemporary distributive 
land reform legislation.311 
 
Part 3 will consider, and then dismiss, claims of existing native title in Scotland. It will be argued 
that the arguments forwarded in favour of native title do not stand up to reasoned criticism, nor 
do they take account of contemporary conceptions of Scots property law.  
3.2 PART 1: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS   
 
In May 1948 delegates met in The Hague and established what has since become known as the 
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European Movement. The creation of the Council of Europe was intended to achieve “a greater 
unity between its members to safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their 
common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress”.312 Article 3 bound members 
to “accept the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.313 To achieve its stated purpose, the Council felt that 
these ideals had to be sustained by law.314  
The ECHR was signed on 4 November 1950 and ratified by the UK on 8 March 1951, entering 
force on 3 September 1953. The ECHR is a treaty made between Member States of the Council 
of Europe, by which the High Contracting Parties undertake to “secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” of the Convention.315 The treaty created the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR/Strasbourg Court) “to ensure the observance of the engagement 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties”.316 The ECtHR has jurisdiction to decide “all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention”.317 Parties undertake “to abide 
by the final judgment of the ECtHR in any case to which they are parties”.318 The ECHR is an 
international treaty, and the ECtHR is an international court with jurisdiction under international 
law to interpret and apply it.319 
Despite the strong British influence during the drafting of the Convention, the British 
Government was determined to avoid the possibility of individual petition or the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR.320 This changed on 14 January 1966, when the UK accepted the 
competence of the ECtHR to receive petitions.321 Prior to the HRA’s coming into force, the ECHR 
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had only limited effect in Scots law, but there had developed a presumption in favour of 
interpreting domestic statutory law in a way that was compatible with the ECHR.322  
3.2.1 HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998  
 
Calls for legislation to guarantee the rights contained in the ECHR in domestic law had been 
sporadically voiced in various corners.323 It was New Labour’s election in 1997 that brought the 
real possibility of reform. Straw MP and Boateng MP wrote prior to the passing of the HRA that 
it would be a significant step away from socialism and towards a liberal constitution.324 The Labour 
Party published “Bringing Rights Home” and later in October 1997, “Rights Brought Home: The 
Human Rights Bill”.325 The white paper noted a fear that: “The rights, originally developed with 
major help from the UK Government, are no longer actually seen as British rights. And enforcing 
them takes too long and costs too much”.326 The primary aim appears to have been to give direct 
effect to the ECHR, allowing access to enforce rights at a domestic level without having to take 
the long, hard, and prohibitively expensive road to Strasbourg.327 The white paper also referred to 
the desirability of British judges being “enabled to make a distinctively British contribution to the 
development of the jurisprudence of human rights in Europe”.328 This appears to place a 
responsibility on domestic courts to interpret and apply the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR in a “British” sense.329 The Government argued that the HRA would “mean that the rights 
will be brought much more fully into the jurisprudence of the courts throughout the UK and their 
interpretation will thus be far more subtly and powerfully woven into our law”.330 The aim was “to 
make more directly accessible the rights which the British people already enjoy under the 
Convention. In other words, to bring those rights home”.331  
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The HRA received Royal Assent on 9 November 1998 with much of the Act coming into force 
on 2 October 2000.332 The HRA does not incorporate the substantive rights in the ECHR into 
domestic law; instead, it creates “Convention rights” as a counterpart of the rights guaranteed 
under international law by the ECHR.333 These mirror the English language text of Article 2 to 12 
and 14 of the ECHR; Articles 1 to 3 of Protocol No. 1., and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13, as read 
with Articles 16 and 18 of the Convention.334 The fact that English is but one of the authentic 
languages of the Convention was conveniently ignored, the other after all is French… quelle horreur!  
As Lord Nicholls observed in Re McKerr:  
 
These two sets of rights now exist side by side. But there are significant differences 
between them. The former existed before the enactment of the [HRA], and they continue 
to exist. They are not as such part of this country’s laws because the Convention does not 
form part of this country’s law. That is still the position. These rights, arising under the 
Convention, are to be contrasted with rights created by the [HRA]. The latter came into 
existence for the first time on 2 October 2000. They are part of this country’s law. The 
extent of these rights, created as they were by the [HRA], depends upon the proper 
interpretation of that [HRA]…335 
 
It is essential not to forget the distinction between the obligations which the UK accepted by 
accession to the ECHR, and the duties under domestic law which were imposed upon public 
authorities in the UK by the HRA.336   
 
3.3 INTERPRETATIVE OBLIGATIONS  
 
The HRA makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right.337 The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Ministers are “public authorities”.338 
In addition to the HRA, the SA 1998 (as amended by the Scotland Act 2012), provides that a 
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provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as it is incompatible with any of 
the Convention rights,339 and that a member of the Scottish Government has no power to make 
any subordinate legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible 
with any of the Convention Rights.340  
 
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right 
must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the ECtHR.341 
This has become known as the “mirror principle”. Domestic courts are required not, without 
strong reason, to dilute or weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case law.342 While the HRA states 
that domestic courts must “take into account” the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, this is not an 
unqualified principle. The domestic courts should view their role in interpreting the ECHR as a 
“constructive collaboration” in which the ECtHR may be the “ultimate authority when it comes 
to defining the ECHR, but this does not make it impervious to the practical realities of domestic 
interpretation”.343  
The HRA section 3(1) states that “so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights”.344 Section 3 is “not an optional canon of construction. Nor is its use dependent 
on the existence of ambiguity”.345 This does not require compatibility to be established at all costs; 
it is a “strong canon of construction”, not a “supplanting mechanism”.346 The duty of national 
courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves: no more, but certainly no 
less.347 The use of “possible” signifies the idea that there is a “Rubicon” which may not be 
crossed.348 The intention was to balance the importance of protecting the rights contained in the 
Convention with the key constitutional principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.349  
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3.3.1 ACTS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND VERTICAL EFFECT  
 
A “public authority” includes “a court or tribunal, and any person certain of whose functions are 
functions of a public nature but does not include either Houses of Parliament or a person 
exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament”.350 Where a breach is 
established the court may grant “just and appropriate” remedies which potentially include damages 
or a declaration that the act was unlawful.351 Section 6 is particularly important in Scotland, as it 
extends the application of the Convention beyond that resulting from the SA 1998 to other public 
authorities.352 The definition of a “public authority” remains opaque as the term “public function” 
is undefined. As a result, what is meant by “public authority”, has been subject to controversy and 
debate.353  
 
3.3.2 PUBLIC AUTHORITY  
Public authorities can be divided between “core” and “hybrid”. Core public authorities are subject 
to the ECHR in respect of the entirety of their activities.354 Core public authorities include “courts 
or tribunals” but also quasi-public bodies such as the Environment Agency.355 A “hybrid” public 
authority is a private body that, according to section 6(3)(b) of the HRA, performs “functions of 
a public nature”.356 Such an authority is required to act in a manner that is compatible with 
Convention rights when discharging a function of a public nature. This requirement does not 
extend to instances where such authority is performing a wholly private function.357  
While this issue has not arisen at the time of writing this thesis, it is likely that disputes may arise 
as to whether the community bodies and crofting community bodies, discussed in part 2 of chapter 
one, constitute hybrid public bodies. For example, a community body for a community right to 
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buy is a company limited by guarantee.358 Community bodies under the right to buy to further 
sustainable development are required to undertake their functions in a manner that benefits 
society, as defined by the Co-operatives and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014.359 It is clear 
that a private company can be amenable to judicial review, and review under the HRA.360 The 
question is whether such a company is a “hybrid” public authority that, performs “functions of a 
public nature”.361  
 
Guidance was given in YL v Birmingham City Council when the House of Lords considered whether 
a company which ran a private care home, providing accommodation pursuant to arrangements 
made with a local authority, constituted a public authority and was performing “functions of a 
public nature”.362 By a slim majority (Baroness Hale and Lord Bingham dissenting) the Appellate 
Committee held that that the private company did not constitute a public body. The majority was 
not convinced by the significance if public funding, although weight was given to the statutory 
powers conferred as was the existence of a regulatory regime. However, the majority stressed that 
the fact that the task undertaken by the private company could have been undertaken by the state 
was not necessarily indicative of the company performing functions of a public nature.363 Despite 
this, there remains “no single test of universal application” to determine whether a body is a public 
body.364 The courts have adopted a “factor-based approach”.365 Lord Collins and Elias LJ in the 
Court of Appeal decision of R (Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing Trust set out four “key 
considerations” when considering a housing trust.366  
1. The Trust received significant capital payments from public funds to provide subsidised 
social housing.367  
2. The Trust worked in close harmony with local government and helped to fulfil the latter’s 
statutory obligations, in particular through allocation agreements which circumscribe the 
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freedom of the Trust to allocate properties. This was not merely a result of choice but of 
the statutory duty to co-operate.368  
3. The provision of subsidised housing, as opposed to the mere provision of housing itself, 
is a function that can be described as governmental.369  
4. The Trust was subject to regulations designed to further the objectives of government 
policy in the provision of subsidised housing. The regulations over matters such as rent 
and eviction were designed to protect vulnerable members of society.370  
Lord Nicholls, in Aston Cantlow, observed that the factors to be taken into account include the 
extent to which in carrying out the relevant function the body is publicly funded, or is exercising 
statutory powers, or is taking the place of central government or local authorities or is providing a 
public service.371 The question is really whether community and crofting community bodies are 
“standing in the shoes” of a public body.372 
 
The first part, of Lord Collins and Elias LJ four-part test, appears to be satisfied as the vast majority 
of community bodies were only able to purchase the land owned by the body due to large 
government subsidies, primarily through the Scottish Land Fund.373 Part two may be satisfied by 
the reality that a body is not a community body unless Ministers have given it written confirmation 
that they are satisfied that the main purpose of the body is consistent with furthering the 
achievements of sustainable development.374 Part three and the provision of subsidised housing 
will be satisfied in case-specific circumstances. For example: in 2017 the Pairc Trust in Lewis 
(which is a community body under the LR(S)A 2003) received £50,621 to purchase a former elderly 
care unit to renovate it to provide an affordable family home for rent.375 In such instances, it is 
apparent that community bodies are taking on the functions of a local authority in providing 
affordable housing. The fourth part of the test is also most likely satisfied as the community bodies 
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are incorporated to “further the objectives of government policy”, namely the wider programme 
of land reform and “sustainable development”.  
 
It is difficult to determine whether community bodies and crofting community bodies constitute 
hybrid public authorities as generalisation in this regard are difficult to make. However, it remains 
that community bodies could potentially be subject to judicial review and be directly subject to the 
HRA. This has the potential to have significant consequences for how community bodies conduct 
their affairs. For example:  in instances where community bodies seek to evict tenants the courts 
may be required to undertake a proportionality assessment under Article 8 of the ECHR. However, 
only with judicial comment on whether community bodies are indeed hybrid public authorities 
will clarity be given.  
 
3.3.2.1 REMEDIES  
 
The judicial remedies available are set out in section 8 HRA. These are available in respect of any 
act, or proposed act, of a public authority which the court finds, is, or would be, unlawful.  The 
court may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just 
and appropriate.376 Damages are limited to competent courts and are only available in civil 
proceedings.377 Damages are only to be paid where the “court is satisfied that the award is necessary 
to afford just satisfaction”.378 In practice this is rare.  
 
3.4 SCOTLAND ACT 1998  
The contrasting approaches of the SA 1998 and the HRA add another level of complexity when 
considering Convention rights. It remains a keystone principle of domestic law that the judiciary 
does not have the power to set aside legislation. While courts may consider arguments on the 
correct interpretation of an Act of the Westminster Parliament, it cannot consider the question of 
whether it should be on the Statute Book at all.379 This principle is not applicable to Acts of the 
Scottish Parliament, as the courts have the power to strike down legislation where it infringes the 
legislative competencies of Holyrood. Section 29 of the SA 1998 outlines that an Act of the 
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Scottish Parliament “is not law so far as any provision of the Act is outside the legislative 
competence of the Parliament”.380 The effect of section 29(1) of the SA 1998 “is that the Scottish 
Ministers have no power to exercise functions that may be conferred on them which are outside 
the legislative competence”.381 Section 57(2) provides that a member of the Scottish Parliament 
has “no power” to make subordinate legislation or do any other act that is incompatible with the 
Convention.382 Therefore, “a proper understanding of the SA 1998 is its concentration on the 
limits of devolved competence”.383 Thus, while domestic courts cannot invalidate Acts of the 
Westminster parliament, they can invalidate acts of the Scottish Parliament. This gives the Court 
of Session and the High Court of Justiciary significantly more power than their English 
counterparts, who are, under section 4 HRA, only able to make a declaration of incompatibility 
that does not affect continuing validity.384  
Under the SA 1998, “Convention rights” has the same meaning as in the HRA.385 Whether a 
provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament is within its competencies is a “devolution issue”.386 
Section 100 of the SA 1998 states that to bring a claim a person must be a victim for the purposes 
of Article 34 of the Convention (within the meaning of the HRA) if proceedings in respect of the 
act were brought to the ECtHR.387 Section 100(3) states that “[t]his Act does not enable a court or 
tribunal to award any damages in respect of an act which is incompatible with any of the 
Convention rights, which it could not award if section 8(3) and (4) of the HRA applied”.388  
The Supreme Court, in Salvesen v Riddell, observed that “as we are concerned in this case with an 
issue about compatibility with a Convention right, the proper starting point is to construe the 
legislation as required by section 3 of the HRA”.389 The obligation to construe a provision in an 
Act of the Scottish Parliament consistently with Convention rights so far as it is possible to do so 
is a strong one, and the court must prefer compatibility to incompatibility.390 Courts are expected 
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to go with the grain of the legislation, as it is not for the court to go against the underlying thrust 
of what it provides for, as to do this would be to trespass on the province of the legislature.391 
Under section 102 of the SA 1998, when a court or tribunal finds that an act of the Scottish 
Parliament is outwith its legislative competence, the court or tribunal may make an order, removing 
or limiting any retrospective effect of the decision, or suspending the effect of the decision for any 
period and on any conditions to allow the defect to be corrected.392 Since the enactment of the 
HRA and SA 1998, only three have been struck down as being beyond the competence of the 
Scottish Parliament.393  
 
3.4.1 CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTION RIGHTS  
 
The HRA has resulted in four important changes to domestic law. First, it requires public 
authorities, including the courts, to act in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights. 
Second, it requires the courts to interpret legislation so far as is possible in a manner that is 
compliant with the Convention. Third, it requires the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court to be 
taken into account by domestic courts when deciding a question on Convention rights. Fourth, it 
empowers the court to award damages where Convention rights have been violated.  
 
3.5 CONVENTION RIGHTS OTHER THAN A1P1  
Before proceeding it is important to illustrate that the effect of the Convention and its Protocols 
on land law is not simply confined to A1P1. Article 8 of the ECHR provides a right to respect for 
one’s private life, family, home and correspondence.394 This is one of the broadest Convention 
rights, containing both positive and negative obligations.395 Article 8 is limited when the right is 
exercised “in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society”.396 To be justifiable 
measures must respond to a “pressing social need” and be proportionate.397 The doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation, and domestically the weight given to the decisions of democratic 
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institutions, have been significant in relation to the operation of Article 8. While the margin or 
weight given, will be determined by the particular facts at issue, in Article 8 cases it appears to be 
narrower than is observable in relation to A1P1.398 In many instances, applications are made under 
a combination of articles.399 For example, The Grand Chamber in Akdivar v Turkey considered the 
application of Turkish nationals who alleged that the attack on the village of Kelekçi by Turkish 
security forces in 1992 violated Articles 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 18, and 25(1), of the Convention and 
A1P1.400  
Conceptions of the “home” have been described as the “headquarters of private life”, the “letzte 
Bastion der Privatsphäre” and a “rempart de l’intimité”.401 The ECtHR has interpreted the concept 
broadly as “the physically defined area, where private and family life develops”.402 Home in such 
instances is defined in a broader sense than the traditional Scots law conceptions of a “dwelling-
house”.403 The ECtHR has extended the definition of  “home” to instances of the registered office 
of a company run by the applicant and has even been held to encompass a lawyer’s office.404 This 
is not just the right to the actual physical area, but also to the quiet enjoyment of that area. A 
violation of Article 8 will be found not just in clear physical breaches such as unauthorised entry, 
but potentially also in serious instances of noise, emissions, smells or other forms of interference.405 
Despite this, it is important to remember that Article 8 (while protecting an important part of 
human dignity) does not protect a property right or rights to property.406 As Lord Hope observed 
in London Borough of Harrow v Qazi, “home” is not a legal term of art and Article 8 is not directed 
to the protection of property interests or contractual rights.407  
Land lawyers may, in certain instances, also be required to consider Article 6 which protects the 
right to a fair trial, Article 10 guaranteeing the freedom of expression, Article 11 guaranteeing 
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freedom of assembly and Article 14 which prohibits discrimination.408 Article 14 of the ECHR 
states that the rights contained must be secured without discrimination “on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status”.409 This is restricted to discrimination 
based on personal attributes or status.410  
 
Challenges under A1P1 often come in combination with claims made under other Convention 
rights. For example, the Court of Session, in Pairc Crofters Ltd v Scottish Ministers, dismissed a 
challenge to the CCRtB on the grounds that it violated Article 6 and A1P1.411 Article 6, 10, 11 and 
14 have, however, only generated limited case law and a finite amount of academic comment in 
direct relation to private law, and land law.412 As such, when considering the proceeding analysis 
in this thesis, it is important to remember that the modern land lawyer cannot confine their analysis 
of the ECHR to A1P1.  
 
3.6 PART 2: RELEVANT NON-CONVENTION RIGHTS  
 
Confidence in the Scottish Government’s ability to “radically” alter property rights was shaken by 
the Supreme Court decision of Salvesen v Riddell.413 In Salvesen a provision, relating to an agricultural 
tenants’ pre-emptive right to buy, was held to constitute a disproportionate interference.414 The 
Justices of the Supreme Court held that there had been a violation of A1P1 of the ECHR, but 
suspended the effect of their finding.415 The response from the Scottish Parliament was swift.416  
 
The facts in Salvesen were sui generis and emanated from a last-minute amendment to the then 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Bill.417 The significance of this decision cannot be overestimated 
as it alerted the Scottish Ministers to the potentially limiting effect of Convention rights on 
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distributive land reform.418 It is clear from the committee debates surrounding the inclusion of 
“relevant non-convention rights” into what became the LR(S)A 2016 that it was included primarily 
as an attempt to limit the “individual rights” of “very powerful individual interests in matters 
concerning urban and rural land”.419 To one MSP:  
If we fail to recognise those wider rights and are mindful only of, for example, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, we are promoting—always promoting—the 
concept of individual rights and never promoting the concept of community rights. It is 
important, at least at the base of decision making by ministers, that they should be mindful 
of those wider obligations.420 
The SLRRS states that “human rights in relation to land include both core civil and political rights 
and wider economic, social, cultural and environmental rights”.421 The SLRRS asserts that Scotland 
is committed to implementing international treaties signed and ratified by the UK.422 The Scottish 
Ministers have come to refer to the ICESCR in their definition of “other” human rights, in addition 
to the Voluntary Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure and the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals.423  
The ICESCR has been added to the Scottish Ministers’ conceptions of “relevant non-Convention 
rights” in the CE(S)A 2015 and the LR(S)A 2016.424 Additionally, the ICESCR is considered 
important to the Commission through their Strategic Plan and a discussion paper published in 
May 2018.425 Writing in The Scotsman in May 2018, McCall reported that a discussion paper 
published by the Commission showed that “land reform in Scotland has the potential to further 
improve human rights across the country”.426 To McCall, this “would mean moving away from a 
perception that the only human rights dimension of land reform is the right to own property”.427 
This is arguably the most significant recent development for socio-economic rights in the UK. 
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The inclusion of relevant non-convention rights is part of a wider on-going conversation in 
Scotland in relation to how the nation is governed and a self-asserted, “different approach”, 
towards a “socio-economic duty”, for the public sector, and the bringing into force of the 
“missing” section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, as amended by the Scotland Act 2016.428   
 
3.6.1 THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS  
 
The most prominent “relevant non-convention” rights instrument is the ICESCR. The ICESCR 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in 1976.429  
The ICESCR was, and remains, the most complete international standard on economic, social and 
cultural rights.430 The ICESCR states that its rights are to be achieved through the modest aim of 
“progressive realisation”.431 The application and interpretation of international human rights 
instruments in domestic law were for a long time relatively rare, and the ICESCR remains a 
“misunderstood instrument”.432 It was viewed as having limited force until the establishment of 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“The Committee”) in 1985. The 
ICESCR was given further powers, beyond the reporting procedure, by the passing of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR, which entered into force on 5 May 2013.433 However, the UK has not 
signed or ratified the Optional Protocol, thereby inhibiting individuals and groups from bringing 
complaints to the Committee.434  
The Scottish Government has stated that it is committed to giving effect to the terms of the 
ICESCR and this “requires appropriate steps to be taken towards achieving certain rights to 
adequate standards of living including adequate food and adequate housing as well as certain rights 
to work”.435 The Memorandum notes the importance of the ECHR, but also states that the Scottish 
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Government is committed to giving effect to the terms of the ICESCR. The memorandum states 
that the “Ministers aim to ensure that, where possible, the framework of rights and responsibilities 
over land are designed to help ensure all members of society have access to the resources required 
to meet their needs”.436 
3.6.2 DEVOLVED COMPETENCE  
 
In relation to the ECHR, the Scottish Ministers cannot alter the effect given to Convention rights, 
and outside of a few minor exceptions, they do not have the power to amend the SA 1998.437  The 
Scottish Parliament cannot modify “protected enactments”, which includes parts of the HRA.438  
While the Scottish Ministers cannot alter the application and effect of the HRA and ECHR, the 
SA 1998 does not reserve “observing and implementing international obligations”.439 Thus, while 
the Scottish Ministers’ cannot negotiate new treaties, they can undertake the implementation of 
existing ones. The incorporation of an international treaty into Scots law and not into the legal 
system of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland is not unprecedented.440 Therefore, while it is the 
UK that is the party to the ICESCR, the Scottish Ministers have the devolved competencies to 
make reference to the ICESCR into Acts of the Scottish Parliament.441 It must be remembered 
that the Scottish Parliament remains a body created by statute that derives its powers from 
statute.442  
 
3.6.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 
The traditional narrative states that socio-economic rights were originally considered “second 
generation” or “positive” rights. This was because unlike civil and political rights, which in most 
instances protect the individual against the actions of the state, socio-economic rights often make 
                                               
436 Land Reform (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 76) [As Introduced 22 June 2015] Policy Memorandum, para. 85-87 and 146-
148.  
437 Ibid Sch. 4. para. 1(2)(f); s. 28(7).  
438 SA 1998 s. 29(2)(c); Sch. 4. 
439 SA 1998 Sch. 5 Pt 1 para 7(2)(a). 
440 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, Sched 3(14); Children and Young Peoples (Scotland) Act 2014 s. 1(1) 
441 Scottish Government, Scottish Land Rights and Responsibilities Statement (n 178). 
442 Whaley v Lord Watson 2000 SC 340 (IH) [348]. 
Douglas S K Maxwell  79 
positive demands.443 This hierarchy, or “separation wall”, remains carved into the international 
human rights system by the existence of different treaties.444 There can be little doubt that these 
divisions are out-dated and insufficiently precise. Notably, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948445 did not divide rights, and the ECtHR has observed in Airey v Ireland that “there is 
no water-tight division”.446 
Despite this, the debate over the role of socio-economic rights continues, and while academics are 
often quick to proclaim that the debate over the justiciability of human rights is over, state actions 
in this area and the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights remains fraught with 
difficulties.447 For many years there remained a widely held belief in the UK that socio-economic 
rights were adequately protected by employment law, the welfare state and judicial review.448 The 
normal criticisms remain that socio-economic rights are too vague, overly expensive, and are 
outside of the institutional competencies of the judiciary.449 These questions have been extensively 
debated over the past decades.450 However, there remains a lack of familiarity with these questions 
in Scotland. It is therefore important to discuss these often-cited criticisms and consider whether 
rights contained in the ICESCR are justiciable.  
3.6.4 DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS  
 
The first criticism often forwarded is that social economic rights are too vague.451 Socio-economic 
rights do pose a particular set of problems as the wording often resembles policy documents or a 
political party’s manifesto. While socio-economic rights are often difficult to define this is not a 
unique problem. In Osborn, Lord Reed observed that the guarantees set out in the substantive 
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articles of the ECHR, like other guarantees of human rights in international law, are mostly 
expressed at a very high level of generality.452 In truth, socio-economic rights, like much legal 
discourse, may simply expose the limits of interpreting contested conceptions of language.453 To 
be effective and adaptable the majority of human rights instruments are drafted in an “open-
textured” manner.454 As the Constitutional Court of South Africa observed in South Africa v 
Grootboom, socio-economic rights “cannot be said to exist on paper only”.455 Therefore, while 
socio-economic rights suffer from definitional problems, this is not unique, nor necessarily 
insurmountable. 
 
3.6.5 INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES  
 
Another common criticism is that socio-economic rights are outside of the institutional 
competencies of the judiciary.456 The fear is that “judicial usurpation” will occur and the courts 
will enforce socio-economic rights in a manner that compromises the decision-making authority 
of democratic institutions.457 This is part of a broader apprehension in the UK of judicialising the 
welfare state, as there remains the firmly embedded belief that public finances are the preserve of 
democratic institutions and not the judiciary.458 As Sir Thomas Bingham MR observed in R v 
Cambridge Health Authority, “difficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited 
budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number... That is not a 
judgment which the court can make”.459  
To some, the complex, often technical knowledge required, means that the judiciary cannot be 
considered well placed to consider these matters and instead it should be left to the legislature and 
executive. The argument appears to be that, due to the positive nature of socio-economic rights, 
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to do otherwise would allow the judiciary to impose budgetary restraints on democratic 
institutions.   
The boundaries between the “legal” and the “political” are, however, not clear-cut, and judges 
undeniably make policy choices.460 For example, the judicial review of administrative decisions 
often requires the court to make decisions about the allocation of limited resources. As the 
Supreme Court of Canada observed that “any remedy granted by a court will have some budgetary 
repercussions, whether it be a saving of money or an expenditure of money”.461 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa considered these criticisms and noted that even when a 
court enforces civil and political rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair 
trial, the order it makes will often have such implications.462 A court may require the provision of 
legal aid or the extension of state benefits to a class of people who formerly were not beneficiaries. 
To the Constitutional Court “it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights, a task is 
conferred upon the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of rights 
it results in a breach of the separation of powers”.463 There is the further criticism that deferring 
complex questions of socio-economic policy to the judiciary entails giving further powers to a 
“legal elite” who may not be wholly representative of broader society.  
The experience of jurisdictions around the world is that overcoming the question of democratic 
legitimacy is not insurmountable. Scotland can, with caution, overcome the risk of judicial 
usurpation and recognise that the rights contained in the ICESCR are not illusory. However, this 
will require injections of enthusiasm and an open dialogue between the judiciary and Holyrood. 
3.6.6 THE COST OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN PRACTICE  
 
The third criticism, often used to discredit socio-economic rights, is that they impose mandatory 
and burdensome financial obligations on the state. This is part of the ideological baggage of the 
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Cold War, where socio-economic rights were often perceived as “red”, or even radical socialist 
rights.464  
Accepting that socio-economic rights can be justiciable does not necessarily result in burdensome 
positive obligations upon the state. Jurisdictions around the world have come to place limits on 
the realisation of socio-economic rights in practice.465 The Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, considered whether a terminally ill patient whose 
kidneys had failed had a right to dialysis.  The petitioner averred that this was a violation of Section 
27(3) of the South African Constitution which states that “no one may be refused emergency 
medical treatment”.466 The court observed that the obligations are “dependent upon the resources 
available… and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of 
resources”. 467 
Further guidance was given in South Africa v Grootboom where the Constitutional Court set the 
standard of “reasonableness” and held that the obligations on the state are for “the progressive 
realisation” of socio-economic rights, within the available resources.468 As such, the South African 
experience has shown that socio-economic rights do not necessarily impose burdensome financial 
restraints.469  
It is important to highlight that under the “reasonableness” standards domestic courts are not left 
to create public policy, instead, they are armed with the power to review the decisions of 
democratic bodies if they do not conform to pre-existing standards they have accepted by being 
party to the ICESCR.  
3.6.7 THE INFLUENCE OF THE ICESCR  
 
It is therefore clear that the rights in the ICESCR can be justiciable. The question turns to the 
existing effect of the ICESCR and socio-economic rights in Scots law. It must be remembered 
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that the UK is a dualist state, and as such even international treaties such as the ECHR and 
ICESCR do not form part of Scots law, although they can be taken into account as an aid to the 
interpretation of statutes and in the development of the common law.470 What the HRA has done 
is to create domestic rights expressed in the same terms as those contained in the ECHR and its 
Protocols. But they are domestic rights, not international rights.471 The domestic rights created by 
the HRA are interpreted by reference to the corresponding rights under the ECHR.472 
The incorporation of the ICESCR into the domestic law of the UK was considered after the 
passing of the HRA.473 This was, in part, inspired by a fear that the ECHR was an “outmoded” 
treaty and as such protected at best, a very basic minimum standard of living.474 In 2002, Van 
Bueren called for the incorporation of the ICESCR, using a framework similar to that provided 
by the HRA, to represent the next constitutional dynamic in the UK.475 Van Bueren, reasoned that 
“it is time to move to a new principled, fully democratic, constitutional settlement”.476 However, 
this has not happened, and legislation implementing the ICESCR at Westminster remains unlikely.  
While demonstrating that there was considerable support in the UK for socio-economic rights the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights was only willing to conclude that “further attention” was 
required.477 
The reference to the ICESCR in several Acts of the Scottish Parliament does not make the 
ICESCR directly enforceable in an equivalent manner to the HRA. As Murdoch and Reed note 
“the significance of other international instruments concerned with human rights is generally less 
than that of the ECHR”.478 The ICESCR has not been implemented by domestic legislation. This 
limits its ability to be enforceable in Scots law although it will remain relevant as an aid to statutory 
interpretation.479 
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A great deal of literature and judicial comment exists regarding the effect of international treaties 
that have not been implemented by domestic legislation in relation to the ECHR prior to the 
enactment of the HRA. For a long time, the Scottish judiciary were apprehensive when considering 
the domestic effect of unincorporated treaties.480 In the Inner House case of Hagan v Lord Advocate, 
the applicants averred that a ban on hunting with wild dogs was contrary to their ICESCR rights 
for everyone to take part in cultural life.481  To Lord Brodie, the rights in the ICESCR were “not 
intended to give rise to a legal right, enforceable against a national government”.482  
There remains limited domestic treatment of the ICESCR. Addressing the House of Lords in 
1996, Lord Bingham outlined that it was “common sense” that courts should ordinarily assume 
that statutes are intended to be compliant with the then unincorporated human rights treaties.483 
Lord Bingham later observed in R v Lyons that prior to direct incorporation the ECHR exercised 
a “persuasive and pervasive influence on judicial decision-making in this country, affecting the 
interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions, guiding the exercise of discretion, bearing on the 
development of the common law”.484  
 
Whether human rights treaties should automatically be given effect in dualist states, has been 
subject to significant judicial and academic debate.485 To Brudner, “since international conventions 
on human rights belong to the category of conventions articulating principles rationally connected 
to the common good of the international community, they stand in no more need of 
transformation than do rules of international custom”.486 To others, it is Parliament’s acquiescence 
to the ratification of treaties that allows the courts to give the effect, even without direct 
legislation.487  
 
There is a strong presumption in favour of interpreting domestic statutory law in a way which does 
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not place a member state in breach of its international obligations.488 As such, where Scots law is 
incomplete or uncertain, it is for domestic courts to interpret the law in a manner that is compliant 
with international treaties.489 While the domestic jurisprudence does not appear to show a complete 
willingness to infringe the constitutional and democratic principle of dualism, there remains a 
strong interpretative presumption in favour of interpreting domestic law in a manner that is 
compatible with international human rights treaties.490 It follows that while the normal canons of 
construction would hold that the Westminster Parliament has already intervened to strike the 
relevant balance, it is not generally permissible for the domestic courts to develop the common 
law in a manner that is contrary to international human rights treaties.491 Therefore, the ICESCR 
should be seen as exercising a pervasive influence on Scots law and not just when the Scottish 
Ministers exercise their discretion under the CE(S)A 2015 and the LR(S)A 2016.  
3.6.8 CAN DOMESTIC LAW BE INHERENTLY LIMITED BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS?  
 
The question is therefore what role can the ICESCR play in resolving apparent inadequacies in 
domestic law. While socio-economic rights may be justiciable, the Scottish Ministers’ inclusion of 
the ICESCR into its definition of “other rights” does not constitute an implementation by 
domestic legislation. Further, the ICESCR will have limited effect due to the inherent limitation 
problem. The “problem” is really a question of “engaging” human rights. Domestic law becomes 
“inherently limited” when it becomes subservient to international human rights law. 
 
The difficulty is finding a situation in which the rights in the ICESCR could be engaged but are 
not already protected in some form by existing principles of Scots law. In many instances, this 
involves the judiciary interpreting what some would call civil and political rights in a manner that 
appears to protect socio-economic rights. More often it involves administrative law and the rule 
of law. This means that in practice those who allege a breach of their socio-economic rights will 
not grasp the ICESCR but instead will still be required to turn to the domestic law to find a remedy.  
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3.6.9 DYNAMIC INTERPRETATIONS 
 
While the ECtHR has a limited capacity to consider socio-economic rights directly, the broader 
dynamic interpretation of the rights contained in the ECHR has evolved in a manner that often 
protects socio-economic rights.492 As Collins notes “the ECtHR promotes an integrated approach 
by which the meaning of the rights protected by the ECHR should be compatible with other 
international conventions”.493  
 
The ECtHR has also held that forced displacement and the destruction of the home (which 
includes the rights of tenants, unsecure tenants, and even squatters) violates A1P1.494 The ECtHR 
has even held that poor housing that results in an unhealthy environment is not compatible with 
A1P1.495 Article 8 does not confer a right to “a home” in the abstract. It protects an individual’s 
relationship with the property which they have sufficient links to that we might call it their home. 
Unlike A1P1, Article 8 is targeted, but does not require the claimant to have a property right.496  
Contrary to the traditional conceptions of “first generation” rights, Article 8 has come to impose 
positive obligations on contracting states. In certain instances, the ECtHR has held that this 
extends to an obligation to protect the right to a private life from interference by another private 
person or entity.497  However, when it comes to safeguarding socio-economic rights, the dynamic 
interpretation of Convention rights can only go so far. In Chapman v United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
observed that:  
It is important to recall that Article 8 does not in terms give a right to be provided with a 
home. Nor does any of the jurisprudence of the Court acknowledge such a right. While it 
is clearly desirable that every human being has a place where he or she can live in dignity 
and which he or she can call home, there are unfortunately in the Contracting States many 
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persons who have no home. Whether the State provides funds to enable everyone to have 
a home is a matter for political not judicial decision.498 
 
On a practical level, housing poses a particular set of challenges to which human rights law and 
policy work are currently limited in their ability to respond.499 Therefore, while Convention rights 
have in many instances protected what can be described as “socio-economic rights” the 
effectiveness of this process is subject to dispute as it leaves contracting states with a wide margin 
of discretion to carry out their functions as they see fit.  
 
3.6.10 THE LIMITS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN PRACTICE  
 
The inclusion of socio-economic rights is far from straightforward.  In the UK as a whole, the 
problems have become apparent in relation to immigration and austerity.500 This came to a head 
in 2015 when, by a majority of 3:2, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions had failed to take into account the interests of children when implementing the 
household benefit cap.501 In 2016, the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
expressed “serious concerns” about the UK Government’s programme of austerity under the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016.502  
 
It is important for the Scottish Government to appreciate that referencing non-convention rights 
such as the ICESCR in Acts of the Scottish Parliament will not result in a panacea. Indeed, the 
evidence from various jurisdictions around the world show that effectively enforcing socio-
economic rights can be problematic. Surveying the available South American studies, Bergallo 
concludes that “in some instances, judicialization has fostered dialogue and inter-branch 
cooperation, in other instances regressive effects may be surpassing the benefits of allowing courts 
a role in the enforcement of social rights”.503 
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Discussing socio-economic rights in public, far less actual meaningful reform, risks a political and 
media backlash. The politically conservative, and certain parts of the media are quick to seize on 
socio-economic rights as allowing for a “scrounger’s charter”.504 This is not distinct to the 
ICESCR. The protection of socio-economic rights within this existing human rights paradigm has 
often resulted in criticism. For example, in 2004 Lord Bonomy in the Outer House was asked to 
consider the judicial review of a prisoner on remand who argued that the decision to continue to 
detain him without proper toilet facilities and his resultant eczema and psychological trauma 
amounted to a violation of Article 3 and Article 8 of the ECHR.505 The resulting “slopping-out” 
cases have resulted in criticism from certain parts of the media.506 
 
A further limit, on the effectiveness of socio-economic rights, remains the question of equality of 
arms and the cost of litigation.  Adapting an old cliché: justice in Scotland is open to everyone, just 
like the publicly owned Old Golf Course in St. Andrews at £180 per round in high season. There 
is considerable evidence from South America that socio-economic rights have been used by those 
with the existing socio-economic capital to utilise the existing legal system.507 The position in South 
Africa differs where some of the most important cases have involved the most vulnerable in South 
African society.508 Generalisations in this regard are difficult to make. The point to remember is 
that parchment guarantees will not result in effective remedies for the most vulnerable in Scottish 
society if the legal system does not offer an adequate and affordable system of redress.  
 
3.7 OTHER RELEVANT NON-CONVENTION RIGHTS  
 
The LR(S)A 2016 requires the Scottish Ministers to have regard to the desirability of promoting 
respect for such internationally accepted principles and standards for responsible practices in 
relation to land as the Scottish Ministers consider to be relevant. This is to include the terms of 
international principles, the Scottish Government believes that UN Voluntary Guidelines on the 
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Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGGTs); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); and the SDGs, are relevant.509 
 
While the main focus of the debate over relevant non-convention rights has been on the ICESCR, 
the Scottish Ministers have stated that land reform entails more than the rights contained in the 
ECHR, and indeed the ICESCR.510 It is not possible within the confines of this thesis to consider 
the other non-convention rights in detail. It is, however, important to briefly outline how these 
rights affect the principles that may be considered by the Scottish Ministers when exercising their 
discretion under the various rights to buy.  
 
The SLRRS notes that Article 14 of the CEDAW makes specific reference to ending 
discrimination against women in rural areas. The SLRRS states that “the Scottish Government 
took the view that Article 14 of CEDAW is important for the purposes of promotion via the 
Statement because of the need to ensure that women play a full social and economic role in rural 
life, and benefit from any government supported rural programmes”.511 
 
The Scottish Ministers have placed importance upon the SDGs. These goals are an international 
agreement, that came into effect in January 2016. There are 17 SDGs (or “Global Goals” as they 
are popularly known) and 169 targets. The signatories commit to tackle issues as diverse and deep-
rooted as gender inequality, climate change, access to quality education and the promotion of 
peaceful and inclusive societies.512 The SHRC has asserted that the SDGs should “inform the 
present debate on land reform in Scotland as they identify land as a key element for the post-2015 
development agenda”.513 The SGDs are not legal obligations and do not impose interpretative 
requirements upon the Scottish Ministers or judiciary. As such, their importance will remain largely 
confined to public policy and the rhetoric of land reform.  
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3.8 PART 2: CONCLUSIONS  
 
The key point, concerning the inclusion of the ICESCR, is that while judicial recognition of socio-
economic rights is not impervious to criticism, the available evidence undoubtedly shows that the 
rights contained in the ICESCR can be justiciable. Despite this, the effect of the ICESCR in Scots 
law will likely remain limited. It is clear that socio-economic rights have been protected in some 
form in the UK since before the dawn of the welfare state. However, existing protections are 
subject to notable criticism, and the shoe-horning of socio-economic rights into the ECHR and 
administrative law has its limits.514 
The relevant non-convention rights have been introduced into several Acts of the Scottish 
Parliament to broaden the existing human rights discourse in relation to contemporary land 
reform. However, this does not constitute implementing legislation in a manner comparable to the 
HRA. Critically for land reform, this means that the widening of the human rights discourse in 
this manner does not change the devolved competencies of the Scottish Ministers and public 
bodies. That being so, the ICESCR has an important role to play at the policy level and when 
exercising Ministerial discretion. Other relevant non-convention rights such as the SDGs and 
VGGTs have a role to play at a public policy level but do not impose legal obligations. Critically, 
it is submitted that the inclusion of relevant non-convention rights does not allow for the 
reinterpretation of A1P1 in a manner that would constitute incompatibility.  
 
3.9 PART 3: NATIVE TITLE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS  
Questions of “native title” have been sporadically cited in relation to contemporary Scottish land 
reform.515 In 2010 the “chief” of Clan Ranald (which is part of Clan MacDonald, to whose 
headship he laid claim) petitioned the Scottish Parliament to investigate native title in Scotland 
under the “Duthchas/Duthaich” system of land tenure. The term Duthchas has several meanings but 
they included the belief in the hereditary right of possession to land. It is not a legal concept, but 
one based on custom and derived from the old clan tradition of land given in return for service. 
Occupation of a holding therefore was seen as being justifiable in moral terms and was in explicit 
conflict with the legal rights of private property in land.516 The argument was that as the Abolition 
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of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 left earlier Norse Udal tenure in Orkney and Shetland 
unperturbed, the same should apply to concepts of native title.517 The petition compared Duthaich 
claims to other claims for native title around the world, notably citing the landmark case of the 
High Court of Australia in Mabo v Queensland.518 The decision in Mabo overturned the doctrine of 
terra nullius in Australia on which colonial and existing titles to land were based. The decision 
recognised that indigenous peoples had title to land prior to the colonisation of Australia and in 
doing so, recognised continuing native title.519 This claim by MacDonald came from a twenty-year 
bitter court battle in which MacDonald was eventually declared the first chief of Clan Ranald since 
1848.520 MacDonald felt that with this title (which remains disputed by many historians) should 
come title to the native lands of the MacDonalds of Keppoch. The claim of MacDonald is 
somewhat opportunist and eccentric, but others continue to argue that contemporary conceptions 
of property rights and land ownership should be set aside in favour of conceptions of native title.521  
It is clear that the Highlands and Islands have a distinct cultural and linguistic composition to the 
rest of Scotland. As noted in chapter one, this can be observed in the history of land ownership 
and land law.522 A small collection of activists, theologians, and politicians have come to argue that 
native title in the Highlands and Islands should be recognised to respect this distinct history.523 
Devine notes that “[t]he Gaels were not being dominated by a foreign power. But there are several 
aspects of their experience which suggest the impact of international colonialism”.524 To Hoffman 
“[w]hen the clan chiefs turned into landlords and the Scottish landscape became private property, 
a tension was created with the old and deeply-held belief that the land was a common heritage”.525 
Inspired by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and replicating the 
Scandinavian Sami Parliament, the Crofters’ Assembly in 2008 declared that:  
                                               
517 H. MacQueen and S. Wortley, “Ur Duthchas, or native title in the Scottish Highlands?” (Edinburgh: Scots Law 
News, 4 January 2010). 
518 Mabo v Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Australia). 
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522 D. Walker, A Legal History of Scotland Vol. 1 (Edinburgh: W. Green 1988) p. 354. 
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The Scottish Crofting Foundation calls on the government to: recognise crofters as 
indigenous people of the Highlands and Islands; respect the growing body of international 
law on indigenous people; and devolve power and decision-making on indigenous issues 
to the people who maintain the indigenous cultures of the Highlands and Islands.526 
The question is whether native title should be allowed to influence the application of A1P1, or 
even displace or inherently limit existing conceptions of rights to property and title to land. The 
UK is a signatory to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted 
by the General Assembly in 2007.527 Interestingly Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
States voted against, although Canada has since removed this objection.528 The legislation has not 
been incorporated into domestic law.  
Despite this, it is submitted that conceptions of native or indigenous peoples’ title should not be 
formally recognised in Scots law. International law does not set out a formal definition of 
“indigenous peoples”. Instead, we are left with a series of indicators. As Anaya noted, indigenous 
people are nations and communities that “find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the 
forces of empire and conquest”.529 While, as chapter one highlighted, the rhetoric of land reform 
often portrays existing landowners as a distinct group, it would be wrong to argue that Scotland 
was colonised in a manner similar to Australia or New Zealand.530 Further, on the passing of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, Pierce, the British representative, noted 
that the Declaration was not legally binding, nor could it have any retroactive effect.531 Pierce 
stressed that no ethnic group or minorities in the UK or its overseas territories could be recognised 
as indigenous peoples.532  
This does not mean the concepts of community should be ignored. The community right to buy 
and the crofting right to buy recognise the importance of “community” even if this concept is 
difficult to define.  Scots law already recognises these regional differences to a certain extent 
through crofting law, which was originally confined to the crofting counties and gives a level of 
                                               
526 I. MacKinnon, Crofters Indigenous people of the Highlands & Islands (Kyle of Lochalsh: Scottish Crofting Foundation, 
2008) p. 7.  
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protection to small-scale landholding, shielding it from market forces. The importance of 
recognising these regional differences in Scotland was a prominent part of the work of the Napier 
Commission and allowed crofters security of tenure long before agricultural tenants in the rest of 
Scotland were given similar protection.533 Further, even those holding secure AH(S)A 1991 
tenancies still do not have a similar absolute right to buy comparable to that provided for 
crofters.534 Therefore, while Scots land law does recognise the regional differences, it should not 
be compared to other claims of native title in former colonised nations.  
3.10 CHAPTER TWO CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has shown the prevailing human rights discourse in Scotland. It has discussed the 
development of the ECHR and the HRA. It proceeded to set out the obligations placed on the 
Scottish Ministers, the judiciary, public bodies, and quasi-public bodies by the HRA and SA 1998. 
It then delineated the broadening of the human rights paradigm in Scotland, asserting that this has 
been a direct response to a perceived overemphasis on individual rights to property in relation to 
contemporary land law reform.  
 
Chapter two has illustrated that any Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as it is 
incompatible with any of the Convention rights.535 Members of the Scottish Government have no 
power to make any subordinate legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation or act is 
incompatible with any of the Convention Rights.536 Critical for the purposes of this thesis, it is 
unlawful for the Scottish Ministers to act in a manner that is incompatible with A1P1.  
 
This chapter has shown that the Scottish Ministers have the devolved competencies to refer to the 
ICESCR and other relevant non-convention rights. However, while socio-economic rights may be 
justiciable, the Scottish Ministers’ inclusion of the ICESCR into its definition of “other rights” 
does not constitute an implementation by domestic legislation. 
 
Critically for land reform, this means that the widening of the human rights discourse in this 
manner does not change the devolved competencies of the Scottish Ministers and public bodies. 
                                               
533 Agriculture (Scotland) Act 1948.  
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That being so, the ICESCR has an important role to play at the policy level and when exercising 
Ministerial discretion. Other relevant non-convention rights such as the SDGs and VGGTs have 
a role to play at a public policy level. As such, their effect on how A1P1 is interpreted and applied 
will be minimal. 
 
It submitted that the Scottish Ministers can, in undertaking their decision-making capacity, have 
regard to the ICESCR and other relevant non-convention rights, and as such, the Scottish judiciary 
is also required to have regard to its international human rights obligations. The caveat is that this 
must be done in a manner that is compliant with their existing obligations and devolved 
competencies. If, therefore, circumstances were to arise in which more than one compatible 
interpretation of A1P1 was open to the Scottish Ministers, they would be required, in choosing 
between those options, to have regard to the ICESCR. Therefore, while the ICESCR can influence 
the realisation of Convention rights in Scots law, it must be done in a manner that is compatible 
with A1P1. Despite this, it must be remembered that the ICESCR cannot operate to allow for the 
limiting or reinterpretation of A1P1 to the extent that such an interpretation is ultra vires. Acts of 
the Scottish Parliament that are not compatible with A1P1 will be held to be “not law”.537 
 
The final part of this chapter illustrated that, while there have been arguments concerning the 
existence of a system of native title in Scotland, these should be dismissed. The existence of 
crofting law in the original crofting counties and the Scottish Ministers’ focus on “community” 
means that regional differences are already recognised in some form in Scots land law. The 
emergence of claims of the existence of native title to land in Scotland should be viewed as part 
of the wider narrative and myth of land reform. This is part of the nationalist belief that Scotland 
is different, even exceptional. Therefore, while native title to land should be dismissed, such claims 
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4 CHAPTER THREE 
INTERPRETING ARTICLE 1 OF THE FIRST PROTOCOL 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter two of this thesis has shown that the Scottish Ministers and judiciary must act in a manner 
that is compatible with A1P1. Any act or omission that is incompatible ought to be held to be “not 
law”. Chapter three will set out a six-part rule-based approach to interpreting A1P1, as developed 
by the ECtHR and applied by domestic courts in Scotland and the rest of the UK. The framework 
outlined in this chapter will then be applied to the contemporary rights to buy in chapter four.  
 
Part 1 of this chapter will begin by outlining the development of A1P1 and its drafting. It is argued 
that while the ECtHR has not confined itself to originalist interpretations, the travaux préparatoires 
remains an important source of secondary material when interpreting A1P1 and also serves as a 
guide to the philosophical and political ideals that resulted in A1P1.538 This functions as a useful 
lens to inform contemporary interpretations and the changing face of A1P1.539 It is posited that 
A1P1 was the result of political compromise and was drafted in a manner that aimed to make 
A1P1 a hollow right.   
Part 2 of this chapter will outline the differing interpretative methodologies undertaken by the 
ECtHR. It will show that A1P1 has been subject to a multitude of differing interpretations. It also 
argues that domestic jurisprudence can be informed by taking into account the interpretive 
methodology undertaken by the ECtHR. Despite this, the composition and judicial reasoning of 
the ECtHR remains a limiting factor when attempting to discern a clear set of principles.  
 
Part 3 of this chapter will argue that the Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence can be reconciled 
into a rules-based approach that encompasses six tests. These tests can be succinctly summarised 
as:  
1. Is the applicant a victim?  
2. Does the applicant hold a possession?  
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3. Has an interference with A1P1 taken place? This involves considering the three rules first 
set-out in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden: 
(a) General interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions;  
(b) Deprivation of possessions; and  
(c) Control of the use of those possessions.  
4. Was the action of the state lawful within the meaning of the article? 
5. Did the action of the state pursue a legitimate aim in the public or general interest?; and  
6. Was the interference proportionate, and did it satisfy the fair balance between competing 
interests? 
 
First, it will argue that the victim test has been interpreted broadly. Second, it will note that 
“possession” has been given an autonomous meaning and should be disassociated from its 
domestic meaning. Third, it will argue that while the Sporrong categories of interference may serve 
a purpose regarding compensation, considerable confusion as to the correct parameters between 
a control of use and a deprivation remain.540 Fourth, it will be submitted that the lawfulness test 
requires domestic law to have certain formal qualities and must be sufficiently accessible, 
foreseeable and compatible with the rule of law. Fifth, it will be contended that the public interest 
test has been rendered a paper tiger in the face of the margin of appreciation given to contracting 
states and the significant weight domestic courts have given to democratic institutions. Sixth, it 
will posit that proportionality must be considered through a structured four-part test. In doing so, 
it will be argued that A1P1’s ability to “bite” and protect the right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions in domestic legal systems is contained within the proportionality standard. While rights 
to property are never absolute, the proportionality test offers the opportunity for the judiciary to 
consider the relative merits of an interference.  
 
4.2 PART 1: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 
 
The travaux préparatoires of A1P1 and questions regarding the historical and theoretical foundations 
of rights to property remain oddly unexplored.541 An examination of the highly contested drafting 
process exposes the differing conceptions of property and the competing political ideologies and 
                                               
540 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35. 
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difficulties that become apparent when drafting rights to property instruments.542 After a general 
debate on the topic, the Preparatory Commission of the Council of Europe ruled by a majority 
that it was desirable to include the right to property following Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”).543 The UDHR was only adopted after considerable 
debate and amendment. The British and Australian delegates attempted to delete the clause as they 
felt property law should be national and not international.544 In practice, Article 17 has been 
interpreted as a general right to not rule out individuals or identifiable groups from owning 
property, rather than an explicit right to property.545 
 
The first draft Convention contained the right to the “Freedom from arbitrary deprivation of 
property”.546 The Consultative Assembly began considering the draft on 19 August 1949, although 
interestingly, the original proposal by the Rapporteur Teitgen did not contain a comparable 
property right.547 The travaux préparatoires illustrate the passionate, but often conflicting, 
conceptions of property held by many of the delegates. The French delegate Bastid stated that  
 
Property is an extension of the man, and man cannot feel safe if he is exposed to arbitrary 
dispossession... I do not know if there is any right more ancient or more firmly established 
than the right to own property. In all civilized nations, there are rules to protect individuals 
against arbitrary confiscation.548  
 
A representative from Ireland feared any tampering or removal with the right to property would 
be “the thin end of the Moscow wedge”.549 The Committee of Experts did call the attention of the 
Committee of Ministers to the right in question. It was felt that totalitarian regimes had a tendency 
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to interfere with the right to own property as a means of exercising illegitimate pressure on its 
nationals.550  
 
The drafting of a right to property proved to be highly controversial. This was particularly apparent 
for many of the British delegates who feared that the inclusion of property rights could inhibit 
their domestic drive to nationalise significant aspects of the British economy.551 Britain’s Labour 
representative Nally argued that “[t]he basis of Europe’s fight for survival is a struggle for the 
subordination of private property to the needs of the community”.552 The representative went 
further and suggested that by protecting property, they would be defending a system in which a 
“tiny handful of people own the means by which millions of others live”.553 The British delegate 
Davies argued that: 
 
To uphold fundamental rights to property on the basis of a pre-legal, moral or naturally 
based conception of the person implies adopting into the ‘public reason’ of the state a neo-
liberal agenda based on freedom of contract and the minimal state. It would open to 
constitutional challenge political schemes which use the law to redistribute property in 
order to advance collectively chosen purposes.554   
While many nations supported the right,555 the result of these disputes was that the right to 
property was not incorporated into the Convention signed on 4 November 1950.556 A considerable 
amount of the disagreement appears to have stemmed from the actual wording of draft property 
clauses, rather than the inclusion of a right to property per se. The Committee of Experts met in 
February 1951 to discuss the Protocol. The British proposed a new draft that stated:  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. This 
provision, however, shall not be considered as infringing in any way the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary either to serve the ends of justice or to secure the 
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payment of monies due whether by way of taxes or otherwise, or to ensure the acquisition 
or use of property in accordance with the general interest.557 
 
In response, the Belgian government proposed a wording that explicitly required deprivations to 
be “subject to fair compensation which shall be fixed in advance”.558 This was opposed by the 
British and the French for differing reasons. The British wanted to avoid the inclusion of a 
compensation requirement, and the French felt that the second sentence of the draft already 
incorporated a compensation requirement.559 Disputes continued around the wording with the 
inclusion of “arbitrary confiscation” and “compensation” being subject to considerable 
disagreement.560 The Commentary of the Secretariat-General helps to explain some of the late 
amendments.  
 
(a) The phrase “arbitrary confiscation” was thought to be too imprecise in a legal text as it is 
capable of varying interpretations. Therefore, it was replaced by the phrase “subject to the 
conditions provided for by law”. It was believed to be more precise and to cover adequately 
the objections in mind.  
(b) There was much discussion as to whether or not it should be stipulated that “no one should 
be deprived of his property except …subject to compensation”. Although the majority of 
the governments were at one time in favour of a provision to this effect, other 
governments felt unable to accept it, as they did not think it possible to express this 
principle in terms which would be appropriate to all the various types of cases which might 
arise, and they could not admit that decisions taken on this matter by competent national 
authorities should be subject to review by international organs. Nevertheless, the phrase 
“subject to the conditions provided for by law” would normally require the payment of 
compensation, since it is normally provided for in legislation on the nationalisation of 
expropriation of property. Further, the phrase “subject to the conditions provided for… 
by the general principles of international law” would guarantee compensation to foreigners 
even if it were not paid to nationals.  
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(c) The second paragraph was expanded somewhat to make it clear that this article does not 
prevent the state from collecting taxes or applying other regulatory measures to the whole 
of property of individuals in question.561 
 
Despite some late attempts at revisions by the Federal Republic of Germany, the text that is today 
A1P1 was agreed on 6 June 1951 with the removal of any reference to compensation.562 A1P1 was 
signed in Paris on 20 March 1952.563 The final text was ratified by ten contracting states and came 
into force on 18 May 1954.564   
 
4.2.1 PART 1: CONCLUSIONS  
The travaux préparatoires emphasise the conflicted nature of rights to property. The philosophical 
disputes between individual rights to property and their ability to conflict with wider social and 
egalitarian interests were a prominent part of the debates. While not expressly articulated, it is 
difficult not to conclude that the fresh memory of the vast Nazi looting of Europe and the 
expropriation of Jewish property in Germany, combined with the Soviet Union’s mass 
expropriations, did not at least help underline many of the delegates’ determination for the 
Convention to contain a right to property. Conversely, other delegates articulated their concerns 
about the inclusion of a right to property using socialist theory. For several delegates, property 
rights were backwards-looking and had the potential to inhibit progressive and distributive 
reforms. The content of the travaux préparatoires and the prevailing ideological disputes as to the 
limits of rights to property are found today in the contemporary land reform debate in Scotland.  
Our analysis is slightly limited by the fact that the debates of the Legal Committee, the Committee 
of Ministers, and the Committee of Experts are not published in full. Despite this, the preparatory 
work offers several important factors that must be taken into account when considering A1P1. To 
be able to understand the development of the jurisprudence of the Convention organs regarding 
A1P1, it is necessary to be aware of contracting parties’ prevailing political and philosophical 
concerns besides the canons of interpretation.  As the proceeding analysis will highlight, the 
vagueness of the language contained in the final text makes it difficult to conclude that the drafters 
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did not quite achieve the stated aim by the Committee of Experts to adopt a system of “precise 
definition to the greatest extent possible for the specific rights to be secured”.565  
The final text included in A1P1 is the result of compromise among different philosophical and 
political concerns, rather than being an expression of a single philosophical approach. This feature 
of A1P1 makes its interpretation more difficult.566 A reading of the preparatory works shows that 
many governments wanted to leave the right to property “as hollow as could be managed”.567 This 
was well known at the time, as shown in a brief written for a Cabinet Meeting of the British 
Government in 1951, where Ernest Bevin wrote that the provision on the right of property “is 
almost meaningless because the reservations seem to cancel out the right”.568 
Despite the best efforts of several delegates during the drafting process, the proceeding analysis 
will show how the interpretative methodologies of the ECtHR have resulted in a right to property 
that requires interference to be lawful, in the public interest, and proportionate in a manner that 
satisfies the fair balance between competing interest. Part 3 will show how these principles have 
been interpreted and applied domestically since the enactment of the HRA.  
4.3 PART 2: INTERPRETATIVE METHOD 
 
The ECHR and its Protocols do not give any direction into how the Convention rights are to be 
interpreted. While the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (“VCLT”) is not technically 
retrospective, the Strasbourg Court has chosen to endorse the VCLT to guide interpretation.569 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT outlines the general rule that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose”.570 This is not a straightforward task when interpreting 
the Convention.571 As Lord Woolf observed, “the ECHR is utterly unlike the ‘black letter’ or 
detailed legislation we are used to”.572 From the earliest days, concerns over the drafting of the 
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ECHR have been apparent. A passionate note from the personal papers of the then Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Jowitt, outlined that his primary concerns with the Convention were that the 
rights contained where “so vague and woolly that it may mean almost anything”.573 Thus, the 
ECtHR has undertaken a multitude of differing interpretive methodologies. These can roughly be 
split into “judicial restraint” and “judicial activist” principles.574 
4.3.1 JUDICIAL RESTRAINT  
The undertaking of a restrained interpretative method can be broken down into several sub-
concepts: “intentionalism” methodology is outlined in Article 32 of the VCLT which states that 
recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable”.575 The problem when considering A1P1 and the Convention, in general, 
is that the travaux préparatoires are often difficult to reconcile, and as already highlighted, the 
preparatory works repeatedly highlight theoretical disputes rather than the clear intent of the 
drafters.  
A “textualist” interpretation seeks to determine what meaning the provision had at the time of 
drafting. In this sense, it is comparable to the concept of “originalism” as practised by several 
justices in the American Supreme Court, most famously by Justice Scalia.576 This methodology 
stands contrary to the “living instrument” theory of interpretation discussed below. The problem 
with taking a textualist approach to interpreting A1P1 is that the wording is opaque and as such 
principles are difficult to garner from only looking at the exact wording of A1P1.   
The “margin of appreciation” is not a right but as a matter of judicial self-restraint. The Strasbourg 
Court is conscious of its position as an international tribunal, and particularly in sensitive areas, 
will find a violation only if it cannot reasonably be doubted that the acts or omissions of the State 
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in question are incompatible with those engagements.577 It is, therefore, a tacit recognition by 
Strasbourg of its “subsidiary” role in the protection of human rights.578  
The doctrine of “fourth instance” is used to justify the Strasbourg Court from interfering in 
domestic laws. This is beyond simply undertaking an expansive margin of appreciation but tends 
to avoid making any pronouncements.579 Following a fourth instance interpretative methodology 
would hold that the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession should be left wholly to 
contracting states.  
 
4.3.2 JUDICIAL ACTIVIST INTERPRETATIONS  
 
The ECtHR has on many occasions taken what can be regarded as an “activist” approach when 
interpreting Convention rights. The “autonomous” concept of legal interpretation describes where 
the ECtHR gives a meaning to a term within the Convention that is not that accepted at a national 
level.580 As this thesis illustrated, and will be further expanded on, this is apparent in relation to the 
meaning given to “possession” under A1P1.581 Autonomous interpretations have come in for 
considerable criticism from politicians and the press, who are quick to fight over allegations of 
activist judges.582  
 
The “living instrument” doctrine of interpreting the ECHR was outlined in Tyrer v United 
Kingdom.583 The ECtHR considered whether corporal punishment of minors on the Isle of Man 
constituted degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention. The Court observed that it:  
 
Must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as the Commission 
rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions… the Court 
cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards in the 
penal policy of the Member States of the Council of Europe in this field.584 
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The ECtHR has taken a “living” instrument interpretation in many cases but appears to be 
apprehensive to follow this doctrine when the application relates to particularly sensitive topics, 
notably in the case of A, B and C v Ireland in a case concerning abortion.585 In relation to A1P1 
applications, the living instrument doctrine appears to have been utilised in relation to the 
definition of “proportionality”. In Handyside v United Kingdom the court appears to have held that it 
was not entitled to consider questions of proportionality under A1P1 applications,586 however in 
later decisions such as Marckx and Sporrong & Lönnroth ECtHR allowed for the evolution of A1P1 
to place significant importance on the proportionality requirement.587 Similar developments can 
be seen in the compensation requirement, which if one considered the travaux préparatoires and 
undertook an intentionalist interpretation, would not be a significant factor in determining whether 
an interference is justifiable. However, the Court has come to hold that compensation is a critical 
factor in determining the “fair balance” test for both deprivations and interferences with the 
control of use of possessions.588 
 
The doctrine of “effectiveness” also known as “innovative interpretation” is where the Court is 
required to give the “fullest weight and effect consistent with the language used and with the rest 
of the text and in such a way that every part of it can be given meaning”.589 The underlying 
justification for the doctrine of effectiveness is that contracting states cannot protect Convention 
rights simply by inactivity but under certain circumstances are required to undertake positive 
actions to protect rights. In Oneryildiz v Turkey a family who had been living in a slum bordering a 
refuse dump when a methane explosion in the dump caused a landslide which engulfed the 
applicant’s house killing his close relatives brought an application.590  To the Grand Chamber, “the 
real and effective exercise of that right does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere 
but may require positive measure of protection”. 591  
                                               
585 A, B and C v Ireland (2011) 53 EHRR 13.  
586 Handyside (n 578).  
587 Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540); Marckx (n 58).  
588 Lithgow v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329 [120]. 
589 J. M. Merrills, The development of international law by the European Court of Human Rights (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press 1990) p.  208. 
590 Oneryildiz (n 494).  
591 Ibid [143]-[146]. 
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4.3.3 PART 2: CONCLUSIONS  
 
As the above analysis has briefly shown, A1P1 has been subject to a multitude of differing 
interpretations by the ECtHR.  Unlike the US Supreme Court where the preferred interpretative 
methods and political ideologies of the Justices are generally known the Judges in the ECtHR are 
often not as easy to predict. Thus, while the interpretative methods undertaken, and the potential 
outcome of any given application, will be determined in part by the makeup of the judge(s) sitting 
in any given case, this is not conclusive nor are judges prone to consistently follow the same 
methodology.  
As will be shown below, differing interpretative methods are seen within A1P1. The general 
principles that appear to have developed are that the court has taken an activist “autonomous” 
interpretation of “possession”. The ECtHR has taken a wide “margin of appreciation” bordering 
on “fourth instance” methodology when interpreting the public and general interest. In addition, 
the ECtHR’s definition of “proportionality” appears to have been in part based on a “living 
instrument” methodology and has taken an activist approach when determining compensation and 
the fair balance test. It appears that the ECtHR remains likely to interpret applications based on 
the particular facts before it. This is exacerbated by the lack of a recognisable doctrine of precedent 
and the fact that ECtHR decisions lack erga omnes force.592 Domestic courts considering the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, which they are required to “take into account”, are therefore also 
required, where possible, to consider the interpretive methodology undertaken by the Strasbourg 
Court. However, this is far from a straightforward task nor, is it usually clear from past decisions. 
4.4 PART 3: INTERPRETING ARTICLE 1 OF THE FIRST PROTOCOL  
 
It has been submitted that the travaux préparatoires, while offering important insights into the 
underlying political and philosophical debates that facilitated the inclusion of a right to property 
in the First Protocol to the ECHR, remain only of limited guidance on the scope of A1P1 as the 
wording was largely the result of political compromise. Further, it has been shown that the ECtHR 
has undertaken several interpretative methods when considering key components of A1P1 and 
that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is often difficult to reconcile as a result. Part 3 of this chapter 
                                               
592 A McHarg “Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty 
in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 671, 673. 
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will proceed to illustrate the observable “rules” as set out by the ECtHR and how these rules have 
been interpreted and applied by domestic courts since the HRA. Part 3 is important as it will set 
tests that must be satisfied for an interference to be compatible with A1P1. These tests will then 
be applied to contemporary Scots rights to buy in chapter four.  
 
The convention right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession states that:  
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.593  
 
The French text was not inserted into Schedule 1 of the HRA. Domestic courts are, however, 
required to have regard to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The French Protection de la propriété, 
stated that:  
 
Toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens. Nul ne peut être privé 
de sa propriété que pour cause d'utilité publique et dans les conditions prévues par la loi 
et les principes généraux du droit international. 
  
Les dispositions précédentes ne portent pas atteinte au droit que possèdent les Etats de 
mettre en vigueur les lois qu'ils jugent nécessaires pour réglementer l'usage des biens 
conformément à l'intérêt général ou pour assurer le paiement des impôts ou d'autres 
contributions ou des amendes. 
 
After considering the difficulties inherent in drafting a right to property clause, the French delegate 
Pernot concluded that: 
 
                                               
593 A1P1. 
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I think actually one may always say of any definition that it lacks clarity. But... side by side 
with texts, there is a thing called jurisprudence, and we may rely on… to discriminate, 
when the time comes, between what would be an arbitrary act and what would be a 
legitimate act.594  
 
In other words, Pernot felt that while the text of A1P1 lacked precision, in practice, the Strasbourg 
institutions would be able to develop over time a suitable body of jurisprudence. In retrospect, 
this sounds naïve, but it perhaps represents the confidence the delegates had in the Convention 
and Protocols they had drafted.  
 
A1P1 is written with a very high level of generality and is not in a form that most would consider 
as comparable to domestic legislation.595 Instead, A1P1 is closer to a general statement of ideals 
similar to what one would expect from a political policy document or a statement given in 
Parliament.596 Due to several factors, most notably the importance placed on the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation in Strasbourg, applications must be fulfilled at a national level through a 
substantial body of more specific domestic law.597 
 
4.5 THE SIX POINT TEST  
 
Part 3 will show that the ECtHR has developed a series of “tests” or “stages” that are followed 
when considering A1P1 applications. Since the passing of the HRA, domestic courts have come 
to follow these tests. There are, however, important differences between how the ECtHR has 
interpreted the ECHR and domestic interpretations of Convention rights in the HRA.  
 
4.5.1 VICTIM STATUS  
 
In a manner similar to the Scots law principles of standing, applicants under A1P1 must be a 
“victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the ECHR.598 The domestic application of Article 34 
                                               
594 TP, vol. VI, p. 106. 
595 Gretton (n 478) p. 275. 
596 Ibid.  
597 Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 64, [2014] AC 1260 [55].  
598 ECHR Article 34; Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2015] CSIH 7, 2015 SC 42 [96].  
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can be observed in section 7(7) of the HRA and section 100(1) of the SA 1998.599 The ECHR is 
concerned with the reality of a situation rather than its formal appearance, to ensure that it 
guarantees rights that are practical and effective. The interpretation of the concept of “victim” is 
correspondingly broad.600 The risk is that an excessively formalistic interpretation of “victim” 
would risk making the rights guaranteed in the ECHR “ineffectual”.601 The question is whether 
the alleged victim is “a member of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the 
legislation”, rather than subject to some purely hypothetical risk.602 It is therefore clear that only 
natural or legal persons, who had a possession which was capable of being interfered with, can 
claim victim status.603 However, an adverse impact on financial interests, resulting from the direct 
effect of a measure on the property rights or possessions of another person, does not suffice to 
establish victim status in relation to A1P1.604   
4.5.2 POSSESSION 
 
An applicant can allege a violation of A1P1 only in so far as the interference relates to a 
“possession” within the meaning of A1P1. The text states that it concerns the peaceful enjoyment 
of “possession”, with “property” only being used in the second paragraph. The following, differing 
terms appear three times in both French and English:  
French English 
(i) Biens (i) Possessions 
(ii) Propriété (ii) Possessions 
(iii) Biens (iii) Property605 
Why the drafters chose to refer to the nature of the interest protected in three different ways in 
the French text and in two ways in the English text is not clear from the preparatory work. That 
the English text refers to “possessions” is also an anomaly as it was made clear to the drafters that 
                                               
599 HRA s. 7(7); SA 1998 s. 100(1).  
600 AXA General Insurance (n 60) [111]. 
601 Lizarraga v Spain (2004) 45 EHRR 1039, [38]. 
602 AXA General Insurance (n 60) [25]-[26].  
603 McMaster (OH) (n 108) [152]. 
604 Ibid [110]. 
605 A1P1.  
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it was not a term commonly used in English speaking legal systems.606 The British delegate Roberts 
noted that “[t]he word ‘possessions’, used in the English text, is not really a satisfactory word... [it] 
would not be found in a British Act of Parliament or any other legal document”.607 The VCLT 
attempts to reconcile such problems stating that, “when a comparison of the authentic texts 
discloses a difference of meaning... the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to 
the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted”.608  
The ECtHR has chosen to deal with this inherent confusion by simply ignoring it, and has 
resultantly interpreted the right to possession broadly.609 An applicant must generally fulfil the 
conditions set by domestic law for ownership.610 However, in practice, the fact that the applicant’s 
property right is not recognised as such in domestic law will not necessarily be fatal to a claim 
under A1P1.611 In Broniowski v Poland the ECtHR observed that: 
The concept of possessions… has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to the 
ownership of material goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic 
law. In the same way as material goods, certain other rights and interests constituting assets 
can also be regarded as “property rights”, and thus as “possessions” for the purposes of 
this provision. In each case the issue that needs to be examined is whether the 
circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a 
substantive interest protected by A1P1.612 
It would appear that A1P1 only applies to existing property and does not confer a right to acquire 
property.613 The possibility of acquiring a possession in the future is unlikely to constitute a 
property right protected by A1P1.614 The applicant must be able to show a legal entitlement to the 
economic benefit at issue.615  
                                               
606 TP, vol. VI, p. 88.  
607  Ibid p. 88. 
608 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, 331, Article 33.  
609 Aston Cantlow (n 352) [91]. 
610 Hadzic v Croatia App no 48788/99, (ECtHR, 13 September 2001). 
611 Gasus Dosier-und Fordertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403. 
612 Broniowski (n 59).  
613 Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium (1996) 21 EHRR 301.  
614 C. Weir and R. Moules, “Human Rights Practice” in J. Semor and B. Emmerson (eds) Human Rights Practice 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 2005) para [15.009]. 
615 Stran Greek Refineries v Greece (1994) 19 EHRR 293 [58]-[62]. 
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Possession can be either “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the 
applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective 
enjoyment of a possession.616 This has to be more than mere “hope of recognition” of a property 
right which is impossible to exercise, nor can it be a conditional claim which lapses as a result of 
the non-fulfilment of the condition.617 Per the ECtHR, this includes the assumed validity of 
planning permission,618 the expectation of being allocated a broadcast frequency,619 the assumed 
validity of a contractual option,620 and the retrospective amendment of legislation which deprived 
the applicant of an accrued statute-based claim for damages.621 The ECtHR appears primarily 
concerned with whether a legitimate expectation is sufficiently established domestically to be 
enforceable.622 The assets of a business in the form of “goodwill” may be a possession under 
A1P1.623  
 
4.5.2.1 POSSESSION IN DOMESTIC LAW  
 
The traditional Scots law classifications between heritable and moveable; corporeal and 
incorporeal; and fungible and non-fungible property are therefore ignored.624 Possession within 
the meaning of A1P1 must be disassociated from the property law distinctions which have been 
taught and practised for centuries. Craig’s Jus Feudale, states that “possession is not a right or title 
and has nothing in common with a right of property”.625 Thus, while in Scots property law 
possessions is “a term of art”, jurists considering A1P1 applications in Scotland are required to 
leave their assumptions about possessions and the many maxims and rules drummed into them at 
law school at the door. Confusion undoubtedly remains. Lord Johnston, in 2001, considering the 
judicial review of the non-renewal of a liquor licence at the “Shed” nightclub in Glasgow stated 
                                               
616 Kopeckyý v Slovakia (2004) 41 EHRR 944 [35]. 
617 Ibid.  
618 Pine Valley Development v Ireland (1991) 14 EHRR 319. 
619 UK Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Defra [2013] EWHC 1959 (Admin) [105].  
620 Stretch (n 527).  
621 Presso Cia Naviera SA v Belgium (1995) 21 EHRR 301. 
622Saggio v Italy (2001) 34 EHRR 1068 [24]-[25]. 
623 Tre Traktörer AB v Sweden [1989] 13 EHHR 309. 
624 Reid (n 22).  
625 Craig (n 51) p. 307. 
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that “I confess to have some difficulty” with the definition of “possession”.626 Some clarity was 
given by Lord Reed in Axa General Insurance v Lord Advocate when he observed that:  
 
The concept of “possession” has been interpreted by that court as including a wide range 
of economic interests and assets, but one paradigm example of a possession is a person’s 
financial resources. That is implicitly reflected in the recognition, in the second paragraph 
of A1P1, that the preceding provisions do not impair the state’s right to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions of penalties.627 
 
Domestic courts have applied “possession” to include real rights in moveable and immoveable 
property,628 contractual and other personal rights,629 the right of a landowner to enjoy vacant 
possession,630 the right to an agricultural tenancy,631 the landlords right to recover possession by 
service of a good notice to quit,632 and contractual rights, including under a lease.633 While the 
autonomous concept does not extend to rights that are unknown in the national law, it may include 
known “rights” which turn out to be invalid.  
 
A legitimate expectation can constitute a possession under A1P1 even if it is not valid under 
domestic law.634 The theoretical basis appears to be that where in reliance on a legal act, and an 
individual incurs financial obligations, he may have a legitimate expectation that that legal act will 
not be retrospectively invalidated to his detriment.635 The ECtHR in Öneryıldız v Turkey appears to 
have placed considerable importance on the applicants being led to believe that they would 
maintain existing rights.636 
 
                                               
626 Catscratch Ltd v City of Glasgow Licensing Board 2002 SLT 503 (OH) [27].  
627 AXA General Insurance (n 60) [144]. 
628 Aston Cantlow (n 352). 
629 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No. 2) [2004] 1 AC 816 (HL).  
630 Manchester Ship Canal Development Ltd v Persons [2014] EWHC 645 (Ch). 
631 McMaster (IH) (n 5).  
632 Sheffield City Council v Smart [2002] HLR 34 (CA).  
633 Mellacher v Austria (1990) 12 EHRR 391. 
634 Pine Valley Development v Ireland (1992) 14 EHRR 319 [80]; Stretch v United Kingdom (2004) 38 EHRR 12; Rowland v 
Environment Agency [2003] EWCA Civ 1885, [2004] 3 WLR 249 [152] (CA).  
635 Times Newspapers Ltd v Flood [2017] 1 WLR 1415; [2017] UKSC 33 [47]. 
636 Öneryıldız v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20.  
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Lord Tyre in Walton v Scottish Ministers was not willing to accept the petitioners’ claim that the 
construction of a western peripheral route around Aberdeen was incompatible with their peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions as A1P1 does not guarantee the peaceful enjoyment of a pleasant 
environment.637 In Peter Laverie v The Scottish Ministers, Lord Clark held that the removal of a lecturer 
from Glasgow Clyde College and his subsequent disqualification from serving on other boards at 
the institution did not constitute a violation of A1P1, as presence on the board did not constitute 
a possession. Lord Clark noted that “A1P1 protects possessions and the key factor is the actual 
existence of some economic interest”, and in regard to the issues before the court “the office of 
board member is not a claim or other form of asset.  It is not something upon which a monetary 
value can be put. It is not capable of being transferred or disposed of or bequeathed”.638 It is 
therefore clear that in almost all instances, the test accepted by the domestic courts, follows that 
of the European Court and asks if the applicant holds an economic interest or a legitimate 
expectation of acquiring an interest.639  
 
4.5.2.2 CONCLUSIONS ON POSSESSION  
 
The first point to note is that the domestic interpretation of “possession”, particularly the test for 
“legitimate expectation”, remains somewhat confused.640 While the definition of possession is not 
completely settled the key factor remains the existence of an economic interest or asset.641 The 
ECtHR has even sometimes used “asset” as a synonym for possession”.642 As Gray and Gray note 
“a focus is placed on the legal entitlement concerned rather than the object of that entitlement”.643  
 
4.6 DETERMINING WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN AN INTERFERENCE: THE 
THREE RULES  
 
Once a domestic court establishes that the petitioner is a victim under section 7(7) HRA and holds 
a “possession” within the meaning of A1P1, the question turns to whether the petitioner has 
                                               
637 Walton v Scottish Ministers [2011] CSOH 131, 2011 SCLR 686 [104].  
638 Peter Laverie v Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 45, 2017 SLT 640 [151].  
639 Stran (n 615) [58]-[62]. 
640 R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2008] 2 AC 719 (HL) [21]. 
641 AXA General Insurance (n 60) [114].  
642 R (Reilly) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] EWCA Civ 413 [2017] QB 657 [37].  
643 K. Gray and S. Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009) p. 120.  
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suffered “interference” with that possession and, if so, the nature of that interference.644 This is 
divided into where there has been a:   
1. general interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions;  
2. deprivation of possessions; or  
3. controls on the use of those possessions.645  
A state action, which falls within one of these three rules, constitutes interference.646 The order 
given in Sporrong is slightly misleading, as before examining the first rule, the ECtHR must concern 
itself with questions of actual interference within the second and third rules. This does not 
necessarily mean that the first rule is of lesser importance as if the facts do not show deprivation 
there remains the possibility that measures may constitute an interference with the peaceful 
enjoyment of property.647 The ECtHR in James v United Kingdom noted that the three rules are not, 
however, “distinct”, in the sense of being unconnected.648 The second and third rules are 
concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
property and should, therefore, be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the 
first rule.649 In AXA General Insurance, Lord Reed observed that:  
Given that the second and third rules are only particular instances of interference with the 
right guaranteed by the first rule, however, the importance of classification should not be 
exaggerated. Although, where an interference is categorised as falling under the second or 
third rule, the Strasbourg court will usually consider the question of justification under 
reference to the language of those specific provisions of A1P1, the test is in substance the 
same, however the interference has been classified.650 
Before inquiring whether the first general rule has been complied with, it must be determined 
whether the last two are applicable.651  
                                               
644 McMaster (OH) (n 108) [153]. 
645 Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540) [61].  
646 Ibid [65]. 
647 James (n 61) [37] and [71]. 
648 Ibid.  
649 Ibid [37].   
650 AXA General Insurance (n 60) [108]. 
651 James (n 61) [37] and [71].  
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4.6.1 GENERAL INTERFERENCE 
 
The ECtHR has read the first paragraph of A1P1 as not simply a general statement of the right to 
property, but additionally as a separate right regulating “interference” with property where the 
interference does not constitute a deprivation or a control of use.652 Thus a broad range of state 
activities, which interfere with any of the normal consequences arising out of the ownership of 
property, will be recognised as giving rise to an issue under the guarantee. In such instances, the 
ECtHR has determined that the interference must comply with the balancing test.653 In Erkner and 
Hofauer v Austria a permit that “was an initial step in a procedure leading to deprivation of 
possession”, constituted an interference with enjoyment.654 The ECtHR appears to have placed 
considerable importance on the interference being a preliminary step that would ultimately 
culminate in a deprivation of the land.655 The development of the general interference standard is 
comparable to what American jurists would describe as “regulatory takings”.656  
 
There remains no single concept of what constitutes a “general interference”.657 The first rule in 
Sporrong has been in practice a vestigial category that is used to describe interferences that do not 
constitute controls of use or deprivation. The ECtHR has accepted that limitations placed on the 
right to dispose of possessions and legal impediments to peaceful enjoyment constitute 
interferences under A1P1.658 
 
The problem is that the availability of domestic judicial discussion as to what constitutes a general 
interference is almost non-existent. The reason for this is that it is unlikely that an applicant is 
going to argue that they have suffered a general interference, as a finding of a general interference 




                                               
652 Beyeler v Italy (2001) 33 EHRR 52 [98].  
653 Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540) [69].  
654 Erkner and Hofauer v Austria (1987) 9 EHRR 464. 
655 Ibid [74]. 
656 E. Epstein, Takings (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1985) pp. 263-282.  
657 Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (n 25) p. 107. 
658 Marckx (n 58) [63]. 
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The second rule in Sporrong covers deprivation of possessions.659 The deprivation of property is 
the most radical form of interference.660 It is generally accepted that a deprivation occurs when all 
the legal rights of the owner are extinguished, and an individual is “deprived of ownership”.661 
Formal or de jure deprivation involves a formal transfer of title and the owners’ rights being 
completely extinguished.662 Deprivation may also be de facto. In Sporrong, the ECtHR asserted that 
it must look at the reality of the situation as the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that 
are “practical and effective”.663 
The ECtHR has accordingly taken a broad definition of deprivation as including expropriation 
and other loss of rights, which flow from the legal consequences of property.664 One of the critical 
distinctions between a deprivation on the one hand and control of use on the other is whether the 
complainant has retained legal title to the possession in question. But even if the complainant has 
retained legal title, the ECtHR has recognised that there can be what it has called a de facto 
expropriation.665  
Domestic courts have taken a similarly broad interpretation of deprivation. The Court of Appeal 
in R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health observed that:  
[O]ne highly relevant factor in considering whether an interference amounts to a 
deprivation or a control of use is whether the complainant has retained legal title to the 
possession in question. But even if the complainant has retained legal title the ECtHR has 
recognised that there can be what it has called a de facto expropriation”.666  
In this instance, British American Tobacco criticised the use in an earlier decision of “expropriation” 
rather than “deprivation”. However, per the Court of Appeal, “since the ECtHR itself uses that 
expression we do not consider that it is a valid criticism”.667 It therefore appears that domestic 
courts are willing to accept both terms. The key point, as articulated in British American Tobacco, is 
                                               
659Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540) [61]. 
660 James (n 61) [71]. 
661 Handyside (n 578) [62].  
662 Lithgow (n 588) [107]. 
663 Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540) [63]. 
664 James (n 61) [38]. 
665 R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWCA Civ 1182, [2017] 3 WLR 225 [93]. 
666 Ibid [93].  
667 Ibid [93]. 
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that “the test for deprivation as opposed to control of use is whether, following the interference, 
the complainant has retained any meaningful use of the possession in question. If the answer to 
that question is “yes”, then the interference is unlikely to amount to a de facto deprivation or 
expropriation”.668 In Cusack v Harrow London Borough Council, Lord Carnwath cited the Grand 
Chamber in Depalle v France to highlight that: 
Regarding whether or not there has been an interference, the Court reiterates that, in 
determining whether there has been a deprivation of possessions within the second ‘rule’, 
it is necessary not only to consider whether there has been a formal taking or expropriation 
of property but to look behind the appearances and investigate the realities of the situation 
complained of. Since the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are “practical and 
effective”, it has to be ascertained whether the situation amounted to a de facto 
expropriation.669 
 
Repeating the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and earlier domestic courts, Lord Clark, in McMaster 
observed that “in order for a deprivation of property to occur, it must be definitive and involve 
an irrevocable expropriation or transfer of rights to property. A de facto expropriation will 
suffice”.670 Further, his Lordship highlighted that “the enactment of legislation which has the 
consequence of devaluing a property right, but does not cause the property right itself to disappear, 
does not amount to an expropriation”.671 
 
Categorisation by the ECtHR “tends to be result-orientated. It first asks itself whether the 
interference is of a sort which calls for compensation. If the answer is affirmative, it is likely to 
classify the interference as a deprivation”.672 It is clear that the critical question for domestic courts 
in determining whether there has been a deprivation is the extinction of all legal rights of the 
owner. However, this is not always followed, as difficult situations can arise.673  
 
                                               
668 Ibid [96]. 
669 Cusack v Harrow London Borough Council [2013] UKSC 40, [2013] 1 WLR 2022 [35] citing Depalle v France (2010) 54 
EHRR 535 [559].  
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4.6.3 CONTROL OF USE 
 
The third rule in Sporrong outlines that states may “control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest”.674 For a interference to amount to a control of use, it must be a legislative 
measure that a state deems necessary to control the use of property. A purely administrative 
decision is therefore not a control of use, although it may constitute an interference with peaceful 
enjoyment.  
 
Guidance was given in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom when the ECtHR considered the loss 
of ownership of land due to the doctrine of adverse possession.675 While a notice to vacate land 
owned by the applicant was served on the expiry of the grazing agreement, Graham continued to 
graze without permission and eventually obtained title after the expiry of the statutory period under 
section 15 of the English Limitations Act 1980. By a narrow majority of 10:7, the Grand Chambers 
dismissed the appeal, observing that “the interference with the applicant companies’ possessions 
was a control of use, rather than a deprivation of possessions, such that the case law on 
compensation for deprivations is not directly applicable”.676 The Grand Chamber, in agreement 
with the UK Government, noted that:  
 
[A] requirement of compensation for the situation brought about by a party failing to 
observe a limitation period would sit uneasily alongside the very concept of limitation 
periods, whose aim is to further legal certainty by preventing a party from pursuing an 
action after a certain date.677  
 
This underscores the fact that the ECtHR has given significant weight to questions of 
compensation when determining the distinction between a deprivation and a control of use.  
 
The ECtHR has interpreted control of use broadly. For example, planning legislation, including 
the imposition and enforcement of planning and land use restrictions, constitutes “control of use” 
for the purposes of A1P1.678 Control of use even extends to restrictions on property use related to 
                                               
674 Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540) [65]. 
675  JA (Pye) (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45.  
676 Ibid [79].  
677 Ibid [79]-[80]. 
678 Allan Jacobsson v Sweden (1989) 12 EHRR 56 [54]. 
Rights to Property, Rights to Buy, and Land Law Reform  118 
the provision of housing, such as rent control legislation679 and measures to control the eviction 
of tenants.680 Measures taken to secure the payment of taxes or interest thereon are considered 
under the second paragraph of A1P1 as a control of use “in the general interest to secure the 
payment of tax”.681 These include the prohibition on an individual with tax debts leaving the 
country with belongings and the seizure of those belongings.682 However, ECtHR jurisprudence 
remains confused.683  
 
4.6.4 CONCLUSIONS ON THE SPORRONG CATEGORISATION  
The three categories of interference have been subject to sustained criticism, even if in practice 
categorization is not always followed. It is reasonable to note that the ECtHR jurisprudence and 
its domestic interpretation appears to show that a control of use, unlike, a deprivation does not 
require the payment of compensation.684 As a result, the ECtHR has in certain instances bent over 
backwards to avoid classifying an interference with property as deprivation”.685 The ECtHR in 
Gillow v United Kingdom stated that the requirements differed as “a deprivation of property is 
inherently more serious than the control of its use”.686 However, this clearly is not always the case. 
There is no moral difference between partial or full deprivation of property, and the magnitude of 
economic loss resulting from use restrictions can be as serious as that of deprivation. 
While applicants may gain a certain tactical advantage, mainly in relation to determining the 
availability of compensation, it ultimately remains that no conclusion on compensation will be 
reached by categorisation. The risk is that potential applicants pursuing measures short of the 
actual transfer of title will, therefore, face unacceptable levels of uncertainty with the potential 
benefits of the Sporrong categorisation being only marginal. This is further compounded by the 
truism that in practice all interferences are subject to the same proportionality tests, particularly 
                                               
679 Mellacher (n 633).  
680 Immobiliare Saffi v Italy (2000) 30 EHRR 756. 
681 Travers v Italy (App no15117/816 (ECtHR, January 1995).  
682 S v Sweden (1986) 8 EHRR 310 [311]. 
683 Pye (n 675). 
684 McMaster (OH) (n 108) [92]; Banér v Sweden (1989) 60 DR 128 [142]. 
685 D. Anderson, “Compensation for interference with Property” (1999) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 543, 553. 
686 Gillow v United Kingdom (1986) 11 EHRR 335 [148]. 
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the requirement that the interferences are proportionate strictu sensu. This should be the primary 
forum to determine compensation and not the Sporrong categories.687  
The Sporrong categorisation was strongly criticised and subsequently ignored in the Supreme Court 
decision of R (Mott) v Environment Agency.688 During submissions Lady Black asked counsel for the 
respondent in reaction to her observation that regardless of categorisation all interferences are 
subject to the same proportionality test, “is this really a requirement of the Strasbourg 
Jurisprudence to categorise”.689 Most familiar with the Strasbourg Court’s persistence to focus on 
categorisation and the many anomalies this has produced will no doubt have already been asking 
the same question.690  
The resulting unanimous opinion, written by Lord Carnwath, dismissed the appeal.691 Affirming 
the earlier Court of Appeal, decision the Justices observed that they “did not find it necessary to 
categorise the measure as either expropriation or control”, instead “the elimination of at least 95% 
of the benefit... was clearly relevant to the fair balance”.692 Lord Carnwath asserted that: “the 
distinction between expropriation and control is neither clear-cut, nor crucial to the analysis”.693  
The decision in Mott exemplifies the limits of the Sporrong tripartite test in the margins between 
control of use and deprivation. However, the Supreme Court has spurned the opportunity to offer 
some clarity to the borders between a control of use and a deprivation.694 The lesson going forward 
is that categorisation is not the sine qua non of determining whether compensation is due. Despite 
this, it is likely that litigators, domestic courts, and the ECtHR will continue to shoehorn 
interferences into a category to attempt to gain a perceived tactical advantage.695 
                                               
687 Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (n 25) p. 122. 
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4.7 ASSESSING WHETHER AN INTERFERENCE IS JUSTIFIED  
 
Any interference with a right to property falling within A1P1, to be compliant with the ECHR and 
HRA, must satisfy prescribed conditions.696 Once possession is established, and one or more of 
the three rules in Sporrong have been engaged, A1P1 will have been prima facie violated.697 As noted 
above the human right to property is a qualified right and can be deprived by states under certain 
circumstances. The ECtHR has determined that interference must meet the test of legal certainty, 
be justified in the general or public interest, and there must be a reasonable degree of 
proportionality between the means selected and the ends sought to be achieved. This is thought 
to be necessary to ensure that a fair balance between individual and collective interests has been 
maintained.698 
 
4.7.1 LAWFULNESS  
Interference with the right to property must first satisfy the requirement of lawfulness. The second 
sentence of A1P1 asserts that deprivation must be “subject to the conditions provided for by law” 
and proceeds to provide that states are permitted to enforce “such laws” as it deems “necessary”.699 
The concept of the rule of law is of fundamental importance to the Council of Europe.700 The 
ECtHR has described it as being inherent in all the articles of the Convention.701 The rule of law 
itself is an “umbrella term” and therefore finding a succinct definition is difficult.702 It should be 
remembered that the test of legality is a threshold test as the fair balance test “becomes relevant 
only once it has been established that the interference in question satisfied the requirement of 
lawfulness and was not arbitrary”.703 As such, cases are rarely decided in Strasbourg on questions 
of legality as the ECtHR does not think it fit for it to determine questions of national law unless 
the national law has been applied “manifestly erroneously or to reach arbitrary conclusions”.704  
                                               
696Murdoch and Reed (n 62) p. 978.  
697 James (n 61). 
698 Ibid. 
699 Iatridis v Greece (2000) 30 EHRR 97 [58].  
700 See ECHR Preamble and Article 3.  
701 AXA General Insurance (n 60) [118].  
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The ECtHR has consistently held that the terms “law” or “lawful” in the ECHR do not merely 
refer back to the domestic law but also relate to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible 
with the rule of law.705 The law must exhibit certain formal qualities. This is consistent with the 
rule that administrative discretion is never unfettered.706 The ECtHR in Sunday Times v United 
Kingdom, observed that:   
First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication 
that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, 
a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able—if need be with appropriate 
advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with 
absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is 
highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep 
pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms 
which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are 
questions of practice.707 
The concept of lawfulness does not merely require the existence of some domestic law but requires 
it to be compatible with the rule of law.708 The criteria of accessibility and foreseeability are not 
absolute; nor is the prohibition of arbitrariness incompatible with the existence of discretion. The 
ECtHR has often said that the effect of these requirements in a given situation depends upon the 
particular circumstances.709  
The ECtHR in Silver v United Kingdom observed that a norm cannot be regarded as a law unless it 
is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. A law which 
confers a discretion must indicate the scope of the discretion.710 Per Lord Reed in Imperial Tobacco 
Ltd v Lord Advocate:  
… not only that Parliament cannot itself override fundamental rights or the rule of law by 
                                               
705 James (n 61) [67]. 
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general or ambiguous words, but also that it cannot confer on another body, by general or 
ambiguous words, the power to do so.711  
The ECtHR has consistently declared that the principle of legal certainty is necessarily inherent in 
the law of the Convention.712 Added to this is the general acceptance of “non-arbitrariness”.  
Accordingly, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion bestowed on the competent 
authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate 
aim of the measure in question, to give the individual sufficient protection against arbitrary 
interference.713  
The rule of law was fundamental to the drafting of the Convention and has been part of the 
jurisprudence emanating from ECtHR the creation of the Court. References to the “rule of law”, 
“Rechtsstaat” or “État de droit/prée ́minence du droit” are common in European legal systems although 
these terms differ in their application and are vulnerable to losing their real meaning through 
translation.714 The Council of Europe in 2007 sought to promote clarity by passing a resolution 
stating that in the two authentic language texts of the Convention, “rule of law” and “prée ́minence 
du droit” are substantive legal concepts which are synonymous.715 Much work has been done by the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (“Venice Commission”), whose founding 
Statute states that it shall “give priority to work concerning, the constitutional, legislative and 
administrative principles and techniques which serve the efficiency of democratic institutions and 
their strengthening, as well as the principle of the rule of law”.716 The Venice Commission 
produced a detailed report in 2016 that offers important insights into how the Council of Europe 
hopes to define the rule of law.717 
Potential applicants under A1P1 will have to consider “the general principles of international law”. 
The ECtHR has consistently held that the principles of international law referred to in A1P1 do 
not apply where a state has taken property from its nationals.718 In the Lithgow judgement, it was 
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ruled that: 
 … although a taking of property must always be affected in the public interest, different 
considerations may apply to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be a legitimate 
reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-
nationals.719  
The non-application of international law to nationals has been roundly criticised. It runs contrary 
to the text of A1P1 which states “everyone” and appears to introduce an unjustified distinction 
between nationals and non-nationals.720 
In James, the ECtHR held that the lawfulness requirement concerning A1P1 only conferred 
domestic law standards and not an international standard of lawfulness on applications by 
nationals asserting that international law only applied to non-nationals.721  
4.7.1.1 CONCLUSIONS ON LAWFULNESS  
 
It is apparent that the ECtHR has limited power to review compliance with domestic law, 
particularly where it does not appear domestic legal provisions have been applied manifestly 
erroneously or in such a way as to result in arbitrary conclusions.722 Despite the limits of the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, a number of general principles can be discerned. First, the 
interference must have a basis in domestic law. Second, this law must be “accessible” in practical 
terms, and third, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the 
competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the 
legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference.723 Interpretation remains confused in many instances. The lawfulness 
requirement should be considered as a primary ground for assessment and can often overlap with 
the proportionality requirements as this also involves an assessment of the impact on the 
individual.724  
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4.7.2 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Irrespective of which of the three rules in Sporrong are engaged, any interference under A1P1 must 
satisfy the requirement of serving a legitimate public or general interest. The problem is that the 
notions of public or general interest remain particularly ambiguous and difficult to define. What 
constitutes the “public interest” is inherently political and based upon underlying moral and 
economic assumptions. There is no “trump card, fuzzy notion of public interest” and as such, the 
available literature is vast.725 Despite this confusion, this section shall illustrate that in practice the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation in Strasbourg, and the comparable domestic doctrine of 
judicial deference, have rendered the public interest requirement a matter wholly for democratic 
institutions. This is a necessary trade-off to protect democratic values.726  
The drafting of A1P1 is again open to criticism. Not only are the terms “public interest” and 
“general interest” slightly different, even if the ECtHR has decided to ignore these differences, 
A1P1, unlike Article 8 to 11 of the ECHR, does not refer to what is “necessary in a democratic 
society”.  The English text refers to the “public interest” in the second sentence and the “general 
interest” in the third. Problematically, the French text is worded slightly differently. The second 
sentence reads; “pour cause d'utilité publique”, and the third sentence refers to “conformément à l'intérêt 
general”. The use of “pour cause d'utilité publique” translates closer to a “public use” requirement than 
the public interest. From a purely linguistic perspective, the French text appears to be narrower as 
it appears ex facie to limit what American jurists would call private-to-private takings, where 
property is taken from one private individual and transferred to another private individual. While 
the ECtHR in James chose to ignore these differences, it remains a concern that the two official 
language versions of A1P1 do not appear to be drafted in a directly comparable way.727 In James, 
the applicant, the Duke of Westminster, challenged a provision of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 
which had allowed tenants a statutory right to buy. In James, the ECtHR observed that “a taking 
of property effected in pursuance of legitimate social, economic or other policies may be in the 
public interest, even if the community at large has no direct use or enjoyment of the property 
taken”.728 
The ECtHR has stated that economic policy may justify the transfer of property amongst private 
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persons. In Sporrong it was stated that a balance must be struck between the “demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights”.729  At the time of writing there does not appear to be a case where the ECtHR 
has ruled that an interference was not in the public interest. For example, in Former King of Greece v 
Greece the court held that interference did serve a legitimate aim, but surprisingly just not the aims 
put forward by Greece,730 and in Amruois v Italy the state failed to forward any aim or purpose for 
deprivation but, the ECtHR mysteriously managed to glean it simply from the “elements of the 
case”.731  
 
4.7.2.1 DOMESTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST  
 
The principle that states can interfere with rights to property in the public interest did not start 
with A1P1. In practice, the right to property in Scotland has never been absolute, and while courts 
and scholars referred to the sacred and exclusive right of landowners, they did not mean absolute 
in the sense of such rights being untouchable.732 Erskine wrote that:  
It is another legal limitation or restraint on property, that is must give way to the public 
necessity or utility. This universal right in the public over property is called by Grotius, 
domienum eminus; in virtue of which the supreme power may compel any proprietor to part 
with what is his own. If, for instance, the public police shall require that a highway be 
carried through the property of a private person, the supreme power may oblige the owner 
to give up such part of his ground as necessary for that purpose. But in this case there 
must, first be a necessity, or at least an evident utility, on the part of the public, to justify 
the exercise of the right. Secondly, the person deprived of their property ought to have a 
full equivalent for quitting it.733 
 
The role of property in wider society came to be incorporated into Scots conceptions of property 
in land. Lord Bankton wrote that “the use of property is likewise frequently restrained for the 
public good: thus sumptuary laws are introduced, that people may not exhaust their substance by 
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living profusely, and become a burden upon the public”.734 Lord Fitzgerald in Flemming v Hislop 
observed: 
   
[T]he undoubted right of the proprietor to the free and absolute use of his own property, 
but there is this restraint or limitation imposed for the protection of his neighbour, that he 
is not so to use his property as to create that discomfort of annoyance to his neighbour 
which interferes with his legitimate enjoyment.735  
 
The underlying justification for such power is that the loss of private land by numerous individuals 
is offset by the gain to the wider community to which those individuals belong.736 Such was implicit 
in the decision of the House of Lords in Burmah Oil Co (Burma Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate.737 The 
standard of review for expropriation is contentious, but the jurisprudence shows that when 
interfering with rights to property the court must “scrutinise anxiously the exercise of these 
powers”.738 Lord Meadowbank in the Court of Session decision of Todd v Clyde Trustees observed 
that “in interfering with private property, Parliament exercises its highest and most delicate powers. 
And statutes are always construed against such an interference. It is justified only by the necessity 
and by some public benefit”.739 
 
When interpreting A1P1, the difficulty comes in defining the “public interest” and “general 
interest”. The problem for domestic courts is that while used interchangeably, neither of these 
expressions have a fixed nor clear meaning as noted above. The Scottish judiciary has failed to 
rectify this as they have avoided making any direct pronouncements on its meaning.740 Domestic 
courts have been willing to accept a broad range of interferences being in the public interest from 
the seizure of property under the proceeds of crime legislation to measures banning bouncers with 
criminal records.741  
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4.7.2.2 THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION  
 
The Strasbourg court has given member states a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to 
determining the public interest. The ECtHR in Hutten-Czapska v Poland observed that it was not 
for it to “say whether the legislation represents the best solution for dealing with the problem or 
whether the legislative discretion should have been exercised in another way”.742 Violations will 
still be found only if the state action can be deemed to be “manifestly unreasonable”, although in 
practice this standard is very high.743   
The importance of the doctrine was affirmed in the Brighton Declaration in 2012 and was 
expressly referred to in Protocol 15.744 Article 1 of Protocol No 15 provides that the following text 
will be added to the final paragraph of the Convention’s Preamble: 
Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in 
this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of 
appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights established by this Convention.745 
 
The ECtHR has shown a particularly wide margin of appreciation in relation to any longstanding 
and complex area of law which regulates private law matters between individuals.746 As will be 
shown in the proceeding analysis, the ECtHR has consistently shown a wide margin of 
appreciation in relation to A1P1 applications at the six stages of reasoning.747 In the spheres of 
economic policies, welfare,748 and other matters which significantly impact upon the public 
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purse,749 the ECtHR has shown a great deal of respect to contracting states.750 The margin is, 
however, narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective enjoyment of 
intimate key rights.751  
 
However, while the Strasbourg Court has consistently cited the margin of appreciation as central 
to the operation of the Convention,752 in practice the doctrine has been problematic. The margin 
has been described as being “as slippery and elusive as an eel”.753 As Judge De Meyer stated in a 
dissenting opinion:  
 
The empty phrases concerning the State’s margin of appreciation – repeated in the Court’s 
judgments for too long already – are unnecessary circumlocutions, serving only to indicate 
abstrusely that the States may do anything the Court does not consider incompatible with 
human rights. Such terminology, as wrong in principle as it is pointless in practice, should 
be abandoned without delay.754 
While member states are given a wide margin of appreciation, it should not be ignored that 
member states cannot choose to opt-out of the minimum standards755 and/or individual 
Convention rights. Such a move would be contrary to the intention of the ECHR.756 As such, 
instances of persistent national abhorrence to the application of individual Convention rights 
cannot be used as a justification to limit the universal importance of the rights contained in the 
Convention and its Protocols.757  
The point to highlight is that, in matters of social policy, the ECtHR is unlikely to intervene in the 
affairs of member states unless the interference is “manifestly unreasonable” and requires an 
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individual to bear “an individual and excessive burden”.758 As such, the often-voiced concern that 
the Strasbourg court is waiting to show the Scottish Ministers the red card in relation to its 
programme of distributive reforms appears misplaced. This is a central point to not only Scots 
land reform but the ultimate effect of A1P1 in domestic law in the UK.  
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is not applicable in Scots law, as the domestic court is 
not under the same disadvantages of physical and cultural distance.759 A considerable body of 
jurisprudence has, however, developed in which domestic courts have shown an apprehension 
when it comes to areas of social and economic policy, particularly where public expenditure is 
involved.760 Lord Hope observed in R v DPP ex p Kebeline that: 
 
Difficult choices may need to be made by the executive or the legislature between the rights 
of the individual and the needs of society. In some circumstances, it will be appropriate for 
the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer, 
on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or 
decision is said to be in compatible with the Convention.761 
 
This is often called the doctrine of judicial “deference”, although the suitability of this term has 
come to be questioned. The Supreme Court prefers the concept of the judiciary giving due 
“weight” to the views of democratic institutions who are deemed to have the requisite expertise 
and critically the democratic legitimacy to balance individual and collective rights.762 The domestic 
courts have thus come to give considerable weight to the decisions of democratic institutions, 
especially in the area of social and economic policy. This can be observed in several Supreme Court 
decisions regarding housing policy.763 In cases where the legislature has chosen to act, it is clear 
that the courts must exercise great restraint in interfering with the decisions made.764 As Lord 
Hoffmann famously held, the HRA 1998 “was no doubt intended to strengthen the rule of law 
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but not to inaugurate the rule of lawyers”.765  
Despite this apprehension by domestic courts, it is important that they maintain a significant 
role.766 The doctrine of judicial “deference” or “weight” does not prohibit domestic courts from 
considering the decisions of democratic institutions, but it does place a democratic limit as to when 
interference is justified. In relation to contemporary land law reform, the importance of giving due 
weight is most apparent in the Inner House decision of Pairc Crofters Ltd v Scottish Ministers.767  
CONCLUSIONS ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST  
 
There are justifiable criticisms as such imprecision risks the public interest being side-lined when 
ex facie the primary beneficiary of a deprivation or control of use is overwhelmingly a private 
interest.768 To Gray, this severely diminished property as a jural category.769 It is submitted that this 
results in the public interest test being rendered a paper tiger. In practice, however, derogation 
from this standard to allow courts to intervene at a standard lower than “manifestly unreasonable” 
would go beyond the legitimate powers of the Strasbourg court and would undermine its legitimacy 
as an institution. Domestically, where the public interest lies should, (unless manifestly 
unreasonable) remain almost wholly to be determined by democratic institutions. This is necessary 
to retain democratic legitimacy and to avoid domestic courts become overly politicised. It must be 
remembered that this does not give legislatures unlimited or near despotic power to legislate as 
they wish. Instead, the requirements of compliance with lawfulness, the rule of law, and the four 
proportionality tests means that rights to property are not completely diminished in content.  
 
4.8 PROPORTIONALITY  
 
The ECtHR has developed the German constitutional law principle of proportionality 
(Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz).770 Proportionality serves as a methodological tool and a structure 
through which to consider a given set of facts. Its raison d’être remains to systematise competing 
                                               
765 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and Regions [2001] UKHL 23 [129]  
766 Medical Costs (n 759) [54]. 
767 Pairc Crofters (n 43) [40].  
768 K. Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ in S. Bright, Modern Studies in Property Law, Volume 6 (Oxford: Hart 2011) p. 30.   
769 Ibid p. 14. 
770 R. Alexy, “Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality” (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131, 135.  
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interests, to rationally consider the validity of an interference with an individual’s human rights.771 
There remains a conflict between a rule-based approach that favours stability in contrast to an 
adaptable discretionary standard based on the facts at issue.772 The latter gives far greater latitude 
to decision-makers when considering human rights and can confuse principles that are already 
difficult to reconcile. As such, it is argued that a structured, rule-based approach should be 
followed. 
 
Taking such an approach does not stifle proportionality requirements into a straightjacket, but to 
the contrary gives it a structure and a certain level of predictability. This section will set out the 
rule-based approach to proportionality. It will argue that following a “four-part” structure to 
proportionality is not only rational from the perspective of consistency but allows for an acceptable 
standard of review that complies with democratic ideals, whilst not permitting unlimited discretion, 
for either the court or democratic decision-maker.  
 
The proportionality test only becomes relevant once it has been shown that the interference has 
complied with the requirements of lawfulness and the public interest.773 A1P1 remains oddly silent 
as the Court generally considers proportionality with reference to what is “necessary in a 
democratic society”.774 Like many of the “qualified” Convention rights, proportionality is often 
the most important determinant factor in A1P1 applications.  
 
In Sporrong and Lönnroth, the ECtHR observed that the rules contained in the first sentence of the 
first paragraph of A1P1 the ECtHR: 
 
Must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's 
fundamental rights. The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention 
and is also reflected in the structure of [A1P1].775  
 
                                               
771 A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge: CUP 2012) p. 458.  
772 S. Sottiaux and G. van der Schyff, “Methods of International Human Rights Adjudication: Towards a More 
Structured Decision-Making Process for the European Court of Human Rights” (2008) 31 Hastings International & 
Comparative Law Review 115, 118. 
773 Beyeler v Italy (No. 2) (2003) 36 EHRR 5.  
774 Sunday Times (n 396) [62]-[68]. 
775 Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540) [69]. 
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The domestic courts in the UK have applied the proportionality standard using a mixture of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and other common law jurisdictions. Interestingly, Lord Reed chose 
to give significant weight to the judgment of Dickson CJ in the Canadian Supreme Court.776 The 
Supreme Court of Canada established that to be a proportionate interference with a constitutional 
right the objective “must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally 
protected right or freedoms” and secondly, the “means chosen” must be “reasonable and 
demonstrably justified”.777 Dickson CJ observed that this involves a form of the proportionality 
test. Measures must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must be 
rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means should impair as little as possible the right 
or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures 
which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been 
identified as of sufficient importance.778 The case of R v Oakes was applied by the Privy Council 
and the same formulation has been applied by House of Lords and Supreme Court.779  
 
The existing domestic interpretation of A1P1 shows that the courts will consider proportionality 
by asking four distinct questions:780   
 
(1) whether there is a legitimate aim which could justify a restriction of the relevant 
protected right, 
(2) whether the measure adopted is rationally connected to that aim, 
(3) whether the aim could have been achieved by a less intrusive measure, and; 
(4) proportionality and the fair balance test 
 
These requirements should be treated as separate, but in practice, they form part of the same 
whole, and therefore foreseeably overlap.781 This is important to avoid the courts taking an overly 
simplistic approach and to maintain flexibility as the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is often not a 
reliable guide.782 This is due to many factors, including the differing interpretive methods 
                                               
776 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 (Canada). 
777 Ibid. 
778 Ibid [70]-[71].  
779 Huang (n 762) [19]; De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agricultural, Fisheries, Land and Housing [1999] 1 AC 
69 (PC).  
780 Medical Costs (n 759). 
781 Bank of Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700 [20]. 
782 R (Lumsden) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, [2016] AC 697 [34]. 
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undertaken in Strasbourg and the style of reasoning, which often prioritises individual cases over 
doctrinal clarity, as explained above. Part four “proportionality stricto sensu” is comparable to what 
Alexy calls the “law of balancing”.783 This rule states that the greater the degree of non-satisfaction 
of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater the importance of satisfying the other. 
 
Without a recognisable doctrine of precedent, the ECtHR is not required to give its reasoning in 
the same manner that would be expected domestically.784 As such, the case law of the ECtHR 
should not be considered as setting out concrete principles that will be followed in similar 
situations. It is important to consider how the ECtHR has applied proportionality in the particular 
context in question.785 For clarity, and in the interest of logic, the four-part test should be 
considered in order. For example, if the first part “a legitimate aim” fails, there can no longer be a 
legitimate means.   
 
It is important to remember that the ECtHR has approached proportionality in a “relatively broad-
brush way” in contrast to the “more analytical approach to legal reasoning characteristic of the 
common law” leading to “a more clearly structured approach”.786 This is primarily due to the 
ECtHR recognising that it lacks the necessary nexus to determine where the appropriate balance 
should be struck in contracting states.787 As such, the proportionality requirement is inexplicitly 
tied to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.  While contracting states retain a wide margin 
of appreciation, it is for the court to determine “whether the requisite balance was maintained in 
a manner consonant with the applicant’s right of property”.788  
 
As noted above, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation is not applicable in domestic law, but 
a considerable body of jurisprudence has developed in which domestic courts have shown 
apprehension when it comes to areas of social and economic policy, particularly where public 
                                               
783 R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Trans. J. Rivers) (Oxford: OUP 2002) p. 102.  
784 See A. McHarg “Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest” (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 671. 
785 R (Lumsden) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, [2016] AC 697 [34]. 
786 AXA General Insurance (n 60) [70].  
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expenditure is involved.789 It must, however, be remembered that the domestic court is not under 
the same disadvantages of physical and cultural distance as the ECtHR.790  
 
4.8.1 PROPORTIONALITY PART 1: LEGITIMATE AIM 
 
To be proportionate an interference with property under A1P1 must pursue a legitimate aim. 
Legitimate aim is tied to the requirement of the interference being in the public interest.791 While 
interferences may be justified using multiple aims the jurisprudence shows that the “dominant 
aim” remains the primary concern.792 The legitimate aim standard is a recognition that there must 
be a justifiable purpose for interfering with Convention rights. This standard is a relatively low 
first hurdle, and as such, it is unusual for a court to hold that an interference does not pursue a 
legitimate aim. In James v United Kingdom, the ECtHR observed that: 
 
The availability of alternative solutions does not in itself render the leasehold reform 
legislation unjustified; it constitutes one factor, along with others, relevant for determining 
whether the means chosen could be regarded as reasonable and suited to achieving the 
legitimate aim being pursued, having regard to the need to strike a ‘fair balance’. Provided 
the legislature remained within these bounds, it is not for the Court to say whether the 
legislation represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the 
legislative discretion should have been exercised in another way.793 
 
The decision in James helps to emphasise that the ECtHR considers the concept of a legitimate 
aim as inter-related to the concept of the public interest and is to be considered only when giving 
considerable weight to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. The nature of the interference 
will influence where it is determined to be legitimate. As the Strasbourg court said in Bäck v Finland, 
it must be open to the legislature to take measures affecting the further execution of previously 
concluded contracts to attain the aim of the policy that was being adopted.794  
 
                                               
789 Huang (n 762) [16].  
790 Medical costs (n 759) [53]. 
791 Činga v Lithuania App no 69419/13 (ECtHR, 31 October 2017) [86].  
792 R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council [2010] UKSC 20, [2011] 1 AC 437 [82].  
793 James (n 61) [51]. 
794 Bäck v Finland (2004) 40 EHRR 1184 [68].  
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What does not constitute a legitimate aim in relation to A1P1 is difficult to discern. While it is 
often asserted that interferences for private profit are not a legitimate aim, domestic courts appear 
willing to justify such interferences by reference to wider public benefits such as increased tax 
revenue and job creation.795 It is clear from the ECtHR and domestic jurisprudence that the 
Scottish Parliament is entitled to a broad area of discretion to determine what is a legitimate aim.796  
 
4.8.2 PROPORTIONALITY PART 2: RATIONALLY CONNECTED TO THAT AIM 
 
The second test for determining proportionality is whether the interference is rationally connected 
to the aim. It is necessary to show that the aims are logically “furthered” by the means adopted.797 
Several recent decisions offer some guidance on what will be considered as “rationally connected”. 
In R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health, it was held that the introduction 
of plain packaging for tobacco producers did not violate the petitioner’s A1P1 rights as the 
measures were rationally connected with the aim, namely “the legitimate health objective of 
reducing smoking prevalence and use”.798 In this instance, the court gave particular weight to the 
quantitative evidence presented which included academic papers, opinions, and studies.799 
 
The requirement of rationally connected does not mean that the object of the interference should 
be indispensable to the aim.800 In International Transport Roth GmbH Simpson-Brown LJ noted that 
“it does not compel and is not to be equated with the least intrusive option”.801 In this context, 
“necessity” is a more flexible concept than “strict necessity”. This is not to be equated with the 
least intrusive option.802  
 
A measure may respond to a real problem but nevertheless be irrational or disproportionate 
because it is discriminatory in some respect that is incapable of objective justification.803 For 
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example, littering is clearly a public and environmental nuisance and therefore measures to stop or 
limit littering constitute a legitimate aim. The use of lethal force by the police, perhaps even a shoot 
to kill policy, when faced with littering, would most likely reduce littering. The use of lethal force 
would, therefore, be rationally connected to the legitimate aim of limiting littering in public. Much 
to the disappointment of some, such measures would not satisfy the third and fourth 
proportionality tests, but they would theoretically satisfy points one and two. It is therefore argued 
that points one and two must be viewed as the first hurdles for proportionality even if they are set 
very low.  
 
 
4.8.3 PROPORTIONALITY PART 3: COULD THE AIM HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED BY 
A LESS INTRUSIVE MEASURE  
 
The third part of the proportionality test asks if the aim could have been achieved by a less intrusive 
measure. This is also known as proportionate necessity and requires the decision maker to consider 
the means chosen to achieve the stated aim.804 
Lord Diplock observed in 1983 that “proportionality in plain English means you must not use a 
steam hammer to crack a nut if a nutcracker will do”.805 This exposes a disconnect between 
domestic law and the ECtHR. To the ECtHR, the fair balance test is not synonymous with the 
“least restrictive alternative” test.806 As Blackmun J, observed in the US Supreme Court “a judge 
would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less drastic or a 
little less restrictive in almost any situation, and thereby enable him to vote to strike legislation 
down”.807 Dickson CJ made clear in R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd that the limitation of the 
protected right must be “one that it was reasonable for the legislature to impose”, and that the 
courts were “not called upon to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones as to the place at 
which to draw a precise line”.808 As a result, the fact that there may be other even better methods 
of achieving the same ends does not necessarily mean that any particular measure is 
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disproportionate.809 Indeed, Parliament might have adopted an alternative approach, but the fact 
it has chosen not to will be respected unless it is manifestly unreasonable.810  
Part 3 is important as when combined with part 2 of the proportionality standards it requires 
decision-makers to rationalise their choices when they interfere with property. It is apparent that 
domestic courts are willing to consider the rationality of an interference in detail and will take into 
account the individual circumstances of the victim.811 The problem is that this requires the judiciary 
to consider complicated questions, and in the process attempt to answer future hypotheticals. 
However, this indeterminacy is an inherent part of the decision-making function of the judiciary.  
4.8.4 PROPORTIONALITY PART 4: STRICTO SENSU AND THE FAIR BALANCE 
TEST 
The final, and often most exacting standard, for proportionality, is proportionality stricto sensu, often 
called results proportionality. This requires interferences to be proportional in the narrow sense, 
meaning that the harm caused to the individual must be weighed or balanced against the potential 
societal gain.812 It is firmly established that any interference with rights to buy must achieve a fair 
balance between the demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of 
the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.813 Parliament has a broad area of discretion 
in determining where the correct balance should be struck, but a fair balance will not have been 
struck where the individual property owner is made to bear “an individual and excessive 
burden”.814  
Of critical importance to proportionality stricto sensu is the requirement of compensation as a means 
of redressing the imbalance caused by the loss of individual rights. The expropriation of property 
in land has nearly always been accompanied by some form of monetary compensation.815 While 
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these exists a common law interpretative presumption for compensation for deprivations, in most 
contemporary applications the rules of compensation have a statutory basis.816  
 
The question then turns to whether monetary compensation should be a permissible justification 
for the individual’s rights being extinguished, and if so what level of compensation gives just 
satisfaction to the victim of a deprivation. As was noted earlier, a specific compensation 
requirement in A1P1 was deliberately omitted to gain the support of several contracting states, 
most notably the UK. Thus, the inclusion of a compensation requirement in A1P1 was clouded 
for over thirty years. The ECtHR has since come to consistently hold that the payment of 
compensation will be highly relevant to the “fairness” of the balance achieved.817 In Lithgow v United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR observed that, “the taking of property without payment of an amount 
reasonably related to its value would normally constitute a disproportionate interference which 
could not be considered justifiable”.818 It has even been said that the protection of the right to 
property would be largely illusionary and ineffective in the absence of any equivalent principle.819 
Significant financial awards by way of “just satisfaction” are now being made.820 The ECtHR held 
in OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia that it could not depart from the “firmly established” 
principles of restitutio in integrum and ordered Russia to pay the applicants €1,866,104,634.821 As of 
writing, this is the largest financial order under A1P1 by way of “just satisfaction”.  
 
In practice, the market value of the property is relevant to the balancing process, as it indicates the 
value that the community attaches to the property in ordinary private transactions.822 Outside of 
“exceptional circumstances”, the ECtHR has taken the view that just compensation is fair market 
value.823 In JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber ruled that “the taking of 
property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a 
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disproportionate interference that cannot be justified”.824 However, in practice, the ECtHR has 
been apprehensive to make inquiries into the adequacy of an award of compensation. While 
compensation is considered essential for satisfying proportionality stricto sensu in relation to 
deprivations under A1P1, the requirement for compensation for a control of use remains less clear. 
The principle appears to be that while not essential, compensation is often a significant factor in 
determining the “fair balance” in instances of a control of use where the interference is 
“sufficiently severe”.825  
4.8.4.1 CONCLUSIONS ON PROPORTIONALITY  
 
Proportionality is most often the critical question in A1P1 applications.826 The proportionality 
requirement functions as a procedure that requires states to comply with abstract criteria, while 
recognising the importance of the margin of appreciation in relation to the use of property.827 The 
domestic courts with a closer nexus have developed a more exacting standard that serves in giving 
A1P1 its domestic “bite” against arbitrary interferences with property. 
 
Part 4 of the proportionality tests often resembles the court making a cost-benefit analysis. This 
complicates the process as the factors taken into account, and the relative merit of each factor, are 
often dependent on value judgments that are often not commensurable. There is the additional 
risk that in making such a value judgment, the court moves into the traditional domain of 
legislature without the requisite democratic credentials.828 As such, the risk of ad hoc decisions 
remains possible, although it is hoped that a structured approach will limit this risk. The potential 
limits of the proportionality standard will be discussed in detail in chapter four in relation to 
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4.9 CHAPTER THREE CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter has scrutinised the drafting and subsequent interpretation by the Strasbourg Court 
of A1P1. As Part 1 of this chapter submitted, A1P1 is the result of a compromise between the 
competing ideologies. The result is that A1P1 was not an effective remedy as initially drafted. Part 
3 of this chapter argued that the ECtHR has come to develop a more exacting standard. Despite 
these limits, it is submitted that a six-part rule-based approach remains the most logical way to 
determine A1P1 applications. First, applicants must satisfy the victim requirement. Second, they 
must hold a “possession”. When considering A1P1, domestic courts have come to disassociate 
possession from its normal meaning in Scots law, and have accepted the ECtHR’s autonomous 
interpretation. The primary determinant factor of whether a possession exists, in the meaning of 
A1P1, remains the existence or the legitim ate expectation of an asset with a measurable economic 
value.  
 
The domestic courts appear to have largely followed a similar approach to the ECtHR and have 
approached categorisation of an interference by first asking whether compensation is due. A 
considerable degree of confusion still exists in how to properly categorise interference mirrored in 
the conflicting principles from Strasbourg. Indeed, the utility of categorisation must be questioned 
as all interferences remain subject to the same test of proportionality and the fair balance test.  
 
The lawfulness requirement under A1P1 is comparable, but does not mirror, the domestic legal 
concept of the rule of law. Despite this, it is important to reiterate that the lawfulness requirement 
is a “threshold” test that is to be satisfied prior to determining questions of proportionality and 
the fair balance test. As such, the domestic courts, like the ECtHR, remain prone to respect the 
decisions of democratic institutions. The public interest requirement has been interpreted with 
such a wide margin of appreciation that it has been rendered a paper tiger. While, like the ECtHR, 
domestic courts have stated that the expropriation of property for a wholly private purpose cannot 
be considered as being in the public interest, in practice, what the domestic courts mean by a 
wholly private expropriation remains unknown.  
 
It has been submitted that the proportionality standard should be determined through a four-point 
rules-based test. When interpreting proportionality, it appears the domestic courts will consider: 
whether there is a legitimate aim which could justify a restriction of the relevant protected right; 
whether the measure adopted is rationally connected to that aim; whether the aim could have been 
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achieved by a less intrusive measure and whether; on a fair balance, the benefits of achieving the 
aim of the measure outweigh the disbenefits resulting from the restriction of the relevant protected 
right. 
 
Parts 2 and 3 of the proportionality requirements place a rationality requirement on the decision 
maker to justify the interference. Compensation appears to be the critical factor in determining the 
fair balance test. This is apparent in domestic decisions concerning deprivations and, in many 
instances, involving a control of use. As such, the proportionality requirement will most likely be 
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5 CHAPTER FOUR 
RIGHTS TO PROPERTY IN PRACTICE: APPLYING A1P1 TO 
CONTEMPORARY REFORMS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis has examined the distinct public policy behind contemporary Scottish rights to buy. It 
then set out the human rights discourse in Scotland. It was shown that the Scottish Parliament 
remains a body limited by its devolved competences. As such, the Scottish Ministers must 
undertake their functions in a manner that is compliant with A1P1. It was then shown how the 
broadening of the human rights paradigm in Scotland to include “relevant non-convention” rights 
is a significant step, although the effect of these “new” rights is limited. This thesis then proceeded 
to consider the drafting of A1P1, concluding that the wording of A1P1 is the result of political 
compromise. The interpretative methodologies undertaken by the ECtHR were then discussed 
before part 3 of chapter three set out, in detail, the existing six-point-test that the ECtHR has 
developed when considering A1P1 applications.  The principles outlined in chapter three will be 
applied to the contemporary rights to buy explained in chapter one. Chapter four will do this 
through the interpretive obligations placed on the Scottish Ministers and the judiciary as shown in 
chapter two.  
Chapter four will argue that the existing debate in Scotland, which tends to ask if A1P1 will act as 
a “red card” to distributive reform does not adequately appreciate how A1P1 is given effect in 
practice. The four community mechanisms and two agricultural tenants’ rights to buy are all 
distinct mechanisms with their own operational complexities and applications. Generalisations 
relating to the A1P1 implications of all six rights to buy taken in totality are not always possible. 
The proceeding analysis will consider the A1P1 implications of the six mechanisms, but will in 
most instances refer directly to the distinct right to buy being considered. 
5.2 PART 1: APPLYING ARTICLE 1 OF THE FIRST PROTOCOL  
This thesis has already shown A1P1 cannot be considered in isolation. This chapter will consider 
how A1P1 applies to the contemporary rights to buy. Since the passing of the HRA, domestic 
courts have come to follow these tests:  
1. Is the applicant a victim?  
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2. Does the applicant hold a possession?  
3. Has an interference with A1P1 taken place? This involves considering the three rules set 
out in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden:829 
(a) General interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions;  
(b) Deprivation of possessions; and  
(c) Control of the use of those possessions.  
4. Was the action of the state lawful within the meaning of the article? 
5. Was the action in the public or general interest?  
6. Was the interference proportionate?  
 
5.2.1 VICTIM STATUS  
 
The concept of a “victim” remains broad. However, for Scottish land law reform is it clear that 
the Scottish Ministers cannot claim to be victims.  As Laws LJ put it, the state has “no right of its 
own, no axe to grind beyond its public responsibility: a responsibility which defines its purpose 
and justifies its existence”.830 Additionally, interest groups such as Scottish Land & Estates or Our 
Land will not satisfy the victim status requirement. However, the victim requirement is not 
particularly exacting and has been interpreted broadly. Concerning contemporary rights to buy, it 
is clear that the individual(s) or entity holding an interest in land and or ancillary rights that are 
subject to a right to buy will satisfy the victim requirement.   
 
5.2.2 POSSESSION  
 
The establishment of a “possession” remains critical to claims under A1P1. Contemporary reforms 
will raise several important points. While the definition of possession is not completely settled, the 
key factor remains the existence of an economic interest or asset.831 A1P1 is therefore not confined 
to landowner’s rights of ownership, but includes almost every party to the Scottish land question. 
In most instances, establishing that there is a possession within the meaning of A1P1 will be a 
relatively straightforward task.  
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The on-going McMaster litigation highlights the importance of establishing that an individual holds 
a possession.832  In McMaster, Lord Clark accepted that a tenancy held by a general partner “who 
had acquired it by virtue of serving a notice in terms of section 72(6) was a possession of the 
general partner for the purposes of A1P1”.833 Lord Clark rejected the petitioner’s averments that 
“the family farming business”, which was said to be dependent upon the tenancy, was a possession 
of each of the petitioners.834 To Lord Clark, this term was “meaningless”.835  
 
Lord Clark was also not willing to accept that section 72(10) of the AH(S)A 2003 “gave the 
petitioners a legitimate expectation that they would, on a balance of probabilities, obtain a secure 
[AH(S)A 1991] tenancy of their holding when they came to serve a section 72(6) notice on their 
landlord”.836 As “there is no settled basis for a claim to a proprietary interest, there can be no 
legitimate expectation. The legitimate expectation itself cannot constitute the proprietary interest 
for the purpose of A1P1”,837 and “in relation to succession, a legitimate expectation of succession 
is not a property right of the other family member, nor is it attached to a property right of that 
person”.838  
This is an interesting conclusion as there is clear ECtHR authority that a “legitimate expectation” 
can constitute a possession under A1P1 even if it is not valid under domestic law.839 What is clear 
is that mere hope does not constitute a legitimate expectation. The ECtHR in Öneryıldız v Turkey 
appears to have placed considerable importance on the applicants being led to believe that they 
would maintain existing rights.840 The petitioners in McMaster clearly had an expectation beyond 
mere hope. The AH(S)A 2003 as initially enacted, and prior to the decision in Salvesen, purported 
to significantly increase the property rights of the petitioners.841 This was not fanciful but a simple 
fact. However, caution is necessary. As a jural right, the original tenancy held in a limited 
                                               
832 McMaster (OH) (n 108). 
833 Ibid [116].  
834 Ibid [119].  
835 Ibid [121] and [126]. 
836 Ibid [117].  
837 Ibid [131]. 
838 Ibid [133]. 
839 Pine Valley (n 563) [80].  
840 Öneryıldız v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20.  
841 Salvesen (UKSC) (11). 
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partnership is a separate proprietary interest to that which exists after the dissolution of the 
partnership.  
 
The position is therefore left unresolved; all that can be said is that the tenancy held by a general 
partner constitutes a possession. This is not a novel observation, but the domestic interpretation 
of “possession”, particularly the test for “legitimate expectation”, does remain somewhat 
confused.842  
Outside of the narrowly defined “legitimate expectation” of obtaining property, A1P1 does not 
guarantee the right to acquire property.843 This is because rights to property must be sufficiently 
established. In Stran Greek Refineries v Greece the ECtHR observed that a decision “merely to furnish 
the applicants with the hope that they would secure recognition of the claim put forward”, did not 
constitute a possession under A1P1.844 Thus, tenants and communities cannot claim that they have 
the right to acquire land under A1P1; the anticipation of distributive land reform cannot constitute 
a possession under A1P1. The critical point for contemporary rights to buy is the existence of an 
economic interest.  
 
5.3 DETERMINING WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN AN INTERFERENCE 
 
The ECtHR remains concerned with the three-part classification of interferences. However, as 
argued in chapter three, the merits of this framework should be questioned, and the recent 
Supreme Court decision in R (Mott) v Environment Agency shows that there is at least a feeling in 
domestic law that the tripartite tests should not always be followed.845 Therefore, while the 
categorisations of interferences appear outdated, it is likely to continue to be part of any claim 
under A1P1. This is due to the fact that once a deprivation is established there is the presumption 




                                               
842 Countryside Alliance (n 640) [21].  
843 Stec v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 47 [53]. 
844 Stran (n 615) [60].  
845 Mott (UKSC) (n 688) [38]. 
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5.3.1 GENERAL INTERFERENCE  
 
In relation to Scottish land law reform, the initial steps leading to a purchase may constitute a 
general interference with possession. The question is whether the requirement to register an 
interest under Part 2 of the LR(S)A 2003, and the automatic registration of all AH(S)A 1991 part 
2 rights to buy since the enactment of section 99 of the LR(S)A 2016, constitute a general 
interference with the landowner’s possession. In Erkner and Hofauer v Austria, a permit that “was 
an initial step in a procedure leading to deprivation of possession”, constituted an interference 
with enjoyment.846 The ECtHR appears to have placed considerable importance on the 
interference being a preliminary step that would ultimately culminate in a deprivation of the land.847  
 
Despite this, it is unlikely that the preliminary steps, short of an actual interference, will be held to 
constitute a general interference. For example: while a community right to buy, once registered, 
removes the ability of the owner to freely dispose of his property, it is unlikely that any form of 
monetary compensation could be claimed for this loss. The loss is similar to existing planning laws 
which generally do not merit claims for compensation outside of the very narrow category of 
“deprivation of any beneficial use”.848 This principle is justified in instances where the owner 
cannot put the land to a beneficial use to the extent that it has become worthless.849 For example, 
in relation to the CRtB, the land does not become worthless. However, the deprivation of the right 
to feely dispose of land is a more restrictive interference with rights to property than the traditional 
forms of interferences associated with planning law.   
 
5.3.2 CONTROL OF USE 
 
There may be a certain overlap between general interferences and controls of use. The CRtB 
requires communities to register their interest. Once this is done, the community obtains a right 
of first refusal before the land can be sold on the free market. The question is whether this 
constitutes a “control of use” under A1P1. In Salvesen v Riddell, the potential restriction on a 
landlord’s right to terminate a tenant’s lease was held to constitute a control of use.850  
                                               
846 Erkner (n 596).  
847 Ibid [74]. 
848 Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 s. 89; Town and Country Planning Act 1990 s. 137 (Eng.). 
849 M. Purdue, “The Law on Compensation Rights for Reduction in Property Values Due to Planning Decisions in 
the United Kingdom” (2006) 5 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 493, 503.  
850 Salvesen (UKSC) (n 11). 
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The jurisprudence of the ECtHR shows that a restriction on a landlord’s right to terminate a 
tenant’s lease constitutes control of the use of property within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of the article.851 This is affirmed by the more recent jurisprudence of the Grand 
Chamber, where restrictions on the applicant’s right to terminate a tenant’s lease constituted a 
control of use.852  
 
Questions remain as to whether the right to buy abandoned and neglected land, and the right to 
buy when the landlord is in breach constitute a control of use. In both instances, the mere existence 
of the rights to buy adds a level of coercion on landowners and limits their ability to use and abuse 
their property freely. As the legislation is not yet fully in force, it is difficult to make concrete 
assertions. As is apparent from the Supreme Court decision in Mott, a control of use will only 
require compensation to satisfy the fair balance in exceptional circumstances where an individual 
has had to bear an excessive burden.853 While the definition of “exceptional” has not been 
described in detail, it appears that the standard is very high. As such, it is submitted that while 
registration of a community right to buy, or the automatic registration of an agricultural tenant’s 
rights to buy, may constitute a control of use, it is unlikely to constitute an individual and excessive 




A deprivation occurs when all the legal rights of the owner are de jure or de facto extinguished, and 
an individual is deprived of ownership. Deprivations are observable when tenants and 
communities exercise the right to buy. For example, part 2 of the AH(S)A 2003 states that where 
a tenant has the right to buy land, the tenant may proceed to buy the land from the owner or 
creditor.854 The crofting community body on the completion of transfer gains title to the croft 
land, common grazing, salmon fishing, or mineral rights.855 The entirety of the rights to property 
held by the original owner(s) are therefore deprived and deprivation under A1P1 has occurred. 
 
                                               
851 Ibid [33].  
852 Lindheim v Norway (2015) 61 EHRR 29 [62]. 
853 Mott (UKSC) (n 688). 
854 AH(S)A 2003 s. 29.  
855 LR(S)A 2003 s. 68 and 87.  
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In Pairc Crofters Ltd v Scottish Ministers, the Inner House accepted, without hesitation, the appellants’ 
submission that the crofting community right to buy constituted a deprivation under A1P1.856 It 
is therefore clear that the rights to buy, once exercised, constitute a deprivation of rights to 
property under A1P1. This is because the landowner retains no meaningful use of the property 
once the right to buy is complete. As will be discussed in more detail below, the significance of 
this is that it creates a presumption for the payment of compensation to the deprived individual(s).  
The critical question is when will an Act of the Scottish government or a decision of the Scottish 
Ministers “go too far” and come to constitute a deprivation. The difficulty is finding a formula 
that points to the Rubicon that has to be passed. Recognition of this problem is not new. The idea 
that interference with one of the bundle of rights that constitute property, deprives the individual 
of the entire use or value of the bundle of rights is observable in the words of Shakespeare’s 
Shylock in The Merchant of Venice:  
You take my house when you do take the prop that doth sustain my house.  
You take my life when you do take the means whereby I live.857 
 
The Court of Appeal appreciated this in Mott where it was observed that “the distinction is not 
always obvious”.858 Where it was not obvious, the Strasbourg court has considered the matter 
against the general principle enunciated and established by the first sentence of A1P1: “Every 
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”.859  
 
In McMaster, Lord Clark observed that a “deprivation of one of the bundle of rights which relate 
to a property right is not the same as a deprivation of the property right. Rather, it is a control of 
use”.860 By contrast the Supreme Court in Mott observed that it was enough that it [a condition 
imposed upon a leasehold interest in a salmon fishery] “eliminated at least 95% of the benefit of 
the right”, thus making it “closer to deprivation than mere control”.861 The problem for 
contemporary Scots rights to buy is that the jurisprudence is often difficult to reconcile. What is 
clear is that rights to buy, when completed, constitute a deprivation.  
                                               
856 Pairc Crofters (n 43) [27].  
857 W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (Oxford: OUP 2016) Act IV, Scene One.  
858 Mott (UKSC) (n 688) [50]. 
859 Ibid [50].  
860 McMaster (OH) (n 108) [156]. 
861 Mott (UKSC) (n 688) [36]. 
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The problem is in the margins, and in the potentially coercive nature of land law reforms to 
influence a landowner’s behaviour. Another example may arise when a community or crofting 
community purchase takes a single parcel, but in doing so, diminishes the value of the land-owner’s 
remaining holdings. The question would arise as to whether this loss in value of land that was not 
part of the community, crofting or agricultural right to buy would constitute a deprivation.  
 
5.3.3.1 CONCLUSIONS ON SPORRONG AND SCOTS LAND LAW REFORM  
 
The Supreme Court in Mott shows that the Sporrong tripartite tests may not always be followed in 
practice. However, the presumption of compensation for deprivations will mean that questions of 
categorisation will continue to be a significant part of any application under A1P1. The question 
of whether an interference satisfies one of the three rules is fact specific, and generalisations are 
difficult to make. What is clear is that when the landowner’s rights are extinguished and they lose 
all beneficial use of the land this constitutes a deprivation and there is an interpretive presumption 
that compensation is due. The registering of a CRtB may constitute a control of use, but it is 
unlikely that the burden imposed upon the owner will constitute an individual and excessive 
burden.  
 
As discussed in chapter three, the categorisation of an interference is a preliminary step, as all 
interferences remain subject to the tripartite tests of lawfulness, the general interest and 
proportionality. Therefore, while the Scottish judiciary will no doubt be required to offer further 
guidance on the parameters between the different types of interference, categorisation remains a 
preliminary hurdle.  
 
5.4 ASSESSING WHETHER AN INTERFERENCE IS JUSTIFIED  
 
5.4.1 LAWFULNESS  
This thesis has argued that the ECtHR has, with varying levels of consistency, held that lawfulness 
requires compliance with the tripartite test of “legal certainty”, “non-arbitrariness” and “the rule 
of law”. This is necessarily inherent in the law of the Convention.862 It is not possible to review 
                                               
862 Salvesen (UKSC) (n 11) [56]. 
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the legislation in its totality, but this section will consider several of the key terms and provisions. 
This chapter shall proceed to consider the lawfulness of: sustainable development, community, 
abandoned and neglected land, and the justiciability of a landlord being in breach.  
5.4.2 LAWFULNESS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
The primary justification for land law reform in Scotland remains “sustainable development”. It is 
found throughout the LRPG and LRRG reports, government guidance, and available literature.863 
Critically it is the primary public policy justification for contemporary rights to buy. Despite this, 
what is meant by sustainable development beyond vague policy goals remains disputed. The 
question turns to whether sustainable development is sufficiently accessible, precise, and 
foreseeable to comply with A1P1. However, as noted above, the lawfulness test remains a 
preliminary hurdle. This point is underscored by the observation of Lord Gill in Pairc that: 
 
In my view, the expression sustainable development is in common parlance in matters 
relating to the use and development of land. It is an expression that would be readily 
understood by the legislators, the Ministers and the Land Court.864 
 
 
5.4.3 LAWFULNESS AND COMMUNITY  
 
To the Scottish Government, one of the primary impetus behind land reform is the idea of 
rekindling “community”.865  The definition of community that has followed has focused on 
defining community in geographical terms.866 To the LRRG:  
 
Community involves a complex set of relationships between individuals and groups, 
involving networks and other linkages, such as family and kinship ties, collective voluntary 
action, informal reciprocity and trust. In addition, there are more intangible aspects such 
                                               
863 Scottish Government, Guidance for applications made on order 15 April 2016 (n 193); Scottish Government, Scottish Land 
Rights and Responsibilities Statement (n 178).  
864 Pairc Crofters (n 43) [56].  
865 Scottish Government, Consultation on the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Bill (Edinburgh, November 2013) 
<https://consult.gov.scot/community-empowerment-unit/cerb/supporting_documents/cerbconsultation.pdf> 
[accessed 1 June 2018].  
866 LRRG, The Land of Scotland and the Common Good (n 122) p. 82. 
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as sense of place and belonging, shared history and cultural identity, and… attachment to 
land.867 
 
The Scottish Government’s most recent guidance states that community may be defined by 
reference to: postcode unit(s); postcode sector(s) postcode district(s); settlement area(s); locality; 
electoral ward; community council area; island.868 But ultimately, “it is up to your community body 
to decide what best suits your needs”.869 The Guidance leaves the definition of community open 
to ministerial discretion stating that, “it is for you to demonstrate to Ministers how you have 
defined your “community” in a way which best suits you”.870 
 
It is submitted that questions have to be raised about the Scottish Government’s definition of 
community and whether it is suitably precise, accessible, and foreseeable. How to define 
“community” is deeply problematic as it is one of the most commonly used terms in development 
circles. It has been acknowledged as being highly elusive, with a multitude of differing 
interpretations.871 As Kepe noted, concerning land reform in South Africa, “defining the 
boundaries of ‘local communities’, and thus who should be included or excluded as beneficiaries 
of land reform, is highly problematic. As a result, the implementation of policies targeting 
‘communities’ is met with numerous challenges”.872  
The original definition given for a “community” in part 2 of the LR(S)A 2003 was simply by 
reference to a postcode.873 This was unsuccessfully challenged in Pairc Crofters Ltd v Scottish Ministers. 
It was submitted that the definition of community was so vague that it was not law and that the 
legislation lacked proper safeguards as the legislative definition of community did not adequately 
provide for the landowner, to the extent that it violated Article 6(1) of the ECHR.874 The CE(S)A 
2015 added part 2 section 34(5A) into part 2 and defines a community “by reference to a postcode 
                                               
867 Ibid p. 82.  
868 Scottish Government, Guidance for applications made on order 15 April 2016 (n 193). 
869 Ibid p. 12.  
870 Ibid p. 12. 
871 D. Robinson, Out of the Ordinary: Learning from the Community Links Approach to Social Regeneration (London: 
Community Links, 2010); R. Booth-Fowler, The Dance with Community: The Contemporary Debate in American Political 
Thought (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 1991).  
872 T. Kepe, “The Problem of Defining ‘Community’: Challenges for the Land Reform Programme in Rural South 
Africa” (1999) 16 Development Southern Africa 415, 415. 
873 LR(S)A 2003. 
874 Pairc Crofters (n 43) [26]-[27].  
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unit or postcode units”, and comprises “the persons from time to time” are “resident in that 
postcode unit”, and are “entitled to vote, at a local government election, in a polling district which 
includes that postcode unit or those postcode units”.875 The LR(S)A 2016 in relation to the right 
to buy for sustainable development defines community in a similar manner, stating that a 
community “comprises the persons from time to time” who are “resident in that postcode unit or 
in one of those postcode units or in that specified type of area”, and are “entitled to vote, at a local 
government election, in a polling district which includes that postcode unit or those postcode units 
or that specified type of area (or part of it or them)”.876  
 
The LR(S)A 2003 requires the community body to demonstrate to Ministers that they have at least 
10% of the community to support the registration.877 In exceptional circumstances, the Ministers 
will accept less than 10%.878 While Sheriff McSherry in Holmehill Ltd v Scottish Ministers appeared to 
have taken issue with 13.62% of the community being considered significantly greater than 10%, 
it was conceded that this was ultimately left to Ministerial discretion.879 The figure of 10% does 
appear to be a rather arbitrary figure and a look through the new register of community interests 
shows that this figure is often just passed. For example, the North West Mull Community 
Woodland Company Ltd registered an interest in March 2018 with only 11.5% of the community 
indicating approval of the registration.880 
This highlights the question of who should speak for, and undertake actions for, the community. 
This remains subject to dispute. An example of this can be observed on the Island of North Uist 
where three councillors compelled a feasibility study for a buyout of the local estate. There was no 
willing seller, and of the seventy people who turned up to a public meeting, only six voted for the 
study. Despite this, the councillors proceeded to a postal ballot. Whether these three councillors 
speak for the community is highly dubious and highlights the opportunity for a small minority to 
manipulate the existing legislative mechanisms.881  
                                               
875 LR(S)A 2003 s. 34(5A).  
876 LR(S) 2016 s. 49(9).  
877 LR(S)A 2003 s. 38(2).  
878 Ibid s. 38(2)(d).  
879 Holmehill Ltd (n 787).  
880 Register of Community Interest in Land, Registration No. CB00233, North West Mull Community Woodland 
Company Ltd, Entered 28 March 2018, Application, para 6.2.  
881 M. Webb, “The twilight of private ownership in Scotland” Financial Times (London: 1 August 2014).  
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It is important to consider what the Scottish Ministers are willing to accept as an acceptable 
definition of the community. An early example can be observed in the application by Crossgates 
Community Woodland, entered into the Register 28 September 2004. The application states that:  
 
 
Source: Register of Community Interests in Land, Registration No. CB00006 (Crossgates 
Community Woodland, Entered 28 September 2004) 
 
A more recent example can be observed in the first urban community purchase in Scotland. The 
application concerned the Old Parish Church in Portobello for the proposed purpose of a multi-
purpose community hub.882 The Community Body named “Action Porty” defines the community 
of Portobello as “that area bounded by the Firth of Forth to the north, Kings Road to the west. 
The southern boundary runs the length of Sir Harry Lauder Road and then along Milton Road 
East. The eastern boundary is effectively defined by South Morton Street and Coillesdene Drive. 
The Portobello community boundary is signified by the purple line in the map within Annex A, 
and is composed of a total of 201 listed postcodes”.883 
 
 
                                               
882 The Scotsman, “Community buy-out of Porty church is given go-ahead in landmark decision” The Edinburgh Evening 
News (Edinburgh: 25 October 2016).  
883 Register of Community Interests in Land No. CB002002 (ACTION PORTY, Entered 13 September 2016) 
(Subjects Description).  
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Source: Register of Community Interests in Land No. CB000202 (ACTION PORTY, Entered 
13 September 2016) Annex A 
 
While this defines the geographic area of Portobello, whether the group represents the community 
is less clear. The initial meeting in April 2016 only attracted 70 attendees out of a self-defined 
community of 5,750.884 The application to the Scottish Ministers shows that Action Porty has 318 
members and 23.9% of the community “indicated approval of the registration” by signing their 
name when asked.885 The purchase is funded 94% by the Scottish Land Fund, requiring £647,500 
of taxpayer’s money.886 The question remains whether inaction by the rest of the community 
represents tacit consent.  
 
5.4.3.1 CONCLUSIONS ON COMMUNITY  
 
It is therefore argued that the current definition of “community” is unsatisfactory. This is not 
simply a problem for the Scottish Ministers and the judiciary but could also be a limiting factor in 
the uptake of community ownership as the mechanisms to facilitate ownership remains confusing 
to those without the requisite legal skills. As outlined in chapter three, the ECtHR has held that 
lawfulness requires legal certainty and non-arbitrariness. However, as already noted the lawfulness 
test remains a preliminary hurdle and the margin of appreciation means that the ECtHR remains 
unlikely to intervene unless the decision is manifestly erroneous.887 Therefore, while concerns 
remain it is unlikely that any of the existing definition of community given in the various rights to 
buy will be held to be incompatible with A1P1 on the grounds of lawfulness. 
 
5.4.4 LAWFULNESS OF ABANDONED AND NEGLECTED LAND  
 
It is submitted that one of the most significant hurdles to be overcome is whether the definition 
of abandoned and neglected land satisfies the test of legal certainty. The main problem with the 
                                               
884 Ibid Annex E.  
885 Ibid Application Form 12092016.  
886 The Herald, “Cherished church is first city project to benefit from right-to-buy powers” The Herald (Glasgow: 10 
May 2017). 
887 Beyeler (n 652) [108].  
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part 3A right to buy remains what one MSP called the “vexed questions of definitions of 
abandoned and neglected land”.888  
The abandonment of land has been traditionally defined as the ability of the owner to unilaterally 
extinguish all legal rights relating to property.889 The problem is that there is no authority in Scots 
law that land can be abandoned.890 As Lord Carloway observed in the Scottish Coal case: “There is 
no legal process whereby a person can transfer land into oblivion”.891 As such, it appears that when 
attempting to define “abandoned” in part 3A we are required to disassociate the term from its 
technical meaning in Scots property law.892 This rejection of the principles of Scots property law 
intensifies the problem of finding an accessible and precise definition to satisfy the lawfulness test.  
Part 3A defines “eligible land” as land that is “wholly or mainly abandoned or neglected, or the 
use or management of the land is such that it results in or causes harm, directly or indirectly, to 
the environmental well-being of a relevant community”.893 Harm includes “the environmental 
effects of which have an adverse effect on the lives of persons comprising the relevant 
community”, and “does not include harm which, in the opinion of Ministers, is negligible”.894 Part 
3A outlines that “eligible land” does not include “land on which there is a building or other 
structure which is an individual's home”, “eligible croft land”, and “land which is owned or 
occupied by the Crown by virtue of its having vested as bona vacantia in the Crown”.895 Our analysis 
in this instance is limited, as much of part 3A is not yet in force. Several amendments are pending. 
The difficulty in defining “abandoned” and “neglected” was consistently cited during drafting.  
 
Coulter, from the charity Dumfries and Galloway Third Sector Interface, giving evidence to the Local 
Government and Regeneration Committee in 2014, noted prior to the passing of the CE(S)A 2015 
that “at some point, the bill will need to be made more specific in its definitions—good luck with 
that, by the way. If there is not a tighter definition, it is inevitable that we will end up in endless 
                                               
888 SP, OR, RACCE, 10 December 2014, col. 27.  
889 M. Combe and M. Rudd, “Abandonment of land and the Scottish Coal Case: was it unprecedented?” (2018) 22 
Edinburgh Law Review 301, 302-303. 
890 Scottish Environment Protection Agency v Join Liquidators [2013] CSOH 124, 2013 SLT 1055 [22].  
891 Scottish Environment Protection Agency v Join Liquidators [2013] CSIH 108, 2014 SC 372 [103]. 
892 K. Swinton, “Dealing with abandoned property” (2015) 83(4) Scottish Law Gazette 64. 
893 LR(S)A 2003 s. 97C(2)(a) and (b). 
894 Ibid s. 97C(3)(a). 
895 Ibid s. 97C(5). 
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debate about whether or not land has been abandoned”.896 Richard Lochhead MSP speaking in 
December 2014 appeared to place a central importance on flexibility in order to make part 3A 
“reasonably wide ranging”. Lochhead MSP, stated that:  
 
Ministers will have the ability to interpret what that means. We do not want to dwell too 
much on definitions, because we are just dancing on the head of a pin, but, ultimately, 
ministers will recognise—as will the communities making the applications—what is 
“abandoned or neglected”.897 
 
Without further guidance and any judicial consideration, what constitutes abandoned or neglected 
land remains obscure and to be determined wholly by the discretion of the Ministers. The Law 
Society of Scotland predicted that the introduction of a right to buy abandoned and neglected land 
would be “thwarted by the complexity of the proposals and potentially limit rather than empower 
local groups and stall development plans for neglected land in urban areas”.898 The Law Society of 
Scotland also noted that “[t]he procedure for registering community interest in abandoned or 
neglected land, which is undefined in the bill, is similar to Compulsory Purchase and there should, 
therefore, be a requirement for a viable business plan and robust development proposals”.899  
 
It is therefore argued that there remain serious concerns about the lawfulness of the right to buy 
abandoned and neglected land. Part 3A is not yet in force, and it is hoped that further guidance 
will be issued. Not only will the poorly drafted definition most likely result in limited uptake, but 
it will also add another level of uncertainty to existing owners who will be unable to determine 
whether their land is “wholly abandoned or neglected”.   
 
5.4.5 LAWFULNESS LANDLORD IN BREACH 
 
The LR(S)A 2016 section 100 amends the AH(S)A 2003 with a new right for a tenant to apply to 
the Land Court for an order of sale “where the landlord is in breach”.900  This is only possible 
                                               
896 SP, OR, LGR, 27 October 2014, col. 19. 
897 SP, OR, RACCE, 10 December 2014, col 28.  
898 Law Society of Scotland “Urban ‘right to buy’ plans too complex” (Edinburgh: 10 September 2014 < 
https://www.lawscot.org.uk/news/2014/09/urban-right-to-buy-plans-too-complex/ > [1 June 2018].  
899 Ibid.  
900 LR(S)A 2016 s. 100; AH(S)A 2003 Pt 2A. 
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when the landlord has failed to comply with an order to remedy a material breach of the landlord 
obligations in relation to the tenant by the Land Court.901 
 
The Land Court must be satisfied that “the failure substantially and adversely affects the tenant’s 
ability to fulfil the tenant’s responsibilities to farm the holding in accordance with the rules of good 
husbandry, greater hardship would be caused by not making the order than by making it, and in 
all the circumstances it is appropriate”.902 Section 38B(7) states for the AH(S)A 2003, Schedule 6 
of the Agriculture (Scotland) Act 1948 is to define the “rules of good husbandry”.903 The guidance 
issued by the Scottish Tenant Farming Commissioner does not add a huge amount: “The breach 
must be material and the landlord must have failed to comply with an earlier order to remedy the 
breach”.904 Serious questions remain over the lawfulness requirement and the right to buy where 
the landlord is in breach. With amendments pending, and further guidance to be issued, patience 
is required to determine the full effect of these new provisions.  
 
5.4.6 CONCLUSIONS ON LAWFULNESS  
 
As the above analysis has shown, serious questions remain over the lawfulness of what are the 
foundational concepts driving contemporary rights to buy. This is part of a wider problem of the 
quality of legislative drafting at Holyrood. In relation to just the AH(S)A 2003 part 2, Lord McGhie 
in Fish v Church of Scotland General Trustee, noted that “we do not find it easy to agree with his [Mr 
Fish, party litigant] submission that the relevant legislation is clear, well written and 
unambiguous”.905  
 
It has not been possible to cover the application of lawfulness in its entirety to contemporary rights 
to buy. Instead, the above analysis has highlighted several potential flashpoints. As the above 
analysis has shown, the lawfulness standard is a preliminary hurdle in A1P1 applications. Domestic 
law must, however, be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable. Clarity is important as the 
initial decision-makers dealing with the legislation will be civil servants and the Scottish Ministers.  
 
                                               
901 Ibid s. 38A(1)((a).  
902 AH(S)A 2003 s. 38B. 
903 Ibid s. 38B(7). 
904 SLC, Guide to the 2016 Land Reform Scotland Act (Inverness: Scottish Land Commission 2017).   
905 Fish (n 268) [52].  
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It is apparent that, while sustainable development and community remain difficult to define, the 
domestic courts are willing to give significant weight to the decisions of democratic institutions. It 
is therefore unlikely (but not unimaginable), that these two key components of land reform will be 
held to violate the lawfulness requirement under A1P1. Concerns remain over the meaning given 
to abandoned and neglected land and where the landlord is in breach. As both are recent 
enactments and are subject to pending amendments and guidance, it is difficult to make 
conclusions on the ultimate effect of these provisions. 
 
For communities and agricultural tenants seeking to acquire title to land, the problems of 
indeterminacy raises further obstacles. As MacInnes from Global Witness stated, existing reforms 
“are already complicated enough. What is needed is simplification rather than greater 
diversification of the legal routes to achieving this single objective”.906 The onus is on the Scottish 
Ministers to set out the requisite parameters for these critical terms. The problem is that there is 
only limited guidance given and relatively sparse judicial comment. Therefore, how to properly 
and rationally regulate one’s affairs remains somewhat lost amongst these opaque terms.  
 
It is submitted that while many problems do remain, and arguments can be made as to the 
lawfulness of certain central terms used in the rights to buy legislation, the legislation as currently 
drafted is unlikely to be held to constitute a violation of A1P1. Problems remain over how to 
define sustainable development or abandoned and neglected land. However, such terms are 
perhaps no more difficult to discern than more familiar terms like nuisance or irrationality. Further, 
the lawfulness requirement remains a preliminary hurdle and is tied to the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation and judicial deference.  Despite A1P1 not acting as a red card to the thrust of the 
existing legislation, there is a cogent argument to be made that the fear of a challenge as to the 
lawfulness of a provision his influenced, and will continue to influence, the Scottish Ministers 
drafting, and the judicial interpretation, of contemporary rights to buy.   
 
5.4.7 THE PUBLIC INTEREST  
 
Chapter three of this thesis has argued that when considering what constitutes “the public 
interest”, the ECtHR has taken a broad margin of appreciation bordering on a fourth instance 
interpretation, and in doing so, has shown considerable deference to national legislatures. 
                                               
906 SP, OR, RACCE, 7 October 2015, col. 38.  
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Domestic courts have taken a similar deferential approach out of respect for democratic 
institutions, albeit that more often this is encountered in the slightly different context of actions 
against administrative authorities, where the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty has a more 
complex role to play. In Prest v Secretary of State for Wales, Lord Denning MR observed that, “I regard 
it as a principle of our constitutional law that no citizen is to be deprived of his land by any public 
authority against his will, unless it is expressly authorised by Parliament and the public interest 
decisively so demands”.907 This emphasises that domestic courts may well be tempted to limit 
public authority actions not explicitly on the basis of human rights, but more directly on the 
concept of Parliamentary intention and the supposed presumptions that attend it. 
Statements of the rights to buy being in the “public interest” are found throughout the 
legislation.908 The most comprehensive legislative definition is found in the conditions that must 
be taken into account when determining an application for a community purchase for sustainable 
development. The LR(S)A 2016 states that:  
[I]n determining what constitutes significant benefit to the community for the purposes of 
subsection (2)(c) or harm to the community for the purposes of subsection (2)(d), the 
Scottish Ministers must consider the likely effect of granting (or not granting) consent to 
the transfer of land or tenant’s interest on the lives of the persons comprising that 
community with reference to the following considerations— 
(a) economic development, 
(b) regeneration, 
(c) public health, 
(d) social wellbeing, and 
(e) environmental wellbeing.909 
 
In relation to the community right to buy, the explanatory notes do not give much guidance, simply 
affirming that this section “states the conditions that must be met before Ministers may give their 
consent”.910 The guidance states that “Ministers will determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether 
                                               
907 Prest v Secretary of State for Wales (1982) 81 LGR 193, 198 (CA).  
908 LR(S)A 2003 s. 38(1)(e), s. 51(3)(d) and s. 97H(1)(b)(i). 
909 LR(S)A 2016 s. 56(12).  
910 LR(S)A 2003 Explanatory Notes, para. 183. 
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your CB’s particular proposal is in the public interest”.911 There can be little doubt that the criteria 
in respect of the public interest are wide and involved with many factors”.912  
 
The right to buy abandoned and neglected land poses several significant questions to our 
understanding of the public interest and private property. What this measure seeks to do is impose 
a certain utilitarian obligation on landowners. This is justified on the rationale that is it in the public 
interest to utilise Scotland’s limited supply of land, particularly brownfield land in an urban setting. 
Individuals’ homes are excluded.913  
 
The English Court of Appeal decision of Malik v Fassenfelt offers an interesting point for 
dsicussion.914 The group “Grow Heathrow”, who had illegally occupied the land, were supported 
by the local community.915 Despite this, the Court of Appeal relied on the earlier decision of 
Walden-Smith J, who noted that:  
 
For a private landowner to have to establish that the possession order is justified because 
his own use of his own land is useful and attractive to the local community and society at 
large, the use of that land by the current occupier against whom he has a right of 
possession, particularly where that occupier is a trespasser, runs entirely contrary to the 
principle of private ownership of land.916 
 
The right to buy abandoned land is not directly comparable to an order for possession. However, 
this decision does bring into focus the question over whether private property can be legitimately 
deprived due to the caveat that existing possession must be justified on a utilitarian front.  
 
Students of Scots law are taught that the right to ownership includes the usus (the right to use and 
enjoy a thing), fructus (the right to derive benefit or profit from using the thing) and abuse (the 
right to freely dispose or destroy the thing). There are examples when even the public interest has 
been dismissed as a caveat in favour of rights to property. In the famous 1895 English case of 
                                               
911 Scottish Government, Guidance for applications made on order 15 April 2016 (n 193) para 90. 
912 Holmehill (n 787).  
913 LR(S)A 2003 s. 97C(5). 
914 Malik v Fassenfelt [2013] EWCA Civ 798. 
915 Ibid.  
916 Ibid. 
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Bradford Corpn v Pickles, the House of Lords allowed a landowner, even though acting maliciously, 
to cut off a supply of clean water, which would otherwise have served the rapidly developing 
domestic, sanitary and industrial requirements of the City of Bradford.917 To the House of Lords, 
the landowner might prefer “his own interest to the public good” and might indeed be “churlish 
selfish and grasping” but although his conduct might seem “shocking to a moral philosopher”, the 
House of Lords refused to intervene.918 This is an exceptional case, and while it shows that rights 
to property have often been sternly protected, it must be remembered that the popular perception 
of land ownership in Scotland has not reflected the conception of ownership of land as one’s sole 
and despotic dominion.  
 
5.4.8 RIGHTS TO BUY AND A WHOLLY PRIVATE PURPOSE 
 
Contemporary Scots rights to buy allow a company limited by guarantee to buy land or individual 
tenant farmers to become owner-occupier(s). The line is blurred between the ability of the holders 
of rights to property to stop other individuals expropriating their rights and the inherent power of 
the sovereign to take property in the public interest. There is a difference between expropriations 
that primarily serve the public interest, and those that essentially serve the interest of a private 
company (even if it does label itself as the “community”) or individual tenants.  
 
The question to be considered is whether there are any circumstances in which a court will hold 
that an interference is not in the public interest in relation to the contemporary rights to buy. The 
nature of the interference is significant when considering whether it is in the public interest.919 
Guidance was given in the 4:3 split Supreme Court decision in R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v 
Wolverhampton City Council where Lord Walker observed that the exercise of powers of compulsory 
acquisition, especially in a “private to private” acquisition, amounts to a serious invasion of the 
current owner’s proprietary rights.920 It has been observed that the power of compulsory purchase 
being used for private profit is “deeply unattractive”.921  
 
                                               
917 Bradford Corpn v Pickles [1895] AC 587 (HL).  
918 Ibid [601]. 
919 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p de Rothschild (1989) 1 All ER 933 938. (CA).  
920 Sainsbury’s Supermarkets (n 792) [84].  
921 Standard Commercial Property Securities Ltd v Glasgow CC [2006] UKHL 50, 2006 SLT 1152 [75].  
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This is a question for ministerial discretion when considering a particular application. It must be 
discerned whether an application is being made wholly or primarily for a private purpose. There 
is a split between the differing rights to buy in Scotland. The community and crofting community 
rights to buy are more likely to satisfy a “public use” requirement compared to the agricultural 
tenant’s right to buy or the right to buy when the landlord is in breach. What constitutes a private 
purpose is difficult to define, but it is submitted that the Scottish Ministers should consider the 
following factors: (i) the balance of power between the parties (ii) the overall effect on the parties 
(iii) the facilitators and agenda setting (iv) location (v) social merit (vi) environmental impact (vii) 
reasonable possibility of success (viii) democratic merit. These factors overlap with the 
proportionality tests. The reason they are set out is to offer a framework in which it is possible to 
consider whether the rights to buy are being used as a stratum for individual private profits that 
do not serve the public interest.   
 
There remains the problem of defining community, with examples of a handful of individuals 
being able to use the rights to buy legislation with only minimal support. It is submitted that this 
should give rise to a greater evidential burden on the individuals who form the organisation to 
prove that the purchase is in the public interest.  
 
It is apparent that a “wholly private” expropriation is not in the public interest. However, it is 
almost impossible to envisage what a wholly private expropriation would look like as argument 
can almost always be made to show some form of public interest. The focus of the right to buy is 
part of a legislative agenda that aims to facilitate the equitable distribution of land ownership in 
Scotland. Lord Nicholls in Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No. 2) observed that legislative provisions 
intended to bring about such fairness, are capable of being in the public interest, even if they 
involve the compulsory transfer of property from one person to another.922 Therefore, even if the 
agricultural tenant’s or community right to buy do facilitate the transfer of property from one 
individual to another or a company limited by guarantee, courts are required to look beyond the 
individual transaction and consider the wider public purpose that has resulted in the interference 
under A1P1. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the weight the courts should give to 
the decisions of democratic institutions mean that it is highly unlikely that the ECtHR and Scottish 
judiciary will ever hold land reform to not be in the public interest.  
 
                                               
922 Wilson (n 629) [68].  
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5.4.8.1 CONCLUSIONS ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST  
 
Chapter three of this thesis argued that the public interest test had been rendered a paper tiger due 
to the wide margin of appreciation given by the ECtHR and the considerable weight given by the 
domestic courts to the decisions of democratic institutions. The only instance in which a right to 
buy could be held to not be in the public interest would be if it is apparent that there is a “private-
to-private” expropriation. This question is left wholly to the discretion of the Scottish Ministers. 
It is therefore argued that it is almost impossible to envisage the ECtHR holding any Act of the 
Scottish Parliament to be contrary to the public interest. This is perhaps only possible in the highly 
unlikely event that the Scottish Ministers chose to target a particular religious or ethnic minority, 
although this would be covered by other provisions of the ECHR.923 Similarly, it is difficult to see 
a domestic court making a similar finding in relation to contemporary sales orders due primarily 
to questions of institutional competencies. Put succinctly, and repeating the LRRG, “the 
responsibility for determining the public interest of the people of Scotland rests with their elected 
representatives”.924 
 
5.5 RIGHTS TO BUY AND PROPORTIONALITY  
 
As has been shown in this thesis, proportionality is central to the jurisprudence of the ECHR, 
even if it is not possible to find the term within the text of the Convention.925 The existing domestic 
interpretation of A1P1 shows that the courts will consider proportionality by asking four distinct 
questions:926  
  
(1) whether there is a legitimate aim which could justify a restriction of the relevant 
protected right, 
(2) whether the measure adopted is rationally connected to that aim, 
(3) whether the aim could have been achieved by a less intrusive measure, and 
(4) proportionality and the fair balance test. 
                                               
923 See ECHR Articles 6, 9, 13 and 14.  
924 LRRG, The Land of Scotland and the Common Good (n 122) p. 21.  
925 Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540) [37].  
926 Asbestos Disease (Wales) (n 698) [45]. 
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As the above analysis has shown, the ECtHR and domestic courts have been apprehensive when 
it comes to considering the lawfulness and the public interest test under A1P1. Thus, questions of 
proportionality and the fair balance test are often the most important considerations. 
It is important to view the proportionality standard as an area of discretion given to public officials, 
the Scottish Ministers and the judiciary. The standard for determining the relative merits of a right 
to buy cannot be rigidly determined by the decision-makers’ whims, self-interests or political 
inclinations.927 As H. L. A. Hart wrote in a paper posthumously published in 2013:  
Discretion is after all the name of an intellectual virtue: it is a near-synonym for practical 
wisdom or sagacity or prudence; it is the power of discerning or distinguishing what in 
various fields is appropriate to be done and etymologically connected with the notion of 
discerning.928 
This is why following the rule-based approach to the proportionality standard outlined in chapter 
three is critical.  
 
5.5.1 PROPORTIONALITY PART 1: A LEGITIMATE AIM  
The first stage in determining proportionality requires the court to determine whether the 
measures that interfere with the Convention right pursue a “legitimate aim”.929 How to approach 
this analysis within the rule-based prism of proportionality is problematic. The question remains 
whose authority the court is to consider. The court can choose to take a deontological approach 
and accept the arguments of democratic institutions as valid due to the expertise within 
organisations like the Scottish Parliament and its democratic mandate. On the contrary, the court 
could potentially take a more inquisitive approach and rely on independent experts and research. 
It must, however, be remembered that it is not for the court to say whether the legislation 
represents the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the legislative discretion 
should have been exercised in another way.930  
                                               
927 H. L. A. Hart, “Discretion” (2013) 127 Harvard Law Review 652. 
928 Ibid 656.  
929 Sofia v San Marino (2017) 65 EHRR SE7 [68].  
930 Salvesen (UKSC) (n 11) [36]. 
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Chapter one of this thesis broke down the reasons for contemporary sales orders into distinct 
grievances. The first was historical, most notably the legacy of landed power and the Highland 
Clearances, the second was absentee landowners, transparency of ownership, and tax avoidance; 
and the third was the high concentration of ownership. In Holmehill Ltd v Scottish Ministers Sheriff 
McSherry observed that “the underlying objective of the land reform programme and the 
introduction of the community right to buy is the sustainable development of rural 
communities”.931 More recent statements speak of productivity, community, and the public 
interest.932 Central to this is a near social utilitarian view on property. Aileen McLeod in the Scottish 
Parliament, debating the Land Reform (Scotland) Bill in 2016, outlined the Government’s 
“absolute commitment to… ensuring that land is owned and used in the public interest for the 
benefit of the people of Scotland”.933 The proceeding analysis will focus on the most prominent 




5.5.2 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A LEGITIMATE AIM  
 
In December 2014, while debating the rights to buy for sustainable development in the Rural 
Affairs Committee, Richard Lochhead MSP asserted that “the thrust of our land reform legislation 
is to promote sustainable development. That is the motivation for intervention and, of course, the 
justification for it”.934 The problem with defining “sustainable development” was discussed above. 
While it remains an undefinable concept, several key parts can be discerned and then considered. 
The first question to consider is whether the current programme of sales orders has an underlying 
economic rationale. Once again, this is limited by underlying subjective assumptions and the limits 
of the available evidence.  
 
The Scottish Government guidance states that “sustainable development is an integrated long-
term approach to economic, social and environmental issues”,935 noting that the information in 
                                               
931 Holmehill (n 787) [99].  
932 SP, OR, RACCE, 7 October 2015, 11 March 2015, col. 34-35. 
933 SP, OR, 7 October 2015, col. 49. 
934 SP, OR, RACCE, 7 October 2015, 10 December 2014, col. 30.  
935 Scottish Government, Guidance for applications made on order 15 April 2016 (n 193), para 84. 
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the application form will be “crucial in determining whether this criterion is met”.936 The guidance 
for the community right to buy sets out the Scottish Government’s approach to sustainable 
development.937 It states that, fundamentally, sustainable development for the Scottish Executive 
is described by the Brundtland definition: “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.938  
It is submitted that serious concerns remain as to whether the opaque nature of “sustainable 
development” constitutes a legitimate aim.939 This is further compounded by the fact that the term 
“sustainable development”, while often used, lacks a precise legal definition.940 The term is broad 
and encompasses a multitude of often conflicting ideals such as economic growth, social inclusion, 
ecological factors, and tackling climate change.941 While the Scottish Parliament information 
(SPICe) centre briefing states that there is an agreed definition of sustainable development, this 
was strongly criticised by several experts giving evidence to the Rural Affairs Committee.942 
Livingstone asserted that: 
The problem is not that the term cannot be defined: it is that it can be defined in a number 
of different ways. Ultimately, if it came before a court, a court might be able to define 
“sustainable development” as meaning whatever, but the difficulty for a landowner or for 
somebody looking to buy land is that they may not be clear about what it is until they get 
to the stage of having the question before the court and being told what “sustainable 
development” means in the circumstances of the individual case.943 
Instead of an accepted definition, what exists is a series of “indicators” that address the underlying 
purpose of sustainable development. These indicators vary in the manner that they can be 
empirically observed. The result is alternative conceptions of differing factors with the weight 
                                               
936 Ibid para 84.  
937 Ibid para 84. 
938 Scottish Executive Environment Group, Meeting the Needs… Priorities, Action and Targets for Sustainable Development in 
Scotland (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office, 2002) para 2.  
939 Holmehill Ltd v Scottish Ministers 2006 SLT (Sh Ct) 79. 
940 V. Barral “Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive Legal Norm” 
(2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 377, 377.  
941 A. Ross, “It’s Time to Get Serious—Why Legislation is needed to make Sustainable Development a Reality in the 
UK” (2010) 2 Sustainability 1101. 
942 SP, OR, RACCE, 7 October 2015, col. 30. 
943 Ibid col. 31.  
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given to each being left wholly to the discretion of the decision maker.944 Giving evidence on the 
LR(S)A 2016 before its enactment, Bovey QC noted that:  
Sustainable development is the aim that is being pursued but it is not an established legal 
term to which the court will be able to refer in respect of its meaning… Putting it in the 
explanatory statement is not a satisfactory way of legislating, because the court does not 
know what to make of the explanatory statement—whether or not it is endorsed by the 
Parliament.945 
One of the biggest concerns has to be that there is almost no guidance on the weight to be allocated 
to differing factors. As a result, it is difficult to point to what the aim of the interference is beyond 
the poorly defined policy of sustainable development. The Scottish Government appears to 
overemphasise socio-political considerations to the detriment of economic and particularly 
environmental factors. As Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration states, “environmental protection 
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation 
from it”.946 This has resulted in a definition of sustainable development put forward by Holyrood 
that better resembles Pearce’s notion of “weak sustainability” in which there is no place for the 
environment.947 The Scottish Government’s own Rural and Environment Science and Analytical 
Services submitted in 2012 that there was a “lack of clarity over the rationale and remit of Land 
Reform” and it was “not clear what form this sustainable development should take, or what 
features should be prioritised”.948 
The question then becomes what the Scottish Ministers are willing to accept as “sustainable 
development”. This is important as it sets out the primary aim of the interference. In the 
application for a Part 2 Community Right to Buy, the question asks if the land being acquired is 
“sufficient to further the achievement of the sustainable development of the community”. 
Examples of what the Scottish Ministers are willing to accept can be found on the Registers of 
Scotland website. Examples include:  
 
                                               
944 N. Hanley, “Measuring Sustainability: A Time Series of Alternative Indicators for Scotland” (1999) 28 Ecological 
Economics 55, 57. 
945 SP, OR, RACCE, 7 October 2015. 
946 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.I) 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). 
947 D. Pearce, Blueprint 3: Measuring Sustainable Development (London: Earthscan, 1994) pp.15–16. 
948 Scottish Government, Overview of Evidence on Land Reform in Scotland (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office, 2012) p. 7.  
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Source: Register of Community Interests in Land, Registration No. CB00006 (Crossgates 
Community Woodland, Entered 28 September 2004) 
While the Scottish Ministers have attempted to articulate a detailed and structured approach to 
sustainable development over the last twenty years, the near-blank acceptance of such a lax 
definition of sustainable development in the application procedure does not inspire confidence. A 
slightly more detailed application can be seen by the North West Mull Community Woodland 
Company Ltd entered on 28 March 2018.  
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Source: Register of Community Interest in Land, Registration No. CB00233 (North West Mull 
Community Woodland Company Ltd, Entered 28 March 2018) 
Despite this, as the decision in Pairc emphasises, domestic courts remain apprehensive about 
considering sustainable development in detail, preferring to defer to the Scottish Ministers. 
Questions remain over the undefined public policy sustainable development constitutes a 
legitimate aim. Community bodies lack adequate guidance as to whether their proposed application 
satisfies the requirement. However, the available evidence in the Register of Community Interests 
in Land shows that the Scottish Ministers are accepted a very low level of detail.  
The island of Gigha remains the most prominent recent example of community ownership. 
However, in 2014 it was reported that the Island of Gigha Heritage Trust was £2.7 million in debt. 
One farmer was quoted in the Herald stating quite bluntly “it has been a shambles”.949 The problem 
is that the legislation remains relatively young and limited in its usage. Therefore, using one single 
example to state that community ownership is inherently un-economical would be naïve. It will 
                                               
949 J. Duffy, “A tale of two islands as Gigha dream turns sour” The Herald (Glasgow: 23 November 2014). 
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only really be with time that the economic case for community ownership will become apparent. 
The problem for the proportionality standard is that it is concerned with the facts before it and 
cannot wait for an undetermined period of time to assess the validity of the claims. This underlines 
the limits of assessing the economic rationale for a deprivation, and explains in part why the courts, 
particularly in Strasbourg, have been deferential to questions of what constitutes a legitimate aim.  
 
The risk remains that unsubstantiated claims are made during the application procedure about the 
“sustainable” credentials of an application. These claims will be made during the application stage 
and, if accepted, there are no checks in place to make sure that proposed measures come to 
fruition.  
 
5.5.2.1 DIVERSIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP AS A LEGITIMATE AIM  
It may come to be considered whether the diversification of land ownership is itself a legitimate 
aim. As Sheriff McSherry noted in Holmehill, “[t]he purpose of the Act [LR(S)A 2003] is to increase 
community ownership in land… The Act should be construed in this light… it should not be 
isolated from its end purpose”.950 The solicitor Livingstone, while giving evidence to the Scottish 
Parliament on the Land Reform (Scotland) Bill in 2015, stated that: 
I have to query whether a change in patterns of ownership for its own sake would be 
regarded as a legitimate aim under the ECHR. I say that, because the fundamental principle 
that underpins [A1P1] is the principle of private property and that people should not be 
deprived of their property or have their property rights restricted unless a wider public 
benefit would be served by doing so. There is a risk in saying that one is entitled to change 
the ownership of property because that is what one wants to do.951 
While Livingstone speaks of the “public benefit” in this instance, it is the aim of the rights to buy 
that is in question. The subtle point Livingstone was trying to convey to the Scottish Ministers was 
that, to be compatible with A1P1, deprivations must have an underlying rationale beyond merely 
changing ownership patterns because the Scottish Ministers want to.   
 
                                               
950 Holmehill Ltd (n 787).  
951 SP, OR, RACCE, 7 October 2015, 10 December 2014, col. 42. 
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The breaking up of large parcels of land oligopolies has been accepted as a legitimate use of the 
state’s power in the US. The US Supreme Court came to consider the validity of distributive land 
reform in the landmark decision of Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff.952 Like contemporary 
Scotland, for several historical reasons, land ownership in Hawaii was unusually concentrated. On 
Oahu, for example, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles. Many of these landowners 
were hesitant to sell parcels of their property because of potentially large federal tax liabilities. The 
result was that most people leased, rather than owned, their homes. According to the Hawaii 
Legislature, this created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State’s residential land 
market and forced thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land 
underneath their homes.953 The Hawaii Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967.954 The 
1967 Act was intended to remedy the islands’ problem of concentrated land ownership as Hawaii 
sought to correct “certain perceived evils of concentrated property ownership” and to eliminate 
land oligopolies.955 The majority in the US Supreme Court accepted the elimination of 
concentrated land ownership as a legitimate aim. To O’Connor J “regulating oligopoly and the 
evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s police powers, and redistribution of fees 
simple to reduce such evils is a rational exercise of the eminent domain [compulsory purchase] 
power”.956  
It is therefore submitted that intervention in existing patterns of landownership to correct market 
failures, particularly in the case of land oligopolies, will be accepted as a legitimate aim under A1P1. 
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the weight given to the decisions of democratic 
institutions means that the question of defining a market failure will be left to be primarily 
determined by the state.  As a World Bank Report concluded in 2003, “governments have a clear 
role to play in promoting and contributing to socially desirable land allocation and utilisation”.957 
5.5.2.2 LEGITIMATE AIM AND COMMUNITY  
One of the driving forces behind the sales orders is the aim of promoting or “rekindling” 
community. It is clear that the initial process can bring communities together. There do, however, 
                                               
952 Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff (1984) 469 US 299 229 (United States).  
953 Ibid 242.  
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955 Ibid. 
956 Ibid p. 266.  
957 K. Deininger, Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction (Oxford: OUP 2003) p. x. 
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remain concerns over who constitutes the “community” and whether the broad definition serves 
the stated aim of stronger local communities. In January 2018 it was announced that “residents” 
of Ulva (an island off Mull), had voted to accept a proposed community buyout plan.958 Of the 
401 who were eligible to vote, 163 backed the buyout of the £4.2 million island. Only six people, 
including the landowner, actually live on the island. The remaining 395 (98.5% of those eligible to 
vote) live on Mull and are able to vote due to the area being covered by the community body “the 
North West Mull Community Woodland Company”. The money to purchase is currently being 
sought through fundraising. The landlord, who is a local farmer, will understandably feel aggrieved 
that his land is potentially being taken from him due to the actions of inhabitants of a neighbouring 
island. In this example, the concept of community has been turned on its head. Those who do not 
live on the island are able to manipulate the community right to buy to attempt to buy land on a 
neighbouring island. It is difficult to hold that this example serves the aim of promoting sustainable 
communities.  
The problems inherent in defining community have already been discussed. The example above 
serves to illustrate the shortfalls of the existing legislation. However, rural communities, in 
particular pose a certain set of public policy challenges. The aim of promoting sustainable 
communities is not narrowly defined.  The concept of sustainable communities is tied to the 
alleviation of population decline, tackling the problems posed by an ageing population, affordable 
housing and the creation of economic opportunities to stop younger generations being forced to 
leave. Such measures constitute a legitimate aim. Further, the ECtHR remains unlikely to interfere 
in such questions of public expenditure and social policy. Therefore, rekindling community and 
promoting sustainable communities constitutes a legitimate aim under A1P1.  
 
5.5.2.3 LEGITIMATE AIMS AND THE RIGHT TO BUY ABANDONED AND 
NEGLECTED LAND  
 
The question is whether using compulsory powers to utilise disused or abandoned urban land is 
perhaps not as radical as it first appears. For example, the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) 
Act 1973 recognises that an owner’s title may become stale.959 Provided the land is occupied 
openly, peaceably and without any form of judicial interference from the rightful owner and 
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959 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. 
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possession is founded on a registered or recorded deed that is ex facie value, the passage of 10 years 
will allow title to change hands through positive prescription.960 The right to buy abandoned and 
neglected land can be considered in light of the old maxim, vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt 
(the law protects those who are awake, not those who sleep).  
 
The public policy aims behind the right to buy abandoned and neglected land is similar to the 
English Empty Dwelling Management Orders (“EDMO”) created by the Housing Act 2004, 
although instead of expropriating the property, the EDMOs resemble a form of compulsory 
leasing. The factors to be taken into account when considering an EDMO are: that the dwelling 
has been wholly unoccupied for at least 6 months; that there is no reasonable prospect that the 
dwelling will become occupied in the near future; and that, if an interim order is made, there is a 
reasonable prospect that the dwelling will become occupied.961 In deciding whether to authorise a 
local housing authority to make an interim EDMO, the tribunal must take into account the 
interests of the community, and the effect that the order will have on the rights of the relevant 
proprietor and may have on the rights of third parties.962  
 
While highlighting that the public policy behind the right to buy abandoned and neglected land is 
perhaps not as radical as it first appears, EDMOs remain unknown to most, and have been mostly 
ineffective in practice due to their limited use. For example, in 2014 only 17 EDMOs were 
successful, despite reports that 600,000 homes in England were empty.963Abandoned and 
neglected land is most likely commensurable to what is often called “blighted property”. The 
American scholar Becher undertook a detailed study of the expropriation of blighted land in 
Philadelphia.964 Becher concluded that the disinvestment and neglect of owners of blighted 
property legitimised the compulsory acquisition of the land for redevelopment.965  
 
The Grand Chamber in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom considered the English law of adverse 
possession prior to the Land Registration Act 2002.966 In this instance, the applicant unsuccessfully 
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submitted that the loss of ownership by operation of the passing of twelve years, under the 
principles of adverse possession, and the lack of compensation, was incompatible with A1P1.967  
 
The decision in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd is illustrative for the purposes of this thesis as the Grand 
Chamber gave significant weight to the second paragraph of A1P1 with its specific reference to 
“the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest”.968 Of particular relevance to the right to buy abandoned and 
neglected land is that it was observed that “[l]and was a limited resource, and it was in the public 
interest that it should be used, maintained and improved”.969 However, caution is necessary as 
Grand Chamber held that adverse possession was compatible with A1P1 by a narrow ten votes to 
seven.970 Further, the Court placed significant weight to the period of twelve years required under 
the English law of adverse possession being “relatively long” and “long-established”.971  
 
It is submitted that the underlying purpose of the right to buy abandoned and neglected land will 
satisfy the legitimate aim requirement. However, challenges are likely to focus on the individual 
decisions of the Scottish Ministers when considering applications. The lesson from JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd is that the ECtHR is unlikely to accept short periods of abandonment as justifying interferences 
under A1P1. Therefore, challenges will conceivably focus the time period required for land to be 
wholly abandoned and neglected.  
 
5.5.3 CONCLUSIONS ON LEGITIMATE AIMS  
It is difficult to make general conclusions as to whether the contemporary rights to buy satisfy the 
“legitimate aim” test. It is also clear that the domestic courts are willing to take a deontological 
approach to determine what constitutes a legitimate aim instead of undertaking a more exacting 
consequentialist approach. It is very difficult to disagree with aims such as “sustainable 
development”, “community empowerment”, and “economic development”.  The diversification 
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of land holdings may also constitute a legitimate aim if such measures are undertaken to remedy 
“market failures”, or even if the market appears to be functioning well.  
It is clear from the ECtHR and domestic jurisprudence that the Scottish Parliament is entitled to 
a broad area of discretion to determine what is a legitimate aim. The level of detail required to 
justify interference in pursuing a legitimate aim in any given instance remains unknown. It appears 
reasonable to conclude that under A1P1, in general, the decisions of the Scottish Ministers (due 
to their democratic credentials) are given significant weight when considering whether the rights 
to buy have a legitimate aim. As a result, it appears that existing measures would be held to 
constitute a legitimate aim within the meaning of the proportionality requirement even if the 
available evidence conflicts with the Government’s rhetoric.  
 
If the courts make a substantive comment on the legitimacy of the aim, they risk moving into the 
traditional domain of democratic institutions. This raises larger constitutional issues about the 
appropriate role of the judiciary and what constitutes an act that is “manifestly unreasonable”. It 
is submitted that the relationship between A1P1 and Scots rights to buy is helping to expose the 
prevailing fragilities of the proportionality test. That being so, it is only through the structured, 
rule-based four-part proportionality standards that some form of consistency is possible. Without 
such a framework an even greater risk of ad hoc judicial decision-making would be possible.  
 
5.5.4 PROPORTIONALITY PART 2: RATIONALLY CONNECTED TO THAT AIM  
 
The second test for determining proportionality is whether the legitimate aim, as examined in part 
one of the test, is “rationally connected to that aim”, and whether the legitimate and important 
goals are logically “furthered” by the means adopted.972 The principle involves a question of 
balance between competing interests. The Scottish Ministers have a burden to convey that the 
restriction on A1P1 is due to a pressing social need. The Ministers must show that the legislative 
means adopted were no greater than necessary.973 As discussed in chapter three, the concept of 
necessity should not be equated to indispensability. It does, however, underline the requirement 
of some form of societal goal or public good as part of the balancing exercise.  
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The question is whether the introduction of the four community rights to buy and the two 
agricultural tenant’s rights to buy are rationally connected with the legitimate aims outlined above. 
Caution is necessary, as it is dangerous to make sweeping statements about the rights to buy. Their 
primary aims are, however, broadly the same (if somewhat poorly defined): sustainable 
development and the diversification of ownership. In relation to the crofting community right to 
buy, this includes strengthening the crofting community and, concerning the agricultural tenants’ 
right to buy, includes increased security of tenure and a more vibrant and sustainable tenanted 
sector.  
 
Agricultural holdings reforms are being undertaken in the belief that they will increase security for 
tenants and facilitate a more vibrant and sustainable tenanted sector. The Review of Agricultural 
Holdings Legislation states that: “The Scottish Government’s vision is for a Scottish tenant 
farming sector that is dynamic getting the best from the land and the people farming it, and 
provides opportunities for new entrants, forming part of a sustainable future for Scottish 
farming”.974 These aims are important, as the tenanted farming sector is vulnerable to wider 
economic forces, with many tenant farmers relying significantly, or wholly, on subsidies to make 
ends meet. The question is then whether the agricultural tenant’s right to buy and the introduction 
of the sale when the landlord is in breach are “rationally connected” to these aims.  
 
The result of these reforms to date has been a lesson in the risks of unintended consequences as 
the reforms have instead come to harm Scotland’s agricultural tenants significantly.975 The increase 
in security of tenure and the possibility of a pre-emptive right to buy has made landowners 
increasingly wary of entering into agricultural tenancies. In response to the AH(S)A 2003 it was 
estimated that over three hundred dissolution notices were served in one evening alone.976 The on-
going controversy surrounding Salvesen v Riddell and McMaster v Scottish Ministers highlights the many 
problems that have been caused.977 The consequences are plain to see: “Scottish tenant farmers 
face eviction due to legal error,” ran a recent headline in The Scotsman.978 For the agricultural 
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tenancy sector in Scotland, who were promised great things before the passing of the AH(S)A 
2003, the results have been less favourable. 
 
While questions remain over the exact parameters of the objectives of the Scottish Ministers, the 
economic consequences of fragmentation must be considered.  There is evidence that by 
transferring land from large estates to family farms you bring idle lands into production, and; 
increase productivity levels.979 There is, however, conflicting evidence that large-scale agriculture 
promotes great efficiency.980 A 2003 World Bank study showed the nations which had worked 
towards a more equitable distribution of landowners between 1960 and 2000 had achieved growth 
rates two to three times higher than those where land distribution was less equitable.981 However, 
other studies have shown contradictory results.982 The most comprehensive study commissioned 
by the Scottish Government concluded that “even where fragmentation had occurred, the current 
owners could not conclude that the ownership change and fragmentation had actually led to 
positive outcomes for the wider rural communities in their area”.983 The same report concluded 
that “it is too simplistic to conclude that scale of land ownership is a significant factor in the 
sustainable development of communities”.984 
This is further compounded by the fact that the rights to buy have introduced a new level of 
uncertainty for landowners and practitioners. Landowners will be aware of agricultural tenants’ 
rights. However, knowledge of community “connections” and intentions are more difficult to 
discern. This is undoubtedly complicated by the late registration procedure. This may only become 
apparent to landowners when they receive a letter from the Scottish Government prohibiting 
disposition, while the merits of the late application are considered. The initial ministerial decision 
process usually takes over two months, adding further time and costs to sales. This introduces 
inefficiencies into the market and can divide communities and harm the relationship between 
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landlord and tenant. In doing so, the rights to buy can be counterintuitive and actually harm 
sustainable development and divide communities.  
There is, therefore, evidence that the right to buy is rationally connected to the alleviation of 
poverty and economic growth. The problem is that there is also conflicting evidence, and the 
Scottish Ministers have been left to assess the validity of the evidence presented to them. The 
courts in this instance are often asked to balance conflicting factors that are frequently based on 
future hypothetical situations. These hypotheticals are unverifiable, and the court is left to make a 
determination in areas that it perhaps lacks the expertise to determine adequately. 
The broad margin of appreciation and the importance of deference to democratic institutions 
means that the courts’ ability to determine such questions based on economic or other evidence 
is limited. This highlights the questions of whether the rights to buy are “rationally connected” to 
the aims of the Scottish Ministers.  
5.5.4.1 CONCLUSIONS ON “CONNECTED TO THAT AIM”  
As discussed in chapter three, the first two parts of the proportionality tests are relatively low 
hurdles. For example, if the breaking up of large landholdings is a legitimate aim, then a measure 
such as Lenin’s 1917 “Decree on the Land”, under which “[l]anded proprietorship is abolished 
forthwith without any compensation” would be rationally connected to that aim.985 Such a measure 
would not satisfy the third and fourth proportionality requirement, but the fact that such a measure 
could potentially satisfy parts 1 and 2 highlights the significance of the margin of appreciation 
given to contracting states. There remains considerable disagreement as to whether the rights to 
buy are rationally connected to the aims of the Scottish Ministers. However, it is submitted, that 
outside of exceptional circumstances, ECtHR and the domestic courts are unlikely to hold that 
contemporary rights to buy do not satisfy parts 1 and 2 of the proportionality test.  
5.5.5 PROPORTIONALITY PART 3: WHETHER THE AIM COULD HAVE BEEN 
ACHIEVED BY A LESS INTRUSIVE MEASURE  
It has to be asked whether the existing rights to buy pose disproportionate “risks”, in terms of 
capital expenditure, economic perils and political and judicial time. Part 3 of the proportionality 
standard asks whether these “risks”, combined with the severity of the interference on individual 
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rights, could be reduced through the utilisation of alternative measures, while at the same time 
retaining the same desired outcomes. 
The domestic courts’ willingness to consider whether the aim could have been achieved by a less 
intrusive measure exposes the distinction between the obligations which the UK accepted by 
accession to the ECHR and the duties under domestic law which were imposed upon public 
authorities by the HRA.986 The result is significant as it shows that an interference may be 
considered incompatible with a Convention right under the HRA but within the state’s margin of 
appreciation by the ECtHR.987  
The margin of appreciation, and judicial deference, have a significant role to play in part 3. As 
Lord Armstrong observed in the Outer House decision of Accountant in Bankruptcy v Walker, the 
courts should be loath to interfere unless the choice of Parliament is manifestly without reasonable 
justification.988  
 
The availability of alternative solutions is, therefore, a factor in determining proportionality, but it 
is not decisive. There are several possible “solutions” to the problems identified in part 1 of chapter 
one. Speaking at a conference at George Mason University, just south of Washington DC, in May 
2017, I was asked by Brian Grindall, a practising American lawyer and lecturer at Georgetown 
University, why the Scottish Government did not just “tax the hell” out of landowners?989 The 
simple answer, was that Scottish Ministers had limited devolved competencies in this area.990  
 
The question to which Grindall was alluding was whether the objectives of land reform could have 
been achieved through fiscal measures in a less intrusive manner. The use of taxation was recently 
discussed in R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health where the claimants 
submitted that the Secretary of State had failed to prove that standardised packaging was 
proportionate because the evidence does not show that there are no equally effective but less 
restrictive alternatives.991 The claimants submitted that it is obvious that taxation is more 
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effective.992 In this instance, the court chose to dismiss these arguments as the competent 
authorities enjoyed a “wide margin of appreciation” which extended to: (i) the need for the 
legislation (ii) its aims, and (iii) its effect.993 Citing James v United Kingdom, Green J noted that it 
should not intervene unless it was “manifestly unreasonable and imposed an excessive burden on 
the person concerned”.994 
 
This raises several important questions, and once again asks us to consider what the Scottish 
Ministers are aiming to achieve. While giving evidence to the Scottish Parliament Rural Affairs 
Committee, Bovey QC noted the Faculty of Advocates’ concerns about the proportionality of the 
right to buy when the landlord is in breach. He argued that to force sale where a landlord “is in 
breach” is comparable to using a sledgehammer to crack a nut, as in doing so you “destroy the 
nut” or eliminate the landowner’s title and “so defeat the purpose” of promoting good land 
management.995 To Bovey:  
 
If a landlord is in breach of his obligations, you must ask whether the only way in which 
you can enforce those obligations is to buy his property compulsorily or whether it would 
be possible to enforce them by, for example, allowing the tenant to withhold his rent and 
to use that money to repair the breaches of which the landlord is guilty.996 
 
The right to buy where the landlord is in breach does pose a particular set of challenges. The right 
is draconian, and while it is intended to be a measure of last resort, questions remain unanswered 
as to where a landlord who is allegedly in breach will be given time to remedy the Land Court 
order to remedy the beach.997 It is submitted that it would be disproportionate for an isolated 
breach, or even a series of breaches, automatically to allow the tenant an absolute right to buy.  
 
It is argued that the right to buy when the landlord is in breach may constitute a disproportionate 
interference if other remedies are available. It must be remembered that under the AH(S)A 1991, 
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agricultural tenants already enjoy near indefinite security of tenure.998 As previously noted, Lord 
Diplock observed, “proportionality in plain English means you must not use a steam hammer to 
crack a nut, if a nutcracker will do”.999 The sale when the landlord is in breach serves a legitimate 
aim, promoting good land management. However, to expropriate the land for an alleged breach 
(if we follow the analogy of Lord Diplock) does not just smash it, but transmutes in the sense of 
being converted to a right to monetary compensation, and all meaningful use of the land is 
extinguished.  
  
The right to buy abandoned and neglected land also raises critical questions of alternative 
measures. What the right does is impose a utilitarian obligation on landowners to utilise “wholly 
abandoned or neglected land”. The ownership rights in this instance are extinguished in their 
totality. Alternative mechanisms to utilise (or coercively force utilisation or sale) are possible. The 
Scottish Greens have proposed a tax on vacant and derelict land and other reforms.1000 These 
would require the owner of abandoned or neglected land to undertake a cost-benefit analysis. The 
underlying rationale is that this forces owners to utilise their land. This proposal is also coercive, 
but it does not completely extinguish Lord Diplock’s fictitious nut — it merely reduces the land’s 
economic value.   
 
When attempting to answer whether the stated policy aims could have been achieved through less 
intrusive measures, it is difficult to make generalisations about the reform of land law. If the stated 
aim is simply the diversification of land holdings, it is difficult to conceive of measures that are 
less intrusive. Indeed, if the policy goal of 1 million acres is to be realised, more intrusive measures 
are probably necessary. If the stated aim is sustainable development or environmental protection, 
then the measures are overly intrusive, and the policy goals could probably be achieved through 
measures short of extinguishing all of the landowner’s rights or smashing Lord Diplock’s fictitious 
nut.  
 
Once again, the reform of Scots land law is exposing the limits of the proportionality test and the 
limits of the judiciary in determining whether such a measure could have been achieved by a less 
restrictive means. The ECtHR has tended to offer contracting states a wide margin of appreciation. 
The judiciary is being asked to consider future hypotheticals and questions with underlying 
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economic and social rationales that they are most likely not best placed to answer. Not only is 
ascertaining such information an inherently subjective and expensive endeavour, but it also risks 
the judiciary trespassing into the traditional domain of the legislature.  
 
5.5.5.1 GRANULARITY  
 
One critical question that remains unanswered is how fixed the analysis under A1P1 should be 
and whether the judiciary should consider particular cases on their merits or should instead look 
at the overall impact of the legislation. As noted in the introductory chapter it is important to 
emphasise that proportionality operates at two different levels.1001 First, at a macro-granular level 
proportionality considers the underlying public policy and wording of the measure. Macro-
granularity is imbued with the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the doctrine of judicial 
reference. Micro-granularity requires the court to consider the distinct facts before the court and 
the weight to be given the competing interests of the parties.  
 
The ECtHR, especially in its earlier decisions, appears to have been primarily concerned with the 
broader picture at a macro level.1002 Domestic courts appear more willing to consider the rationality 
of individual evidence. In Mott, the Supreme Court based its decision almost entirely on a micro-
granular analysis of the personal circumstances of Mr Mott at the expense of environmental 
regulations.1003 
 
The problem is that a macro granularity ignores the personal circumstances of landlords and 
landowners. It is obvious that the effect of contemporary rights to buy will have differing 
consequences when applied in their various forms. For example, when considering a right to buy 
abandoned and neglected land, should the Scottish Ministers take a micro approach and give 
weight to the individual circumstances of the landowner? Would it be relevant if the landowner 
had left the land wholly abandoned and neglected as they had been acting as the primary carer of 
a disabled or ill relative and, during this period, lacked the time and resources to actively manage 
the land? Or on the contrary, should the Scottish Ministers favour a macro-granular approach and 
look at the overall impact of the right to buy on the community and ignore the circumstances of 
the landowner? It is submitted that this example highlights the problem of granularity and that the 
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Scottish Ministers and judiciary should not ignore the individual circumstances of the landowner 
when considering part 3 of the proportionality standard.   
 
The lesson for Scots land reform is that future challenges to rights to buy will most likely focus on 
the micro-granularity of the evidence that led to the Scottish Ministers’ decisions. This will focus 
on the individual circumstances of the landowner and also the merits of the community’s 
application to fulfil the legislative requirements, which include the furthering of sustainable 
development. As already discussed above, the Scottish Ministers appear to have set the standard 
of detail relatively low. It is highly likely that a challenge to a contemporary right to buy on the 
level of detail undertaken during the application process will offer a possible avenue for litigators 
to challenge rights to buy under A1P1. This is not a challenge to the compatibility of the legislation, 
but instead looks at how it has been applied by the Scottish Ministers.  
 
5.5.5.2 CONCLUSIONS ON LEAST INTRUSIVE INTERFERENCE  
 
The above analysis has shown that serious questions remain unresolved as to whether less 
restrictive measures could be utilised to attain the Scottish Ministers’ desired outcomes. The 
differing aims articulated by the Scottish Ministers, and the difficulty in defining what are often 
general public policy statements or aspirational goals, clouds the analysis. The clearest example of 
where the aims of a right to buy could have been achieved through a less intrusive measure is most 
apparent in relation to the new right to buy where the landlord is in breach. While not yet in force, 
it is submitted that this draconian measure, which intends to facilitate good husbandry and land 
management, goes too far in that is does not resolve the dispute between the landlord and tenant 
but simply extinguishes the rights of the landlord in their totality. Due to the closer nexus of 
domestic courts, it is submitted that they should consider whether the aims could have been 
achieved through a less intrusive measure to comply with their obligations under the HRA.   
 
5.5.6 PROPORTIONALITY PART 4: STRICTO SENSU AND THE FAIR BALANCE 
TEST  
 
It is a firmly established test that any interference must achieve a fair balance between the demands 
of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
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fundamental rights.1004 To the ECtHR, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a 
fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements 
of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.1005  
 
The availability of compensation is an important factor (often the critical factor), in the assessment 
of proportionality. There is a presumption in favour of compensation where property has been 
expropriated. As already shown, there is a deliberate absence of an explicit compensation 
requirement in the text of A1P1. The ECtHR has come to hold that the deprivation of property 
without compensation will be a disproportionate interference.1006 The ECtHR has only been 
willing not to consider compensation as a critical factor in a handful of unique cases, such as the 
unification of Germany.1007 Outside of such cases, if the amount paid is deemed to be “manifestly 
disproportionate”,1008 this will serve as strong evidence towards a disproportionate interference.1009 
In practice, the ECtHR has been apprehensive to make inquiries into the adequacy of an award of 
compensation.1010  
 
The Scottish Government has included compensation requirements in the rights to buy.1011 The 
provisions require the value of land to be determined by a suitably qualified and independent 
“valuer”.1012  The valuer is to act on behalf of neither the community body nor property owner 
and serves only as “an expert and not as an arbiter”.1013 The “market value” is to be determined by 
reference to the “open market” value as between a willing seller and buyer, any depreciation in the 
value of other land or interests belonging to the targeted property owner, and “any amount 
attributable to any disturbance to the seller which may arise in connection with the transfer”.1014  
The amended LR(S)A 2003 and the LR(S)A 2016 allows community bodies and landowners to 
appeal for a complete reassessment of the compensation valuation made by the independent valuer 
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to the Lands Tribunal for Scotland.1015 The prospect of an appeal also risks a greater financial 
burden being imposed on landowners and communities that may be unaffordable for one or both 
parties.  
 
The initial valuation is without any reference to the landowner.  As a result, landowners are unable 
to claim for what the Fennell calls “uncompensated increments”.1016 First, the legislation does not 
include any reference to the landowner’s subjective valuation of the land. Second, the opportunity 
to be compensated for any post-transfer surplus, or re-development value, is omitted. Third, the 
owner’s autonomy, which is violated by a non-consensual expropriation, is also ignored.1017 This 
is of particular relevance to this thesis as it must be considered whether the compensation 
requirements satisfy the fair balance test under A1P1. However, when compared to existing 
principles of compensation under compulsory purchase law, these provisions are not as radical as 
they first appear. Further, the judiciary has previously appeared deferential to questions of value 
in relation to land reform. Lord Malcolm observed in Pairc Crofters Ltd v Scottish Ministers that 
reasonable compensation “will go a considerable distance towards satisfying the requirement for 
a fair balance and the avoidance of a disproportionate” interference.1018  
 
The problem is that the concept of the open market automatically implies a willing seller and a 
willing buyer, both of whom in such forced sales are a hypothetical abstraction.1019 This can cause 
overcompensation as well as under compensation. In instances of overcompensation, the ECtHR 
appears disinterested. The Grand Chamber in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd observed that “the possibility of 
‘undeserving’ tenants being able to make ‘windfall profits’ did not affect the overall assessment of 
the proportionality of the legislation”.1020 Further, there are already isolated instances where the 
fair balance may have been overtly in favour of the existing owner. A notable example is Scottish 
Water, who were “very pleased with the valuation” of an underground redundant water tank in 
Silverburn.1021 Thus, the overall process for determining just compensation remains a task fraught 
with operational complexity.  
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1016 L. Fennell, “Taking Eminent Domain Apart” (2004) Michigan State Law Review 957, 958-959.  
1017 J. Lovett, “Towards Sustainable Community Ownership: A Comparative Assessment of the Community Right to 
Buy” (Cambridge Centre for Property Law Conference, Cambridge, 26 May 2018). 
1018 Pairc Crofters (n 43) [105].  
1019 Gray v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1994] STC 360 [372] (CA).  
1020  Pye (n 675) [83]. 
1021 L. Kermack, “Coping with Rights to Buy – Part 1” (2006) 46 The Bulletin of the Agricultural Law Association 8, 9.  
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5.5.6.1 PROPORTIONALITY STRICTO SENSU AND PROPERTY AS A LIABILITY 
RULE  
 
Part 4 of the proportionality rule has come to accept that the individual’s rights to the peaceful 
enjoyment of possession can be justifiably deprived if compensation is paid. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, property is a limited right. The presumption against interference imposes 
certain obligations on the judiciary when assessing the proportionality of an interference stricto 
sensu. This has been done by the payment of compensation which is determined to be recompense 
for the loss of individual rights.  
 
Using the theoretical foundations of Calabresi and Melamed, property rules can be described as 
the ability of a recognised owner to “just say no” to a prospective purchaser. To Calabresi and 
Melamed “what is generally called private property can be viewed as an entitlement which is 
protected by a property rule. No one can take an entitlement to private property from the holder 
unless the holder sells it willingly and at a price at which he subjectively values the property”.1022 
Property rules involve a collective decision as to who is to be given an initial entitlement but not 
as to the value of the entitlement.1023 The term “liability” rule is borrowed from American tort law 
to describe how property owners only have a liability rule to the protection of monetary 
compensation against the government with its power of eminent domain.1024  
 
It is argued that Scots land law reform is exposing the inherently subjective nature of property 
rules and liability rules but also serves to illustrate the misplaced existing conceptions of “absolute” 
rights to property in land. It is posited that proportionality stricto sensu brings into view the reality 
that absolute ownership of land, does not exist. Instead, owners hold a qualified entitlement that 
can be denigrated to a liability rule or claim for compensation when democratic institutions 
(exercising their powers in conformity with the rule of law, the public interest, and in a 
proportionate manner) see fit.  
                                               
1022 M. Radin, “The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings” (1988) 88 
Columbia Law Review 1667. 
1023 G Calabresi and A D Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ 
(1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089, 1092. 
1024 Ibid.  
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The right to property is therefore not a legal entitlement to “sole and despotic dominion”1025 over 
an area of the earth, but a qualified right that has its ultimate foundation in a claim for monetary 
compensation for the value of those legal rights at market value. The rationale for the market value 
remains critical as it attempts to prohibit proportionality stricto sensu being manipulated for 
egalitarian purposes. This gives us the underlying justification for the payment of compensation, 
but it does not resolve what constitutes just compensation and what the ECtHR is willing to accept 
as such.  
5.6 THE COST OF REFORM  
 
Funding community ownership remains one of the primary limiting factors. Where a community 
is unable to afford the purchase and has taken “all reasonable measures” to obtain independent 
financing, the Scottish Ministers can decide that it is in the public interest to pay a grant to fund 
the purchase.1026 The majority of community acquisitions have been through such grants. The 
funding has come from a combination of the publicly funded Scottish Land Fund and Growing 
Community Assets fund and through partnerships with the Big Lottery Fund, which is a non-
departmental public body reasonable for distributing funds raised by the National Lottery.1027 The 
burden of land reform is therefore firmly placed on the taxpayer directly through public funding 
and indirectly through the National Lottery.  
The principle of equivalence is unlikely to satisfy those who are currently calling for “radical” land 
reform and redistribution in Scotland. The reality is that land reform is prohibitively expensive and 
to undertake the sort of mass transfers proposed is unaffordable. For example, The Knight Frank 
Scottish Farmland Index 2016 reported that the average price of land in Scotland per acre was £4,223, 
with “good arable land” averaging £9,050.1028 An additional 437,770 acres has to come into 
community ownership to achieve the target of having one million acres of land in community 
ownership by the end of 2020.1029 If we take the average price of land sold in Scotland in 2016, the 
total cost has the potential to be around £1,848,702,710. If the land bought is “good arable land” 
the cost would be closer to £3,961,818,500 and even the lowest quality and cheapest land simply 
                                               
1025 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England Book II.  
1026 LR(S)A 2003 s. 97U(1)-(2); LR(S)A 2016 s. 68(1)-(2). 
1027 Big Lottery Fund, “Scottish Land Fund” <https://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/funding/programmes/scottish-
land-fund> [accessed 1 June 2018].  
1028 A. Shirley (ed) Scottish Farmland Index H2 2016 (London: Knight Frank Rural Research, 2017).  
1029 Scottish Government, “Estate of Community Owned Land in Scotland 2017 Experimental Statistics” (n 78) p. 1. 
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defined as “Hill” which averages £673 per acre, makes the total cost £294,619,210. These are very 
general figures, but they do emphasise the sheer cost of undertaking land reform through rights to 
buy.  
It is nearly impossible to see where this sort of money would come from. The Scottish 
Government’s Draft Budget for 2018-2019 has budgeted £404,900,000 for Environment, Climate 
Change and Land Reform.1030 The title is slightly misleading as within this category £152 million 
is allocated to Environmental Services and £113.5 million to Scottish Water. Land reform has only 
been allocated £17.1 million in the draft budget.1031 This is still a significant figure, but it will come 
as a surprise to few that the aim of 1 million acres by 2020 is impossible. While funding can be 
sought from other channels, including charity, donations and fundraising, it is unlikely that such 
endeavours would be able to fill this financial void.  
5.6.1 COMPENSATION BELOW MARKET VALUE  
 
It appears reasonable to conclude that Scotland cannot currently afford land reform on the scale 
it has proposed, and the existing reforms have already been undertaken by shifting the financial 
burden to the taxpayer.1032 As such, the compensation requirement will limit the full effect of 
“radical” reforms. However, the Scottish land question has often resulted in calls for 
expropriations below market value or in extreme instances of mass confiscation.1033 The question 
then turns to whether compensation can be paid below market value or removed in its entirety.  
As illustrated in chapter two, the introduction of a compensation standard was one of the most 
controversial elements of the drafting of A1P1. Britain’s Labour representative Nally argued that 
“the basis of Europe’s fight for survival is a struggle for the subordination of private property to 
the needs of the community”.1034 The representative went further and suggested that by protecting 
property, they would be defending a system in which a “tiny handful of people own the means by 
which millions of others live”.1035 This has direct parallels with the land reform movement in 
                                               
1030 Scottish Government, Scottish Budget: Draft. Budget 2018-19 (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office 2017) p. 8.  
1031 Ibid.  pp. 138-139.  
1032 S. Johnson, “Taxpayers ‘face compensation bill for SNP land reform” The Telegraph (London: 28 January 2015). 
1033 Evans and Hendry (n 95).  
1034 TP, vol. II, pp. 74, 78, and 80.  
1035 Ibid p. 80.   
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Scotland as many have come to question why the individual rights of landowners should trump 
the Scottish Ministers’ egalitarian reforms.   
The early jurisprudence shows that the ECtHR was not concerned with the fair balance test and 
questions of compensation, but simply whether the court must restrict itself to supervising the 
lawfulness and the purpose of the restriction in question.1036 This was expanded upon in the 
famous trio of Marckx, Sporrong and James to include questions of proportionality.1037 The early 
decisions of the ECtHR appear to show that there was initially no guarantee of a right to full 
compensation. In Lithgow v United Kingdom is was observed that a legitimate public interest “may 
call for less than reimbursement of the full market value”.1038 The Convention is a living instrument 
and later cases have come to hold that A1P1 would be largely illusionary and ineffective in the 
absence of any equivalent principle. The payment of compensation at fair market value has been 
consistently held as critical to the question of whether the fair balance has been struck.1039  
 
The ECtHR has held that states are unable to justify a lack of compensation or under 
compensation on the grounds of limited resources. Even the bankruptcy of a local authority has 
not been held to make under compensation permissible.1040 Therefore an argument cannot be 
made that reducing compensation from fair market value is justifiable as the cost of facilitating 
land reform imposes a prohibitively expensive financial burden upon the state.  
 
What is observable in this shift is a tension between conceptions of property as a “liberal” right or 
conversely as a “social democratic right”.1041 Conceptions of property as a “liberal” right find their 
foundations in the entitlement of individual liberty in the face of state intervention.1042 Central to 
liberal theory is the importance of the individual’s ability to freely determine the use and disposal 
                                               
1036 Handyside  (n 578) [62]. 
1037 Marckx (n 58); Sporrong & Lönnroth (n 540); James (n 61). 
1038 Lithgow (n 588) [121]. 
1039 James (n 61) [54].  
1040 Burdov v Russia (2004) 38 EHRR 29 [41].  
1041 Allen, “Liberalism, social democracy and the value of property under the European Convention on Human 
Rights” (n 474).  
1042 C. Rose, “Privatization – The Road to Democracy?” (2006) 50 Saint Louis University Law Journal 691. 
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of property. Interference is therefore only permissible in a narrow set of circumstances and will be 
deemed to be an unjustifiable invasion of liberty if the owner is left worse off.1043  
The payment of compensation for deprivations of property is not a new phenomenon in the UK. 
The House of Lords noted in Attorney-General v Nissan that “even under the Stuarts there is no case 
supporting that there might be seizure by the Crown without a right to compensation”.1044 
Therefore, a liberal conception of property would most likely exclude the possibility of the Scottish 
Government legislating in a manner that does not satisfy the principle of equivalence. As Lord 
Nichols observed in Waters v Welsh Development Agency “in a modern democratic society... hand in 
hand with the power to acquire land without the owner’s consent is an obligation to pay full and 
fair compensation, that is axiomatic”.1045  
5.6.2 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC RIGHT TO PROPERTY  
 
Standing opposed to the liberal theory are those who conceive of property as a “social democratic 
right”.1046 These theorists believe that state interference with property is not only permissible but 
expedient in the face of the many basic “needs” that are left unsatisfied by the free market and 
capitalism.1047 Therefore, where the public interest directs, full compensation is not necessary; 
instead, the broader reciprocity of societal advantage should be the key consideration. A social 
democrat would argue that the legislature has an important role in determining the value of 
property, and that the legislature may decide that the public interest demands that some values 
that are realisable in a private transaction are not compensable on expropriation.1048  
If this theory is applied to Scots land law reforms, it would forward that the necessity of land 
reform and the democratic mandate of the Scottish Ministers allows for land reform to bypass the 
normal principles of equivalence.1049 Added to this is the question of whether market value 
constitutes the fair or true value of property. To some theorists, the removal or reduction of full 
compensation is permissible when it is undertaken in the public interest and promotes ethically 
                                               
1043 Allen, “Liberalism, social democracy and the value of property under the European Convention on Human 
Rights” (n 474) 1056.  
1044 Attorney-General v Nissan [1970] AC 179 [193] (HL).  
1045 Waters v Welsh Development Agency [2004] 1 WLR 130 [1] (HL).  
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permissible policies.1050 In such circumstances, it is considered expedient to subvert the economic 
status quo in the pursuit of worthy social causes.1051 However, the possibility of reducing 
compensation does not automatically mean the removal of the compensation requirement in its 
totality.   
 
Dagan argues that we should avoid the extremes between the libertarian concept of all 
interferences requiring compensation for every “taking” and conceptions of compensation that 
hold that landowners should bear the individual burden of social change.1052 To Dagan, when 
considering compensation, it is important: to consider the nature of the resource, to determine the 
personhood value of the property and the social context in which land is owned; to establish the type 
of human relationship the existing rights structure takes and regulates. Dagan submits that the 
legislature should create a bright line rule — a formula of sorts — that determines when partial 
compensation is due. These three proposed rules are:  
 
1) When the beneficiary of the public project at hand is one’s local community and the 
expropriated land has been held as an investment, meaning the owner held it as fungible 
property, compensation will be calculated as only x% (say 80%) of the fair market value.  
2) By contrast, when the land is expropriated as part of a larger (e.g., regional or state) 
governmental project and has previously served its owner for constitutive purposes (a 
home or maybe also a farm or small business), full compensation (fair market value) will 
be awarded.  
3) In between these two extreme categories are cases in which constitutive land is 
expropriated for purposes that benefit its owner’s local community, and cases in which the 
use of fungible land benefits broader society. These intermediate types of cases should 
both trigger the award of intermediate measures of recovery: y% of the fair market value 
where x% < y% < 100% (say 90%).1053 
In the context of Scottish land reform, there is the possibility of applying this analysis. It would 
hold that when expropriating land from owner-occupier farmers, and even large-scale resident 
                                               
1050 E. Baker, “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty (1986) 134 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 741, 765.  
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landlords, full compensation should be awarded. It would propose that in instances where land is 
held (for example) by an anonymous offshore trust, or as part of an international investment 
portfolio, the nature of the resource and the social context in which it is held would allow for a 
reduction in compensation below market value if this was necessary to serve a public project and 
benefited the local community. This would allow the compensation requirement to be used for 
distributional purposes. It makes it more expensive to expropriate from “ordinary citizens” than 
it is to expropriate property from owners of what Dagan terms “fungible property”, whom he 
notes are typically real-estate holding corporations of wealthy individuals.1054 Significantly, for the 
Scottish Ministers’ programme of having 1 million acres in community ownership, Dagan argues 
that such a system would incentivise large-scale purchases and balance the political and economic 
power relations between small domestic owners and large-scale corporations whose social 
connection with the land is minimal.   
The problem with the deadlocked debate over compensation and land reform in Scotland is that 
both sides have become entrenched in their positions. It is impossible to reconcile claims that land 
should be nationalised or expropriated with no (or minimal) compensation when juxtaposed 
against those who submit that fair market value alone does not constitute acceptable 
compensation. Dagan did not set out his rules with Scotland in mind, but it is submitted that they 
do offer an alternative. If the nature of the resource and the social context is considered, it does 
become apparent that an argument can be made that compensation can be reduced in certain very 
confined circumstances.  
 
There are notable examples of this in the past. The Uthwatt Committee on Compensation and 
Betterment set up during the Second World War discussed the purpose of compensation detail.1055 
To stop land speculation and profiteering during the reconstruction of many towns and cities after 
the Blitz, the Uthwatt Committee ordered that the value of land should be set as its pre-war value. 
In this instance, Parliament chose to limit compensation as it was considered expedient to meet 
the pressing social need for reconstruction.1056 Support for this view is observable is certain 
contracting states. The 1973 Irish Report of the Committee on the Price of Building Land asserts 
that “[t]he alleged right of landowners to get the full market price for something in limited supply 
                                               
1054 Ibid p. 54.  
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(a right which we believe does not exist) is not consistent with the common good”.1057 In 1980 the 
Italian Constitutional Court held that, while compensation must not be “negligible” or “symbolic”, 
this should not be equated with “market value”.1058 
The Strasbourg Court famously held in Jahn v Germany that the “exceptional circumstances” of 
German reunification were taken as a relevant factor in their holding that the principle of 
equivalence could be ignored.1059 In Urbárska v Slovakia the Strasbourg Court observed that:  
While it is true that in many cases of lawful expropriation only full compensation can be 
regarded as reasonably related to the value of the property, A1P1 does not guarantee a 
right to full compensation in all circumstances. Legitimate objectives in the “public 
interest”, such as those pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to 
achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value. 
Less than full compensation may also be necessary a fortiori where property is taken for 
the purposes of fundamental changes of a country’s constitutional system or in the context 
of a change of political and economic regime.1060 
 
This appears to support a social democratic view of compensation, but a note of caution is 
necessary. The economic rationale for reducing or removing compensation remains disputed.  To 
some, a reduction in compensation beyond market value risks demoralising citizens.1061 Further, 
such a move would potentially result in a loss of inward investment which would not be offset by 
the benefits of society receiving “free” or reduced property.1062 However, to others, economic 
efficiency is reduced by the principle of equivalence, as powerful owners are able to counteract the 
risks of expropriation.1063  
It must be noted that the ECtHR will only find a breach of A1P1 where there is an extreme 
disparity between the compensation awarded and value.1064 One of the reasons for this is that the 
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ECtHR is unable to call and examine witnesses. As a result, the ECtHR is normally limited to the 
factual situation before the court and the documents presented to the court. This is not necessarily 
an acceptance that compensation is to be determined wholly by the contracting state, but more a 
recognition that the ECtHR lacks the necessary nexus to adequately determine the question of 
what constitutes fair market value.  
5.6.2.1 CONCLUSIONS ON JUST COMPENSATION  
 
It is argued that the Scottish land debate will remain theoretically unresolved due to the intractable 
tension between liberal individual notions of rights to property and social democratic conceptions 
of rights to property. The removal of the compensation requirement would mark a significant shift 
in Scots land reform, from a process that has been rhetorically radical, but in reality, limited, to 
one that is revolutionary.  The differing opinions are a complex relationship between theft and 
restitution or unjustifiable interference in the market, to correcting the failures of neoliberalism. 
The question of compensation is at the core of the Scottish land question. How one conceives of 
just compensation is foundational to one’s perspective on the entire debate.  
 
It is clear that any Act of the Scottish Parliament that completely removes the principle of 
equivalence will be held incompatible with A1P1 and will, therefore, be not law.  However, this 
does not mean that under certain confined circumstances compensation many be limited below 
“full” market value. A1P1 does not guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances. If 
we take the framework outlined by Dagan which places a value on the nature of the resource and 
the social context in which it is held and used, there may be the possibility of reducing the 
compensation requirement below the market value where it serves social justice and the public 
interest. Caution is necessary when implementing such a measure for it to remain compliant with 
A1P1, but it is possible.  
 
The response to such a measure would perhaps limit its effectiveness. For example, if the 
framework given by Dagan, is followed the most significant possible reduction in compensation 
is 20%. The introduction of compensation below full market value would likely result in a media 
and judicial backlash. The risk would be that the surrounding litigation and controversy would 
increase the cost of the rights to buy.  
 
The result of this analysis is that it is submitted that A1P1 prohibits truly “radical” reform in the 
form of expropriations without compensation. It is therefore clear that A1P1 does not 
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automatically entitle owners to full market value in very confined circumstances, but the Scottish 
Ministers would be taking a significant risk if they were to ever attempt to reduce compensation 
below market value. While such a move would perhaps satisfy certain elements of the pro-land 
reform agenda, it would fuel the counter narrative that the Scottish Government is attempting to 
undertake a socialist land grab. As a result, it would not only risk being a violation of A1P1, but 
would almost certainly derail the opportunity to reconcile existing claims.  
 
5.7 RELEVANT NON-CONVENTION RIGHTS AND THE FAIR BALANCE TEST   
 
It is submitted that the final part of the fair balance assessment for the contemporary right to buy 
is the effect of “relevant non-convention rights”. As discussed in chapter two, the political rhetoric 
surrounding the inclusion of relevant ICESCR shows that the reference to the ICESCR and other 
non-convention rights was an attempt to rebalance the human rights debate.1065 To Shields, “the 
nub of the issue is now focussed on legitimising interference with the right to property in pursuit 
of the public interest in order to enable the positive impact of land reform on economic, social 
and cultural rights”.1066  
 
This raises several problems. What weight should be given to relevant non-convention rights 
compared to Convention rights? Whether a “clash” is even possible is disputed. To some scholars 
clashes only occur due to the incorrect interpretation of one right when juxtaposed against another. 
While there is considerable literature on conflicting rights within the ECHR, little has been written 
on the relationship between the ECHR and other human rights instruments, and the application 
of the ICESCR and other socio-economic rights in Scots law.1067 
 
It must be asked whether human rights tensions should be considered within a hierarchy of rights, 
and what abstract weight should be given to different human rights. The final consideration is 
whether finding a balance between competing interests can be legitimately decided by the judiciary 
or should be the preserve of democratic institutions.  
 
                                               
1065 SP, OR, RACCE, 11 March 2014, col. 46. 
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5.7.1 A HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS 
 
Whether a hierarchy of human rights exists is subject to dispute. The UN World Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993 declared that all human rights are “indivisible”, “interdependent”, and 
“inter-related”.1068 However, there are examples where the abstract weight of rights is not equal. 
The right to life has a higher weight than the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.1069 
The problem is in the margins: when rational individuals disagree as to which human right has a 
higher weight. To Smith, the ranking of human rights should be determined by popular 
referendums.1070 With recent events in mind, it is unlikely that a referendum of this nature will take 
place in the near future.  
 
As already noted, to many, socio-economic rights are “secondary” or lesser rights. Pipes went as 
far as to describe socio-economic rights as “at best a moral claim, and at worst, if enforced by 
public authority an unearned privilege”.1071 As the UN Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) noted: “In relation to civil and political rights, it is generally taken for 
granted that judicial remedies for violations are essential. Regrettably, the contrary assumption is 
too often made in relation to economic, social and cultural rights”.1072 
 
Whether “property” is a human right is also disputed. Scots land reform and the contemporary 
debate surrounding rights to property and socio-economic rights are exposing a fundamental 
tension between conceptions of property. This is further complicated by the reality that while 
rights to property are a central pillar of private law, rights to property lack a similar resonance in 
public law.1073 To Waldon, “the slogan that property is a human right can be developed only 
disingenuously to recognise the massive inequality that we find in modern capitalist countries”.1074 
American property theorist, Alexander, cites two core concerns: first, that protecting rights to 
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property in such a manner “shrinks the scope of democratic deliberation” since they become 
“beyond change, modification, or ending through ordinary political processes”, and second, that 
protection has a fundamentally anti-redistributive effect.1075  
Despite these conflicting claims, it is clear that the Scottish Ministers cannot choose to opt-out of 
the minimum standards for Convention rights.1076 Even if the Scottish Ministers are unhappy with 
the potentially limiting effect of Convention rights on their apparent democratic mandate for 
“radical” land reform, this cannot be used as a justification to limit the universal importance of the 
rights contained in the Convention and its Protocols.1077 Therefore, despite the apparent anger and 
indignation many in Scotland have at the nation’s concentrated patterns of land ownership, this 
cannot be used to justify limiting the effect of the rights contained in the ECHR.  
The jurisprudence from around the world shows that courts have been apprehensive to make 
direct pronouncements on these questions and instead prefer to defer to democratic institutions. 
What weight should be given to differing rights in relation to contemporary land reform in 
Scotland will remain a controversial question. The relative weight of socio-economic and 
community rights compared to rights to property will be determined, at an individual level, by 
various explicit and implicit political, social and economic assumptions.  
Scotland should turn to South Africa for a comparative lens. The South African 1996 Constitution 
protects private rights to property in Section 25(1) and socio-economic rights in several regards, 
including Section 26 which guarantees a right to access to housing and a protection against eviction 
and Section 25(5) and (6) which provides a right to access to land and security of tenure. A 
considerable body of jurisprudence has built up in which the South African courts have attempted 
to balance these conflicting rights. 
 
The decision of the South African Constitutional Court in Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdry 
(Pty) Ltd concerned an eviction order of a settlement of an estimated 18,000 squatters east of 
Johannesburg.1078 Some of the land was incorrectly thought to be owned by the municipality, but 
in reality, it was privately owned. The foundation of the claim was the enforcement of an eviction 
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order against unlawful occupiers. The Court made it clear that the state has a duty to step in and 
assist the landowner in protecting her property against an unlawful occupation.1079 The 
Constitutional Court held that it would cause “unimaginable social chaos and misery and untold 
disruption” to evict the squatters.1080 Van der Walt wrote, following the decision, that the South 
African Constitution has to be read in a manner that recognises and accommodates both the rights 
of landowners and the rights of those who do not have access to land.1081 The lesson for Scotland 
is that rights to property and socio-economic rights when juxtaposed, do not necessarily have to 
result in one individual or group’s human rights being wholly set aside. In the Modderklip Boerdry 
case, the court chose to protect the squatters’ rights until another adequate site could be acquired. 
The court also chose to balance the deprivation of property and to make sure that the owner did 
not have to bear an individual and excessive burden by holding that they were entitled to 
compensation.1082 
It is appreciated that this does not give concrete guidance, nor does it give an official weight to 
individual human rights that could be used in something resembling a mathematical formula. The 
critical lesson from Modderklip Boerdry is the indivisibility of human rights, the importance of a 
democratic dialogue, and an obligation on the state to protect the rights of the community and the 
landowner.  
5.7.2 THE FAIR BALANCE TEST AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS  
 
To Vandenhole, the ECtHR comes close to applying a “proportionality plus” test in instances of 
conflicts of socio-economic rights.1083 The “plus” in the proportionality test is the addition of 
socio-economic considerations. This means that the balancing exercise involves inter alia 
considerations such as the financial situations of the parties and the power relations.1084 The “plus” 
is supposed to emphasise the importance of taking a holistic approach to judicial decision-making.   
 
                                               
1079 A. J. Van der Walt, “The State’s Duty to Protect Property Owners v the State’s Duty to Provide Housing” (2005) 
21 South African Journal on Human Rights 144, 158.  
1080 Modderklip Boerdery (n 446). 
1081 Ibid 149.  
1082 Ibid.  
1083 W. Vandenhole, “Conflicting Economic and Social Rights: The Proportionality Plus Test” in E. Brems (ed.), 
Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights (Oxford: Insertia 2008) p. 575.  
1084 Hutten-Czapska (n 742) [178].  
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Sachs J gives a certain amount of guidance in the South African Constitutional Court decision of 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers. The court identified three salient features: 
 
First, The Constitution is strongly supportive of orderly land reform, but does not purport 
to effect transfer of title by constitutional fiat. Nor does it sanction arbitrary seizure of 
land, whether by the state or by landless people. The rights involved… are defensive rather 
than affirmative. The land-owner cannot simply say: this is my land, I can do with it what 
I want, and then send in the bulldozers or sledgehammers1085  
 
A second major feature of this cluster of constitutional provisions is that through section 
26(3) they expressly acknowledge that eviction of people living in informal settlements 
may take place, even if it results in loss of a home.1086  
 
A third aspect of section 26(3) is the emphasis it places on the need to seek concrete and 
case-specific solutions to the difficult problems that arise.1087 
 
As noted above, in tackling tensions between socio-economic rights and civil rights to property, 
South Africa has focused on the State’s duty to protect both rights. The South African courts have 
come to conclude that conflict would never have arisen if the State had complied with its duties 
towards both rights.1088 The right to housing is said to be “an important right”, but the importance 
of the right to property is equally recognised. 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality, the court gave significant weight to the unequal power relations 
between the two parties, noting that private rights to property are “qualified and subject to societal 
considerations”.1089  This was justified to redress “the grossly unequal distribution of land” which 
is a legacy of the apartheid era. To Sacks J, the role of the court in cases where two rights are in 
conflict is to “balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking 
account of all the interests involved and specific factors relevant in each particular case.1090  The 
                                               
1085 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers [2005] 1 SA 217 (CC) (South Africa) [20]. 
1086 Ibid [21]. 
1087 Ibid [22].  
1088 Modderklip Boerdry (n 446) [40]. 
1089 Ibid [16]. 
1090 Ibid [23].  
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same court in the Grootboom case observed that “[t]hose whose needs are the most urgent and 
whose ability to enjoy all rights… is most in peril must not be ignored by the measures aimed at 
achieving the realisation of rights”.1091 
It is submitted that the lesson for Scotland is that the reference to relevant non-convention rights 
in the rights to buy legislation should play a role in determining whether the fair balance has been 
satisfied in applications concerning A1P1. As was argued in chapter two, if circumstances were to 
arise in which more than one compatible interpretation of A1P1 was open to the Scottish Ministers 
or judiciary, they would be required, in choosing between those options, to have regard to the 
ICESCR and other relevant non-convention rights. The South African experience is useful as it 
shows that modern legal systems can balance the potential rights-tensions that arise. It is argued 
that Scotland should learn from the importance the South African judiciary has placed on 
protecting both rights and the existence of a dialogue between the judiciary and democratic 
institutions. As was shown in chapter two, the caveat is that this must be done in a manner that is 
compliant with their existing obligations and devolved competencies. Relevant non-convention 
rights cannot allow for the limiting or reinterpretation of A1P1 to the extent that such an 
interpretation is ultra vires. Acts of the Scottish Parliament that are not compatible with A1P1 will 
be held to be not law.1092 
 
5.7.3 THE LIMITS OF PROPORTIONALITY  
 
The balancing of human rights has been subject to criticism.1093 To the German philosopher 
Habermas, balancing downgrades the normative powers of rights to merely goals or values. They 
thereby lose the “strict priority” that is characteristic of “normative points of view”.1094 To 
Habermas, if “cases of collision all reasons can assume the character of policy arguments, then the 
fire wall erected in legal discourse by a deontological understanding of legal norms and principles 
collapses”.1095 To some critics, the question of balancing rights tensions and undertaking a 
proportionality assessment results in the judiciary determining whose rights and interests should 
                                               
1091 Grootboom (n 455) [44]. 
1092 Salvesen (UKSC) (n 11). 
1093 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Trans. W. Rehg) (Cambridge: Polity, 1996). 
1094 Ibid p. 256.  
1095 Ibid p. 258.  
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prevail. This confers on the judiciary a task that should perhaps be the preserve of democratic 
institutions.1096 
 
5.7.4 CONCLUSIONS ON PROPORTIONALITY  
 
It is submitted that the application of the contemporary rights to buy to A1P1 exposes the 
intractable tension at the core of the proportionality standard. The courts are to make what often 
appear to be ad hoc decisions based on the evidence presented before them. The multitude of 
disparate factors taken into account means that a coherent line of reasoning is difficult to discern, 
and all possible scenarios have not been exhausted. Judges cannot be Dworkin’s conception of the 
all-knowing judge Hercules. The viability of a community right to buy in the future and whether 
the proposals will result in “sustainable development”, cannot be considered with absolute surety 
by a Minister or a member of the judiciary. Instead, we are left with a system of making the best 
possible educated guess which places significant weight on the decisions of democratic institutions. 
The decision is not subject to review after a period of time. If a community expropriates land for 
sustainable development, the landlord cannot return five years later, provide evidence that the 
community is not fulfilling the promises made during its application, and have the land return to 
him as it was expropriated under false representation or at least misleading or inaccurate 
predictions.  
 
However, if you look at much of the rhetoric surrounding land reform in Scotland, it is the 
statistical diversification of ownership —  the numbers that grab the headlines — that appears to 
be the primary concern. As such, even if the community has not been able to promote sustainable 
development, is it better that the community (or at least a company purporting to represent the 
community) has title and not an individual landlord? This once again exposes an intractable 
tension, as it asks what the purpose of land reform is and if it is simply to diversify ownership, to 
promote economic development, or to promote environmental wellbeing.  
 
It is submitted that it is within part 4 of the proportionality requirement that the real core of the 
Scottish land question exists today. The Ministers and judiciary’s interpretative obligation requires 
them to determine when, in a given instance, the expropriation of land is permissible. The 
prevailing debate has focused on whether A1P1 will act as a “red card” or a shut gate to 
                                               
1096 J. Morgan, “Amateur Operatics: The Realization of Parliamentary Protection of Civil Liberties” in T. Campbell, 
K. Ewing & A. Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford: OUP 2011) p. 429.  
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contemporary rights to buy. This thesis has, however, shown that to ask such a question is to 
misunderstand how A1P1 has been interpreted in practice and the various tensions at the core of 
disputes over the ownership of valued resources. The problem remains that conceptions of 
property remain disputed between liberal conceptions of individual entitlement and social 
democratic theories that often focus on egalitarian distribution. The core of the dispute is how to 
adequately reconcile these tensions.  In the words of Kipling:  
 
But my Totem saw the shame; from his ridgepole-shrine he came, 
And he told me in a vision of the night: — 
“There are nine and sixty ways of constructing tribal lays, 
“And every single one of them is right!”1097 
 
Rudyard Kipling 
In the Neolithic Age 
 
In relation to the competing claims over the correct interpretation of rights to property in Scots 
law, there is a certain merit to the conclusion that “every single one of them is right!”. What 
constitutes valid deprivation remains a fundamentally political question. The conclusions one 
makes are formulated by various implicit and explicit assumptions about the world which make 
question over the just entitlement of rights to property essentially contested. Whether a particular 
right to buy satisfies the “fair balance” is a question of politics, economics, sociology, ecology and 
many other specialist and case-specific factors, that can be thrown into the equation.   
 
This is why the most fraught and misunderstood element of the Scottish land question remains 
the application and effect of A1P1. To say that every one of the competing claims is right is not 
to avoid the answer, but shows that when considering whether an expropriation constitutes a 
legitimate interference under A1P1 the Scottish Ministers and judiciary are to consider a question 
of balance: an equation of sorts. Unlike mathematicians, decision-makers cannot necessarily prove 
their conclusions through the luxury of a closed structure permitting verifiable and repeatable 
proofs. As such, all lawyers and politicians risk leaving their assertions vulnerable to different 
interpretations and susceptible in part to criticisms of didacticism. This thesis has argued that 
questions over the “just” distribution and protection of rights to property are not, as is often 
                                               
1097 R. Kipling, Stories and Poems (Oxford: OUP 2015) p. 452. 
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asserted, binary. In an often inconceivably complex world, disparate claims to property can have 
elements of legitimacy and illegitimacy.1098 
 
The Scottish Ministers and judiciary are required to find solutions to the problems presented and 
cannot simply proclaim the issues before them to be too complex to resolve. In practice, decisions 
about property entitlements are unavoidable, and, despite the possibility of the incommensurability 
of values, making a decision remains possible through reasoned deliberation. When examining 
potential tensions between rights to property and conflicting communitarian or social-economic 
rights, judges, scholars, and lawyers must consider in greater detail the political, moral, and 
economic theory underpinning the law.1099  
 
The proportionality of an interference under A1P1 therefore requires a detailed consideration of 
multiple factors. This can only be logically achieved through following the four-part rule-based 
approach outlined above. The court or decision-making body cannot purport to find a correct 
answer in the sense that it is impervious to criticism. The purpose of the proportionality standard 
is to find a balance between the competing interest and to assess the relative weight of the aims 
sought and the means undertaken.  This is not about finding some mysterious “red card”. As such, 
it is impossible to say if the rights to buy constitute a disproportionate interference with A1P1 in 
their textual form. Instead, it is for the Scottish Ministers and the judiciary to determine the relative 
weight of a given application before them. What the above analysis has done is to set out the rules 
to be followed and highlighted several problems that may arise. However, the unique nature of 
land as a valued resource and the multitude of disparate ways in which the contemporary rights to 
buy legislation can be utilised means that each application should be considered on its own merits.  
 
5.7.5 CONCLUSIONS ON APPLICATION OF A1P1 TO CONTEMPORARY RIGHTS 
TO BUY  
 
This chapter has made several important conclusions on the application and effect of A1P1 in 
relation to contemporary rights to buy in Scotland. It has been shown that the victim test is a 
relatively low standard. It has been argued that the question of whether an applicant holds a 
“possession” will be easy to ascertain in most instances. However, in the margins, especially in 
                                               
1098 D. Maxwell, “Disputed property rights: Article 1 Protocol No.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016” (2016) 41 European Law Review 900, 923.  
1099 R. Dworkin Law’s Empire (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1986).  
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cases where there is a legitimate expectation of obtaining a possession, it will likely remain blurred. 
It is hoped that the forthcoming decision in the appeal of McMaster v Scottish Minister will add some 
clarity.  
 
This chapter has analysed how the judiciary should classify interferences under A1P1. It was 
submitted that the registration of a community interest and other steps that eventually lead to a 
right to buy could constitute a control of use. However, it was concluded that even if this is 
established, it is unlikely that such a control of use would impose an individual and excessive 
burden, as their use of the property is not severely diminished. It was then contended that when 
the rights to buy are utilised, it will be relatively straightforward to establish that a deprivation has 
taken place, as landowner’s rights to property are extinguished and replaced with a right to 
compensation. The problem remains in determining when a control of use is sufficiently severe to 
constitute a de facto deprivation. For example, if a community purchased 50% of an estate making 
the remaining 50% uneconomical, it remains unknown as to whether this would constitute a de 
facto expropriation of the entire estate. It was shown how the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Mott highlights that the domestic courts are primarily concerned with the burden imposed, 
although in this instance the Supreme Court spurned the opportunity to offer clarity on the correct 
parameters between a control of use and a deprivation.1100 
 
This chapter has submitted that concerns remain over whether certain key parts of the rights to 
buy legislation satisfy the lawfulness requirement and are sufficiently accessible and foreseeable. 
In particular, it was argued that the definitions given for sustainable development, community, 
abandoned and neglected, and when a landlord is in breach are unsatisfactory. However, it is 
concluded that the broad margin of appreciation given by the ECtHR and the significant weight 
given to democratic institutions, as was apparent in Pairc v Scottish Ministers, means that it is unlikely 
that the rights to buy legislation will be held to violate the lawfulness requirement under A1P1.1101 
 
It was submitted in chapter three, and has been affirmed in chapter four, that the public interest 
test has been rendered a paper tiger in the face of the wide margin of appreciation, bordering on 
fourth instance interpretation given by the ECtHR, and the significant weight domestic courts 
tend to give democratic institutions. As such, it is almost impossible to envisage Scots land law 
reform being held incompatible with the public interest test under A1P1.  
                                               
1100 Mott (UKSC) (n 688). 
1101 Pairc Crofters  (n 43). 
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Chapter four followed the four-part rule-based approach to proportionality that was outlined in 
chapter three. It has forwarded that the vague rhetoric and public policy surrounding the aims of 
the contemporary rights to buy legislation posed a particular set of challenges. However, it was 
concluded that the broad margin of appreciation and judicial deference meant that the courts were 
unlikely to intervene. The next question was whether the rights to buy were rationally connected 
to the aims forwarded by the Scottish Ministers. The problem is still the lack of clarity around 
what the aims are in practice and the limited available evidence. Economic evidence can be cited 
that favours the fragmentation of land as promoting development, but even the Scottish 
Government’s research has shown that it cannot be proven that land reform has a positive impact 
on sustainable development. It was submitted that this exposed a difficulty at the core of land 
reform and the proportionality standard, as it is exceedingly difficult for a court to discern the best 
available evidence. Added to this point is the problem of determining who is best placed to assess 
the relative weight of conflicting evidence. It was submitted that, in this regard, the courts should 
be apprehensive to intervene.  
 
It was argued that domestic courts are required to consider whether the aims sought could have 
been achieved through less intrusive means. It was argued that, in many instances, the aims sought 
by the Scottish Ministers can be realised without completely extinguishing the owners’ rights. In 
particular, it was argued that the right to buy when the landlord is in breach allowed the Scottish 
Ministers to use a sledgehammer when a nutcracker would in most cases be sufficient. Parts 2 and 
3 are important as they raise the question of the rationality of the contemporary rights to buy. It 
is submitted that the most likely recourse for successfully challenging the existing rights to buy will 
be in the form of arguments that the Scottish Ministers did not undertake their decision-making 
in a sufficiently exacting manner. The existing jurisprudence shows that the scale and level of detail 
that is to be accepted by the court is critical. While the ECtHR was historically prone to determine 
the broader purpose of the interfering legislation, the domestic jurisprudence shows a willingness 
to consider the individual circumstances of the victim.  
 
The final part of the proportionality test, often called results proportionality or the fair balance 
test, should be considered the essential point in all A1P1 applications. It was shown how the 
inclusion of provisions for just compensation in the rights to buy legislation will in most instances 
satisfy the fair balance requirement. It was argued that this helps to illustrate the myth of absolute 
ownership of land and instead means that land ownership often resembles a liability rule. It was 
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then shown how this requirement will likely limit the Scottish Ministers’ ability to radically alter 
ownership patterns in Scotland due to the cost of purchasing land. It was considered whether land 
could be deprived for less than its open market value. This question is controversial and has been 
raised by several of the more radical elements of the pro-land reform agenda. It was submitted 
that in most instances, full compensation must be paid, but by utilising the work of Dagan, under 
certain narrowly defined circumstances compensation may be reduced. However, the reduction 
could only be nominal, and any attempt to remove the compensation requirement in its totality 
would be a violation of A1P1.  
 
It was submitted that it is important to accept, that part of the fair balance test requires the 
consideration of relevant non-convention rights in particular the ICESCR, as discussed in chapter 
two. The jurisprudence of South Africa was utilised to show that land reform should aim to protect 
the rights of non-owners, tenants, and landowners, and that the primary focus of the Scottish 
Ministers and the judiciary should be the indivisibility of human rights. This means that, if more 
than one interpretation of A1P1 is possible, regard must be had to the relevant non-convention 
rights.  
 
This chapter has shown that the existing binary debate which asks whether A1P1 gives an absolute 
protection to rights to property or instead is completely subservient to the decisions of the Scottish 
Ministers misunderstands how A1P1 works in practice. This chapter has shown how A1P1 should 
be seen as a justifiable hurdle to be overcome to allow for the permissible interference with rights 
to property. It is submitted that a structured rule-based approach to interpreting whether a given 
right to buy is compatible with A1P1 is necessary for the interests of consistency, and to avoid the 
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6 CHAPTER FIVE 
LAND LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The enactment of the HRA, and the possibility of supranational human rights law coming to 
influence private law, was greeted by many with suspicion.1102 However, prior to 2012, it appeared 
that A1P1 was still only of limited effect in domestic courts. The House of Lords had overturned 
several activist judgments from the Court of Appeal.1103 That was until the Supreme Court was 
asked to consider the test case of Salvesen v Riddell and whether the AH(S)A 2003 was a 
disproportionate interference with the landowner’s rights under A1P1.1104 The cause célèbre of land 
reform is also arguably the most important decision relating to A1P1 in the UK.1105  
 
The final chapter of this thesis will consider what effect A1P1 has had on domestic property law, 
and will ask what lessons can be learned for the application and effect of A1P1 in the UK from 
the analysis relating to land law reform in Scotland. A critical question remains unanswered as to 
the true effect of A1P1 on domestic law. It is to be asked if A1P1 represents, as Wilson J suggested, 
a “reservoir of entitlement” for applicants who have lost out under domestic property law.1106  
 
While categorisation has its limits, this chapter will break down the potential effect of A1P1 into 
three distinct theories. The first is known as the “sceptical” or “mirror” theory. This holds that 
A1P1 preserves existing principles of domestic property law. To some, this extends to a positive 
obligation not to allow the ECHR to alter domestic law. The second is the theory of 
“displacement” or “subordination” under which A1P1 inherently limits domestic law. Under the 
displacement theory, A1P1 has displaced native rights to property and replaced these entitlements 
with the supra-national rights of the ECHR. The third theory offers a more nuanced (and 
complicated), appraisal of the application of A1P1 to domestic rights to property. The 
complementary theory forwards that A1P1 has come to exist within, or concurrently with, 
                                               
1102 J. Howell, “Human Rights Act 1998: Land, Private Citizens, and the Common Law” (2007) 123 Law Quarterly 
Review 618, 643.  
1103 Wilson (n 629). 
1104 Salvesen (UKSC) (n 11). 
1105 Ibid. 
1106 Pirabakaran v Patel [2006] EWCA Civ 685, [2006] 1 WLR 3112 [41]. 
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domestic law. The theory is, in practice, a complex mix of the first two. It holds that, in certain 
circumstances, A1P1 mirrors domestic law or offers a less effective remedy, but also that in others, 
it also engages and can influence, subordinate, or inherently limit domestic law. While the first two 
theories offer a relatively straightforward binary view on the effect of A1P1 in domestic law, the 
third does not really answer the critical questions for litigators, the judiciary, and the legislature, of 
when exactly A1P1 is engaged in a manner that inherently limits domestic law. Instead, it simply 
concludes that this is an indeterminate question. The problem of determining when A1P1 
inherently limits domestic law, is in practice, a labyrinth of possibility for which there is no 
discernible verifiable and repeatable mathematical proof. However, the legal system cannot work 
in the abstract.  
 
Whether A1P1 significantly alters domestic law remains disputed.1107 The answer to this question, 
while initially appearing quite distant from the raison d’être of this thesis, has significant 
consequences. The extension of fundamental rights into what was traditionally a private law matter 
among largely non-state actors’ risks, in the words of Gerstenberg, “a sweeping judicial usurpation 
of legislative prerogatives in determining the boundaries of spheres of private autonomy, thereby 
displacing or even overriding the policy choices of [the] statutory legislator”.1108 There can be little 
doubt that much of the often-forceful rhetoric surrounding the effect of A1P1 on contemporary 
reforms has centred on A1P1 curtailing the ability of the Scottish Parliament to legislate freely on 
an issue in relation to which it believes it has a democratic mandate.1109  If A1P1 mirrors existing  
private law principles, then the conception of public law usurping the Scottish Ministers 
programme of progressive land reform is misplaced. However, as this chapter will show that the 
relationship between private law and public law is exponentially more complex.  
 
 
6.2 THE MIRROR THEORY  
 
The “mirror” theory holds that Convention rights replicate existing principles of private law. This 
is part of the truism that statute and the private law have long-protected human rights. As Lord 
Denning asserted while addressing the House of Lords prior to the passing of the HRA: “we have 
                                               
1107 Howell, “Human Rights Act 1998: Land, Private Citizens, and the Common Law” (n 1027) 643. 
1108 O. Gerstenberg, “Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement” (2004) 10 European Law Journal 
766, 769; Collins (n 493).  
1109 SP, OR, RACCE, 7 October 2015, col. 10. 
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no need for them [Convention rights] to be written down in this country. The judges have been 
able to protect them by their decisions”.1110  
 
It is obvious that the ability of Scots law to protect rights to property did not start with the signing 
of A1P1 or the enactment of the HRA and the creation of Convention rights. To the Institutional 
writer Erskine, ownership entailed “the right of using and disposing of a subject as our own, except 
in so far as we are retrained by law or paction”.1111 The Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1995 
asserted that the incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law was to be firmly based on “Scottish 
traditions and values”.1112 The question is whether the principles developed by the ECtHR 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis differ drastically from the traditional concepts of rights 
to property in Scots law or, instead, mirror existing entitlement.  
 
There is jurisprudence that points towards A1P1 simply replicating private law. Sullivan J, in the 
English case of Tesco v Secretary of State, was “not persuaded that either the Convention or the 
principle of proportionality add any new dimension to the pre-Convention jurisprudence”.1113 
Harrison J followed in another English case this apparent indifference to Convention rights in 
Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Secretary of State.1114 In Carroll v Scottish Borders Council, the Court of 
Session considered the approach to be taken, in a planning law context, when a court scrutinises 
a discretionary decision delegated to a statutory body.1115 In Carroll, this concerned the grant of 
planning permission for wind turbines. Lord Menzies, sitting in an Extra Division of the Inner 
House, placed importance on the Scottish Planning Series Circular 4/2009.1116 To Lord Menzies, 
“[p]roportionality is achieved in our planning system if the decision maker properly takes account 
of the public interest and the rights of the individual. Neither EU nor Convention law adds to this 
– the question remains, have the decision makers done what they ought to have done?”1117 Carroll 
was cited with approval in Coastal Regeneration Alliance Limited v Scottish Ministers and Scottish Power 
                                               
1110 HL Deb, 6 July 1960, vol. 224, col. 1195. 
1111 Erskine, Institute, Book II, 1, 1. 
1112 Scottish Constitutional Convention, Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right (Edinburgh: Convention on Scottish Local 
Authorities 1995) p. 20. 
1113 Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000) 80 P & CR 427, 749 (HC).  
1114 R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 
323 [35].  
1115 Carroll v Scottish Borders Council [2015] CSIH 73, 2016 SC 377.  
1116 Ibid [20].  
1117 Ibid [32].  
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Generation Limited, where Sheriff Ross, sitting in Edinburgh, considered the application for a 
community right to buy two plots of land in East Lothian near the old Cockenzie power plant.1118 
In Coastal Regeneration Alliance Ltd Sheriff Ross noted that the court was invited to accept that this 
[Lord Menzies in Carroll] was the correct approach in a land registration context. The applicable 
principles are similar, and there is no persuasive basis (and none was suggested) to distinguish 
between a planning context and a land registration context.1119 If the reasoning of Lord Menzies 
and Sheriff Ross are followed to their logical conclusion, public law in the form of Convention 
rights have done little more than mirror existing private law rights.  
 
If one takes a tunnel vision approach to A1P1 the serving of a notice to quit on the holder of an 
agricultural tenancy is an interference with the tenant’s rights to property under A1P1 and also 
most likely their rights under Article 8. The tenant held a “possession”, and that possession has 
been deprived. The agricultural tenant has the right to his private life, family and correspondence. 
This has been interfered with. However, A1P1 cannot in this example inherently limit private law 
and change the terms of the lease or partnership. This is an example of the enforcement of a pre-
existing legal right, and not a shift or transfer of a right. In such instances, Lees would hold that, 
where Convention rights protect pre-existing legal rights (the tenant was always subject to the 
partnership agreement), there cannot be an interference within the meaning of A1P1 and Article 
8.1120  
The early apprehension to engage with A1P1 can be observed in Wilson v First County Trust Ltd 
(No. 2) where the House of Lords overturned a declaration of incompatibility by the Court of 
Appeal.1121 The case concerned an improperly executed consumer credit agreement in relation to 
a pawned BMW convertible. Lord Hope observed that A1P1: 
 
… does not confer a right of property as such, nor does it guarantee the content of any 
rights in property. What it does instead is to guarantee the peaceful enjoyment of the 
possessions that a person already owns, of which a person cannot be deprived except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law.1122  
                                               
1118 Coastal Regeneration Alliance Ltd v Scottish Ministers 2016 GWD 29-523 (Sh Ct). 
1119 Ibid [43]; Carroll (n 1115).  
1120 Lees (n 26) 35. 
1121 Wilson (n 629) [106]. 
1122 Ibid. 
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It is a matter for domestic law to define the nature and extent of any rights which a party 
acquires from time to time as a result of the transactions which he or she enters into. One 
must, of course, distinguish carefully between cases where the effect of the relevant law is 
to deprive a person of something that he already owns and those where its effect is to 
subject his right from the outset to the reservation or qualification which is now being 
enforced against him. The making of a compulsory order or of an order for the division 
of property on divorce are examples of the former category. In those cases, it is the making 
of the order, not the existence of the law under which the order is made, that interrupts 
the peaceful enjoyment by the owner of his property. The fact that the relevant law was 
already in force when the right of property was acquired is immaterial, if it did not have 
the effect of qualifying the right from the moment when it was acquired.1123 
 
The result was that while the House of Lords accepted that there had been an interference under 
A1P1, the court should give greater weight to the decision of parliament and the underlying 
purpose of the regulatory framework, as to do otherwise would have weakened consumer 
protection. Further, Lord Hope placed significance on the fact that the agreement was entered 
into improperly. Therefore, it was always subject to the restrictions on its execution under the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974.1124 Similarly, in Aston Cantlow, Lord Hope held that a chancel repair 
liability was an incident of ownership, and so the enforcement of the liability could not amount to 
an A1P1 interference with possession.1125 It is reasonable to conclude that, in many instances, 
A1P1 has been held to mirror private law. This is especially the case where the property right is 
from its creation subject to a specific risk of interference, such as through a tenancy agreement. In 
such instances, there can be no interference with A1P1 when the potential interference 
crystallises.1126  
 
There is therefore evidence that, in many instances, A1P1 mirrors private law. To use a metaphor, 
private law and public law become like two identical semi-detached houses standing together. They 
support each other’s overall structure, but a partition wall means that you cannot walk freely from 
one to another. However, to a purchaser, the division is largely irrelevant as the two houses are 
                                               
1123 Ibid. 
1124 Ibid [107].  
1125 Aston Cantlow (n 352). 
1126 Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (n 25) p. 234.  
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pari passu. The problem with the application of the mirror theory across the broad spectrum of 
property law is that it would render A1P1 little more than a box-ticking exercise, and the semi-
detached house signposted “private law/domestic law” is automatically preferred, leaving the 
house marked “public law” unable to develop a meaningful character of its own.  The difficulty 
that mirror theory faces is that there are examples when A1P1 has been innovatively applied by 
the Supreme Court to allow for a remedy that is only possible because of A1P1.1127 In doing so, 
the courts have smashed the image of two perfectly replicate semi-detached houses, and as such it 
is difficult to hold that public law simply mirrors private and domestic law.  
 
6.3 DISPLACEMENT AND SUBORDINATION THEORY  
 
The HRA resulted in concerns that “superimposed” Convention rights would come to inherently 
limit and, as a result, radically alter domestic property law.1128 The “displacement” or 
“subordination” theory holds that private law is subservient to Convention rights to the extent 
that public law and human rights have come to exclusively govern relationships that were 
traditionally the domain of private law. Fundamental rights thus do not simply influence private 
law; They govern private law, thereby enjoying priority over private law values.1129 As already noted, 
the HRA imposes duties on public authorities in domestic law, reflecting the obligations 
undertaken by the UK under international law by its ratification of the ECHR. It did so by creating 
“Convention rights” as a counterpart of the rights guaranteed under international law by the 
ECHR.1130 The purpose of the HRA is to give effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the 
ECHR; the domestic rights created by the HRA are interpreted by reference to the corresponding 
rights under the ECHR.1131 
 
Taken to its extremes, displacement theory holds that Convention rights have full, or direct 
horizontality, and the courts are “required to create appropriate rights and remedies by revising 
the common law to protect Convention rights subject only to the limitation that a clear statute 
must prevail”.1132 This was forwarded by Sir William Wade to whom the Convention should have 
                                               
1127 Mott (UKSC) (n 688); Salvesen (UKSC) (n 11). 
1128 Carey-Miller (n 827). 
1129 O. Cherednychenko, “Fundamental rights and private law: A relationship of subordination or complementarity?” 
(2007) 3 Utrecht Law Review 3. 
1130 Murdoch and Reed (n 62) p. 1 
1131 S and Marper (n 64). 
1132 I. Leigh, “Horizontal Rights” (1999) 48 International & Comparative Quarterly 57, 86. 
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“full operation in the sphere of private rights”.1133 To Wade, the state, as manifest in the courts, is 
required to act in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights.1134 
 
The primary argument against the application of constitutional human rights in private law is that 
recognition of these rights in relationships between private individuals will deeply harm human 
rights themselves, primarily the individual’s autonomy of will.1135 For example, the risk is that 
human rights could come to invalidate contracts that would be valid under domestic contract law. 
This could introduce an unacceptable level of indeterminacy and seriously limit the individual’s 
right to freedom of contract. The counter-argument, as posited by MacDonald, is that: 
The most grievous and most frequent abuses of civil liberties occur in the exercise of 
private power. The occasions for discriminatory state action are both comparatively few 
and subject to relatively formalized procedures for their exercise, when contrasted with an 
employer’s power to dismiss, a landlord’s power to exclude the needy, or an entrepreneur’s 
refusal to provide services.1136 
To others “the relationship between private parties must be regulated, as it has been from time 
immemorial, by private law”.1137 There are several theoretical justifications for direct statutory 
horizontality. The Dutch academic van Dam asserts that human rights and private law (in his 
example, tort law), protect the same fundamental rights.1138 There is a certain merit to this, but it 
cannot be ignored that private law has developed to govern relationships between theoretically 
equal individuals. Human rights have developed, in response, to curtail the state’s coercive 
monopoly on violence.  
Proponents of direct statutory horizontality can be observed throughout Continental Europe, but 
a note of caution is necessary.1139 First: the UK remains a dualist state, and this must be preserved; 
second: the HRA does not incorporate Article 13 of the ECHR which provides that everyone 
                                               
1133 W. Wade, “Horizons of Horizontality” (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 217. 
1134 Ibid. 
1135 Barak (n 771) p. 35.  
1136 R. MacDonald, “Postscript and Prelude – The Jurisprudence of the Charter: Eight Theses (1982) 4 Supreme Court 
Law Review 321, 347.  
1137 Barak (n 771) p. 18.  
1138 C. van Dam, European Tort Law (Oxford: OUP 2013) p. 223. 
1139 M. Kumm, “Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the 
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whose rights have been violated “shall have an effective remedy before a national authority”.1140 
The ECHR and HRA do not envisage horizontal effect in their wording.1141 Further, direct 
horizontality is problematic as there are no specific remedies available against a judicial decision 
that fails to protect a Convention right and which is arguably an unlawful act of a public body.  
Lord McCluskey famously feared the potential “disruption” caused by the domestic application of 
the ECHR to the Scottish judiciary would be “a field day for crackpots, a pain in the neck for 
judges and legislators, and a gold mine for lawyers”.1142 The ECHR is an odd institution in many 
ways, with its fair share of problems. There can be little doubt that the UK has always had an 
uneasy relationship with the Council. Whether it is prisoner voting,1143 human rights on the 
battlefield, or the attempted deportation of radical clerics,1144 politicians and certain corners of the 
media have done astonishingly well at distorting the public perception of the HRA. In response to 
the Hirst decision, Foreign Secretary Liam Fox asserted that the decision was “an outrageous 
decision and a perfect example of how Europe is intruding in areas of our national life where it 
has no business”.1145 Laws LJ asserted that the HRA has pushed the judges into the field of political 
decision and that the result has been a failure to keep control of the proper place of human 
rights”.1146  
The application of A1P1 to land law reform in Scotland is somewhat peculiar in this regard. 
Especially since the decision in Salvesen, the same criticisms cited by Liam Fox and Laws LJ have 
been asserted by those who would normally be expected to extoll the virtues of the ECHR.1147 
Critics and politicians like to hold A1P1 up as unjustly protecting individual entitlement at the 
expense of the Scottish Ministers’ ability to legislate freely.1148 The potentially limiting effect of 
A1P1 on contemporary Scots rights to buy through the compensation requirement (as discussed 
early in this thesis) highlights the potential for Convention rights to limit the ability of democratic 
institutions to carry out their functions. The counter argument is obvious, but perhaps not suitably 
                                               
1140 ECHR Article 13.  
1141 Lees (n 26) 35.  
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1143 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41. 
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1145 E. Voeten, “The Politics of International Judicial Appointments” (2007) 61 International Organisation 669, 669.  
1146 J. Law, The Common Law and Europe: Hamlyn Lecture III (Cambridge: CUP 2013) para. 23.  
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articulated. Human rights law is designed to curtail the legislative ability of states, as they evolved 
as a direct response to centuries of individuals’ rights being abused by the state. The rights are 
universal, and their protection stops despotic interferences by the state and preserves the individual 
in the face of the potential tyranny of the majority. However controversial the decision in Salvesen, 
Lord Hope was undoubtedly correct to assert that, “as a minority group landlords, however 
unpopular, are as much entitled to the protection of the Convention rights as anyone else”.1149 
To return to the semi-detached houses metaphor above, the displacement theory in essence holds 
that the walls have been knocked through and we are left with only one single occupancy house 
that inhabits the entire structure. In essence, this constitutes Lord Neuberger’s conception of a 
“grand unifying theory”,1150 or what Collins describes as “a single source theory of the structure of 
a legal system”.1151  
6.4 COMPLEMENTARY  
What this thesis has termed the “complementary theory” is the most difficult of the three theories 
to explain in a succinct manner. This is close to the German constitutional law concept that human 
rights have an “Ausstrahlungswirkung” (radiating or rippling effect), on the entire legal system.1152 
The complementary theory indicates that Convention rights are important within the existing 
hierarchy of rights, but do not negate the role of private law. Thus, while Convention rights 
influence private law, private relationships are still left to be primarily governed by the norms of 
private law.1153  
The extent of the complementary theory is often determined by the question of whether the 
Convention rights have “strong” or “weak” indirect horizontal effect. The radiating effect of A1P1 
may influence judicial reasoning, although exactly when A1P1 as a complementary right “bites” 
and influences and (or) determines the outcomes of a dispute between parties, and (or) determines 
the manner of judicial reasoning, is more difficult to explain. This is beyond simply an indirect 
                                               
1149 Salvesen (UKSC) (n 11) [38].  
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CUP, 2011) p. xiii. 
1151 Collins (n 493) p. 19  
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acknowledgement that Convention rights exist or accrediting existing domestic conceptions of 
rights to property to A1P1. 
In HM Advocate v Montgomery, Lord Justice-General Rodger, sitting the High Court of Justiciary, 
observed that “it would be wrong… to see the rights under the European Convention as somehow 
forming a wholly separate stream in our law; in truth, they soak through and permeate the areas 
of our law in which they apply”.1154 The ordinary approach therefore places an obligation on the 
domestic courts to start with domestic law, the starting point being native legal principles rather 
than the judgments of the international court.1155 The complementary theory holds that it is a 
mistake to assume that, because an issue appears to fall within the ambit of the ECHR, it 
automatically follows that the legal analysis should be confined to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
and the HRA. Correctly understood, Convention rights do not form a detached body of domestic 
law originating in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.1156 
 
While domestic law in most instances mirrors the ECHR, there are instances where it fails to 
adequately reflect the requirements the UK must fulfil under its international obligations and (or) 
the obligations imposed by the HRA. The HRA has allowed for several additional mechanisms 
that allow public authorities to act in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights. The 
HRA is clearly a significant part of the UK’s constitutional landscape. However, as Lord Reed 
observed in R (Osborn) v Parole Board, it does not supersede the protection of human rights under 
the domestic law or statute or create a discrete body of law based upon the judgments of the 
ECtHR. Human rights continue to be protected by our domestic law, interpreted and developed 
in accordance with the HRA when appropriate.1157 
 
It appears reasonable to submit that rights to property, and the UK’s international obligations as 
a party to the ECHR, should be primarily protected through the existing principles of domestic 
law. However, it does not follow that the domestic law in all instances mirrors ECHR law. The 
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1155 Osborn (n 389) [62].  
1156 Ibid [63]. 
1157 Ibid [57].  
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HRA provides additional tools to allow for more “heroic surgery” to be carried out by the 
courts.1158 If the change is significant, then the heroics should be left to democratic institutions.1159 
 
An example of “heroic surgery” can be observed in the domestic law in relation to privacy.1160  
While the common law does not recognise a general tort (delict) of privacy, Article 8 explicitly 
contains the right for private and family law.1161 While it appears that the courts are not willing to 
accept that the HRA has created new private law rights and obligations, it has become apparent 
that the values that underpin fundamental rights have come to influence domestic law.  
Guidance on how the courts hope to approach these questions is apparent in the reasoning in the 
House of Lords’ decision in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspaper Ltd.1162 In this case, the well-known 
model Naomi Campbell was photographed exiting a drug rehabilitation clinic, despite having 
previously publicly denied attending such facilities. Campbell claimed for breach of confidence 
and a breach of privacy. In a 3:2 majority (Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman, dissenting) the 
Appellate Committee held that there had been a violation of Campbell’s right to privacy. Some 
Justices turned to tort law or “old” law.1163 To Lord Nicholls, “The common law or, more precisely, 
courts of equity have long afforded protection to the wrongful use of private information by means 
of the cause of action which became known as breach of confidence”.1164 Baroness Hale observed 
in Campbell that “The [HRA] does not create any new cause of action between private persons. But 
if there is a relevant cause of action applicable, the court as a public authority must act compatibly 
with both parties’ Convention rights”.1165 By not giving automatic precedence to the right to 
freedom of expression, domestic courts have underscored that, while judges are required to 
consider Convention rights, they do not have automatic priority over domestic law.  
A useful metaphor was given by Lord Denning in Bulmer Ltd v Bollinger, when he observed that the 
principles of EU Law were “like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It 
                                               
1158 R. Reed “Human Rights and Domestic Legal Traditions” in Anderson, Chalmers and MacLeod (eds) Glasgow 
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cannot be held back, Parliament has decreed that the Treaty is henceforward to be part of our 
law”.1166 Sedley LJ, speaking in 1999, suggested that the HRA deserved its own metaphor — the 
ECHR should perhaps be viewed as a dye which will colour the fabric of our law except in those 
places where the fabric is impervious to it.1167 The problem remains the indeterminacy of when 
the dye soaks into domestic law and when domestic law is impervious. The result is that human 
rights in their current form are limited to a rather unwieldy means of identifying objectively gross 
and disproportionate violations.  
 
This dye has soaked through the entire legislative process at Holyrood. Chapter two noted that 
the Scottish Ministers and public bodies must undertake their functions in a manner that is 
compatible with Convention. Similarly, the Secretary of state may make an order prohibiting the 
Presiding Officer from submitting a Bill for Royal Assent if it contains provisions which they have 
reasonable ground to believe would be incompatible with international obligations.1168 The 
influence of Convention rights is observable throughout the drafting of the rights to buy and the 
work of the Scottish Land Commission.1169  
 
The complimentary theory faces several important challenges. Arguably the most significant is the 
fundamental difference between the values and theoretical basis of Convention rights when 
juxtaposed against the values that have shaped private law.1170 To Dworkin, public law rights are 
“clubs” or “trumps” that allow the individual protection against the coercive abuse of the state.1171 
Whereas to Collins, private law rights are “diamonds to be traded with other or discarded by 
choice”.1172  
 
6.4.1 THE COMPLEMENTARY THEORY ASSIMULATION  
 
The law of equity is alien to the Scots lawyer, so to compare the effect of human rights law in 
private law to the relationship between the English common law and equity poses a certain set of 
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challenges. Despite this, it is submitted that the debates over whether equity and the common law 
should be assimilated offers a useful lens through which to consider the relationship between 
Convention rights and private law.1173 
 
In very rough terms, equity is a system based on the conscience of the rights holder. Equitable 
remedies are said to concern fairness and justice between parties. However, this does not mean 
that all the principles of the common law achieve unfairness or injustice.1174 Human rights are said 
to protect the rights of the individual against the state and are rhetorically justified on the same 
grounds of justice and fairness. Students of English law are accustomed to the phrase “the position 
is different in equity”. If we are to proceed on the assumption that A1P1 complements domestic 
property law, the question is when, if ever, is it correct to state that “the position is different under 
the HRA”. Put succinctly, when can it be said that Convention rights intervene when the rigidity 
of the common law does not allow for a remedy that conforms to the principles contained in the 
ECHR and, in doing so, come to inherently limit the common law?  
 
There is a limit to this argument as the UK is a dualist state. The purpose of the HRA was to fuse 
the principles of the ECHR in domestic law through the creation of Convention rights. Further, 
to describe something as traditional common law or domestic rights, can mean the law prior to 
the enactment of the HRA in 2000, or principles that are considered to have a native origin. 
However, as was already discussed even prior to the HRA, there was a general presumption in 
favour of interpreting the law in a manner that was compatible with the ECHR. Added to this is 
the reality that many of the rights contained in the ECHR have long been protected by the 
common law. A controversial question to ask is whether the HRA fused the duties of the judiciary 
to follow so far as possible the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, but in practice this did not fuse the 
substantive law, and Convention rights and the common law continue to operate in separate 
spheres.   
In Scotland we lack the equivalent of the famous Earl of Oxford’s case, where the principle that 
equity takes precedence over the common law was established.1175 The problem is that there does 
appear to be a disconnect between the Court of Session and the Supreme Court as to the correct 
starting point. For example, the Inner House in Salvesen v Riddell started their analysis with the 
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traditional tools of statutory interpretation.1176 The Inner House only turned to the question of 
legislative competence and Convention rights as a secondary issue. This focus on the traditional 
canons of construction as the primary interpretative tools appears to be uniform across the 
Scottish judiciary.1177 As Lord Drummond Young recently observed in the Inner House decision 
of McMaster v Scottish Ministers:  
Before the Convention can operate, it is first necessary to ascertain what the parties’ 
domestic rights and obligations are and, in a case such as the present, how those rights and 
obligations have been affected by domestic legislation.1178 
The issue is that the Supreme Court in Salvesen began its analysis with the issue of compatibility 
with Convention rights.1179 Thus, there appears to be a disconnect between the interpretative tools 
used in the Court of Session and those used in the Supreme Court.   
As was discussed in relation to the mirror theory, is it clear that this position is not different when 
considering pre-existing rights.1180 Where the property has always been subject to the possibility of 
interference, no interference can materialise if this possibility crystallises and becomes a reality.1181 
A1P1 appears to have the ability to inherently limit domestic law where a statutory provision has 
modified an existing right to property. For example, in the 2018 Supreme Court decision in Mott v 
Environment Agency, it was the fact that the Environment Agency had changed Mr Mott’s existing 
rights to property by imposing a limit on his leasehold interests in salmon fishing between 2012 
and 2014 which was central to the Court’s decision.1182 This was held to be a violation of A1P1, as 
this modification was not accompanied with the payment of compensation.1183 If the catch limit 
had always been part of Mr Mott’s leasehold interest, it is unlikely that he would have been able to 
determine that the limit constituted an interference under A1P1, as this would have been part of 
a contractual obligation he had accepted, even though the interference (the limit on his catch), 
which was held in Mott to be incompatible with A1P1, would have been the same.  The key point 
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appears where an individual’s rights to property is interfered with, but they have not given express 
or tacit agreement to this interference in the normal realms of private law, and the interference is 
held not to satisfy the six point test discussed above.  
 
It has already been submitted that property in land is best considered akin to a liability rule that 
entitles a landowner to a monetary payment. While a circular argument would hold that this means 
that all rights are therefore subject to interference, what we are looking at instead is a change in 
the nature of a right since its original acquisition. This change cannot be one that has already been 
expressly agreed to, for example through the form of a lease or contract, but instead denotes a 
change in character resulting from an act of a public body. This means that A1P1 is engaged by 
Scots rights to buy, as when an individual’s land is subject to an application to buy, or is placed in 
the register, the content of the owner’s rights to property have been altered. This alteration is the 
result of the community, crofting community, or agricultural tenant utilising Acts of the Scottish 
Parliament.  
 
6.5 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS  
 
There can be little doubt that the application of human rights has reached the “heartlands of 
private law”.1184 However, this does not mean that domestic law in its entirety has become 
inherently limited by Convention rights. The importance of the rights protected in the ECHR 
should not be in doubt, but in practice, their protection in the UK did not start with the drafting 
of the ECHR or the enactment of the HRA. Human rights have long been protected in some form 
in domestic law and continue to be protected. Some scholars are quick to claim that human rights 
values have always been intrinsic in private law, as the basis of the private law structure are human 
rights standards such as individual autonomy and dignity.1185 While this may be partially true, a 
note of caution is necessary, as this is to pick and choose from history. The development of 
property law, particularly the private ownership of land, has arguably not been grounded just in 
individual autonomy and dignity, but has also preserved power and class structure. As Linklater 
asserted, “[t]he idea of individual, exclusive ownership, not just of what can be carried or occupied, 
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but of the immovable, near-eternal earth, has proved to be the most destructive and creative 
cultural force in written history”.1186 
 
The HRA did not create a new or discrete body of case law based solely upon the judgments of a 
supranational court. Instead, domestic law has been developed in accordance with existing 
principles and values. If “heroic surgery” is required to remedy a deficiency in domestic law, then 
to remain compliant with the UK’s international obligations, domestic law may become inherently 
limited. The role of the ECtHR to act as a guiding hand remains pivotal.1187 However, it must not 
be forgotten that land lawyers are private lawyers, and thus the majority of land law regulates the 
legal relationship between individuals and rights to property. Public law and human rights law have 
not swallowed up private law. 
The realisation that the application of A1P1 is not observable in a binary fashion leaves the hanging 
question of in what circumstances it can be correct to state that “the position is different under 
the HRA”.  The risk is that litigators and the courts are left like night watchmen looking out for 
icebergs (Convention rights), without realising that the principles of domestic law should resolve 
the dispute. Or, on the contrary these parties find themselves stuck in domestic law to try and 
resolve their predicament. This risks a false sense of complacency, that domestic property law is 
compliant, results in interpretations that later transpire to be incompatible with Convention 
rights.1188 Further, there is the risk of “double accounting”, where the inability to determine 
whether Convention rights are applicable to what would have traditionally been a private law 
dispute, results in protracted proceedings as the parties attempt to rely on public law and private 
law rights that simply mirror the same principle. The submission that pre-existing rights cannot 
engage A1P1 is borne out in domestic case law, but it still does not give a definitive answer as to 
when A1P1 has the ability to inherently limit domestic laws.  
 
The result is that it is not possible to produce a verifiable proof in which the substantive hierarchy 
between Convention rights and private rights is discernible. Instead, this is left to the judiciary 
when dealing with submissions. The problem is that domestic courts have shown a determination 
to avoid direct discussion of the relationship between private law and Convention rights.  
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7 CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
 
This thesis has examined the application and effect of A1P1, within the wider human rights 
paradigm, to the contemporary community, crofting, and agricultural rights to buy in Scotland.  In 
doing so, it has filled a notable gap in the available literature and added a level of impartiality that 
has been largely absent from the current discourse.   
 
The aims of this thesis were: (i) to question why Scotland is undertaking a process of distributive 
land reform and to understands the legislative methods used; (ii) to determine what rights, and 
whose rights, are engaged; (iii) to trace the development of A1P1 and set out a framework within 
which questions of compatibility can be determined, before critiquing the fitness of this 
framework; (iv) to apply the framework of A1P1 to Scots rights to buy to determine whether 
contemporary reforms are compatible with the Scottish Ministers devolved competencies and to 
see what lessons this gives on the application and effectiveness of A1P1; and, (v) to consider what 
effect A1P1 has had on domestic law and to consider the vexed question of when, if ever, can the 
application of A1P1 result in a remedy that would not have been available to the applicant.  
 
7.1 CHAPTER ONE: THE LAND QUESTION AND LAND REFORM  
 
The first objective of this thesis was to consider why the Scottish Government was instituting a 
program of land law reform. Chapter one concluded that the driving force behind contemporary 
reforms can be reduced to four primary factors: first, the rhetoric of historical injustice; second, 
absentee ownership and tax avoidance; third, the high concentration of ownership; and fourth, an 
ideology of egalitarianism.  Part 2 of chapter one then set out six rights to buy enacted by the 
Scottish Government.  It was submitted that Scotland is serving as a particularly useful lens 
through which to analyse the relationship between human rights and property law. This is because 
property as a human right has come to be scrutinised at a political level that is not observable in 
the rest of the UK.  
 
7.2 CHAPTER TWO: WHAT RIGHTS AND WHOSE RIGHTS 
 
The second objective of this thesis was to locate the right to property. Chapter two illustrated that 
any Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as it is incompatible with any of the Convention 
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rights.1189 Members of the Scottish Government have no power to make any subordinate 
legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with Convention 
Rights.1190 It was submitted that when carrying out functions of a public nature, this requirement 
extends to crofting and community bodies.  
 
This chapter submitted that the Scottish Ministers have the devolved competencies to make 
reference to the ICESCR and other relevant non-convention rights. However, while socio-
economic rights may be justiciable, the Scottish Ministers’ inclusion of the ICESCR into its 
definition of “other rights” does not constitute an implementation by domestic legislation. It was 
argued that if circumstances were to arise in which more than one compatible interpretation of 
A1P1 was open to the Scottish Ministers, they would be required, in choosing between those 
options, to have regard to relevant non-convention rights. Despite this, it was asserted that this 
does not allow for the limiting or reinterpretation of A1P1 to the extent that such an interpretation 
is incompatible with the A1P1.   
 
7.3 CHAPTER THREE: ARTICLE 1 OF THE FIRST PROTOCOL  
 
The third objective of this thesis was to consider how to interpret A1P1. Chapter three approached 
the often-conflicting jurisprudence of the ECtHR through the organising structure of six distinct 
tests. It illustrated the broad category of individuals that will constitute a victim. It noted how the 
ECtHR has given “possession” an autonomous meaning and thus domestic courts have to 
disassociate possession from its normal domestic use. It proceeded to outline the three rules in 
Sporrong: interference, deprivation, and control of use. The primary determinant factor for 
categorisation in Strasbourg appears to be the requirement of compensation. Chapter three then 
considered the tests when A1P1 is prima facie engaged. It noted how interferences must be “lawful”, 
which the ECtHR has interpreted as requiring domestic law to be sufficiently accessible, precise 
and foreseeable. Chapter three outlined the public interest test and noted the wide margin of 
appreciation given to member states, bordering on a fourth instance interpretation. As such, the 
public interest test as a standard of review is a paper tiger. The final, and most important standard 
of review is the proportionality requirement. This thesis chose to take a rule-based approach 
(matching the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court) and broke down proportionality into a four-
                                               
1189 SA 1998 s. 29.  
1190 Ibid s. 57. 
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part test. First, there must be a legitimate aim. Second, the measure adopted must be rationally 
connected to that aim. Third, it must be considered whether an aim could have been achieved by 
a less intrusive measure. Fourth, whether a fair balance has been achieved, often called results 
proportionality or stricto sensu. Central to the fair balance test is the principle of equivalence.  
 
7.4 CHAPTER FOUR: APPLY A1P1 TO CONTEMPORARY RIGHTS TO BUY  
 
It was submitted that a relatively broad category of claimants would satisfy the victim requirement. 
It was argued that the primary determining factor for determining whether an applicant held a 
“possession” within the meaning of A1P1 was the existence of an economic asset. In relation to 
Scots rights to buy this extends beyond landowners, but to anyone with an economic interest in 
land or related rights.  
 
It was shown how the categorisation of an interference will remain important to any application 
under A1P1 due to the presumption of compensation when a deprivation is established. It was 
submitted that the registration of a community right to buy, and the automatic registration of all 
AH(S)A 1991 tenancies for the tenant’s right to buy, constitutes a control of use. Further, it was 
shown, how when utilised, the rights to buy extinguish the landowner’s existing rights. As a result, 
this constitutes a deprivation under A1P1. The problem, as exemplified by the Supreme Court 
decision in Mott, and the Inner and Outer House decisions in McMaster, is determining the Rubicon 
that has to be passed for an interference to constitute a deprivation and not merely a control of 
use. The ECtHR jurisprudence appears to point towards the extinction of all rights relating to 
property, but the domestic courts point towards a standard that is closer to a loss of all beneficial 
use. It is hoped that the decision in McMaster will be appealed to the Supreme Court and some 
guidance will be given.  However, it was conceded that the exact point when a control becomes a 
deprivation will in many instances remain clouded in legal and political rhetoric.1191 
 
Chapter four argued that while the lawfulness requirement remains a preliminary hurdle, the 
Scottish Ministers are not given unlimited discretion. As such, questions remain over the meaning 
and application of several key terms. Chapter four also reiterated that the “public interest” test is 
synonymous with the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, and as such, it is highly unlikely that 
contemporary reforms will be held contrary to the “public interest” within the meaning of A1P1. 
                                               
1191 See McMaster v Scottish Ministers [2018] CSIH 64. On 18 September 2018 the Inner House refused to grant 
permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.  
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It was submitted that the poorly defined nature of community does pose the risk of a community 
right to buy being utilised for a wholly private purpose. However, it was conceded that the courts 
are unlikely to ever find there to have been an interference that is not in the public interest.  
 
It was submitted that the four-part proportionality test is where A1P1 has the ability to offer some 
bite. The first two stages of the proportionality standard require there to be a legitimate aim and 
that this aim is rationally connected to the interference with individual rights. These two stages 
remain tempered by the margin of appreciation and the domestic courts preference to give weight 
to democratic institutions. Utilising the two-tier approach of undertaking a macro-granular and 
micro-granular approach it was submitted that it is unlikely that the existing reforms will be held 
incompatible when undertaking a macro approach. For example, it is unlikely that the existing 
reforms will be held to not constitute a legitimate aim, and the domestic courts will be notably 
apprehensive to find that legislative measures are not rationally connected to a legitimate aim.  
 
The third rule requires the court to consider whether the ends sought could have been achieved 
by a less intrusive mechanism. It was shown how part three exposes the differing standards of 
review between Strasbourg and domestic courts. While the ECtHR will be loath to intervene, 
domestic courts, particularly relating to Acts of the Scottish Parliament, will be more likely to 
undertake a micro-granular review. It was submitted that parts 2 and 3 combined, impose a duty 
on the Scottish Ministers to rationalise their decisions to consent to a right to buy. The mirco-
granularity of the evidence considered by the court will be an important determining factor, 
particularly as the judiciary will consider the individual circumstances before it and mot merely the 
overall purpose of the legislation.   
 
The final part of the proportionality requirement requires a detailed micro-granular approach as 
the courts seek to balance of individual and collective rights. Central to this is the payment of 
compensation, as this is thought to redress the imbalance and inhibit one individual bearing an 
individual and excessive burden.  It was submitted that the principle of equivalence will serve as 
the primary limiting factor to the Scottish Ministers obtaining their goal of 1 million acres in 
community ownership in 2020. Chapter four then argued that A1P1 does not guarantee full 
compensation in all circumstances. As such, it was shown how a framework that takes into account 
the nature of the resource, the personhood value of the property, and the social context within 
which it is held could be used to reduce compensation below market value in very confined 
circumstances. However, it was argued that reducing compensation below market value would not 
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only risk constituting a violation of A1P1, but would undermine the land reform agenda and help 
to fuel the narrative that the Scottish Ministers are undertaking a land grab.  
 
It was submitted that the Scottish Ministers and judiciary, when considering the fair balance, 
should give weight to the relevant non-convention rights, particularly the ICESCR. It was argued 
that Scotland should turn to South African jurisprudence, where post-Apartheid constitutional law 
has focused on the indivisibility of human rights. This submission was made with the caveat that 
the weight given to the non-convention rights cited in the CE(S)A 2015 and the LR(S)A 2016 
cannot allow for the reinterpreting of the right to property to the extent that it is incompatible 
with A1P1.   
 
Chapter four concluded that the existing binary debate, that asks whether A1P1 will serve as a red 
card to contemporary rights to buy, fundamentally misunderstands how A1P1 works in practice. 
It was submitted that the broad margin of appreciation, and the weight given to democratic 
institutions in domestic law means that the legislation in its existing form is unlikely to be held 
incompatible with A1P1. The question to be determined by future case law is whether a particular 
right to buy can constitute a disproportionate interference under A1P1. It was submitted that this 
question will turn on the level mirco-granular evidence accepted by the Scottish Ministers and the 
circumstances of the individual(s) whose rights have been interfered with. Chapter four set out 
several potential flashpoints that are likely to arise, including questions of compensation and the 
potential that a right to buy will impose an individual and excessive burden on the landowner. The 
problem, as discussed in detail, is the multidimensional nature of competing claims to land and the 
risk of incommensurable values. The Scottish Ministers and judiciary cannot be expected to 
resemble Dworkin’s conception of the all-knowing judge Hercules. However, it is submitted that 
through a detailed rules-based approach to A1P1 they can attempt to undertake their decision 
making in an independent discretionary manner. If followed, correctly, A1P1 will act as a hurdle 
that prohibits the arbitrary use of the rights to buy. It will not, however, act as a red card to 
underlying public policy goal of progressive land reform.  
 
7.5 CHAPTER FIVE: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RIGHTS TO PROPERTY  
 
Chapter five considered what effect A1P1 has had on domestic property law. It was illustrated that 
the HRA did not create a new or discrete body of case law based solely upon the judgments of a 
supranational court. Instead, domestic law has been developed in accordance with existing 
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principles and values. If “heroic surgery” is required to remedy a deficiency, then to remain 
compliant with the UK’s international obligations, domestic law may become inherently limited. 
However, it must not be forgotten than land lawyers are private lawyers and thus the majority of 
land law regulates the legal relationship between individuals and rights to property. 
 
Instead, A1P1 has a pervasive influence on the entire workings of all public bodies and like a dye 
permeates the legislative process. By utilising the English experience concerning the possible 
assimilation of equity the question was posed “when is the position different under the HRA”. 
The answer to this determines when Convention rights have the ability to inherently limit domestic 
law, the problem is that there is only limited guidance.  
 
It was submitted that domestic law is impervious to the dye of A1P1 when considering pre-existing 
rights. Where the property has been always subject to the possibility of interference, no 
interference can materialise if this possibility crystallises and becomes a reality. A1P1 appears to 
have the ability to inherently limit domestic law where a statutory provision has modified an 
existing right to property.  
 
7.6 CONCLUDING POINTS  
 
This thesis has submitted that A1P1 should not be viewed as an open or shut gate to contemporary 
rights to buy. Instead, A1P1 should be conceptualised as more akin to a necessary hurdle. The 
merits of an application should be seen as six rules (blocks) that when placed on top of each other 
allow community, crofting community, and agricultural tenants to easily walk over the hurdle. The 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the weight given to democratic institutions means that 
several of these blocks, most notably the public interest requirement, are already firmly fixed in 
place. The second to last block requires the Scottish Ministers to rationalise their decision to allow 
a right to buy. The last block, will often be the most exacting and expensive block to add as it 
requires the payment of compensation. However, as was argued in chapter four, in certain very 
confined circumstances, compensation under A1P1 does not necessarily mean full compensation. 
The recognition that A1P1 does not exist in isolation does not alter the hurdle, but relevant non-
convention rights should be utilised as part of the establishment of the final proportionality block. 
Further, the Scottish Ministers lack the devolved competencies to remove the hurdle or reduce its 
height. The hurdle of A1P1 should not be ignored because it serves that justifiable purpose, 
prohibiting the arbitrary  
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